

# BEFORE THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD OF THE WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASSOCIATION

In re

#### **BAKARY FANSU CONTEH**

Lawyer (Bar No. 35098).

Proceeding No. 13#00112

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND HEARING OFFICER'S RECOMMENDATIONS

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND HEARING OFFICER'S RECOMMENDATIONS - 1

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Pursuant to Rule 10.13 of the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct ("ELC"), a hearing was held before the undersigned Hearing Officer on January 14 and 15, 2015.

Disciplinary counsel Debra Slater appeared for the Office of Disciplinary Counsel ("ODC") of the Washington State Bar Association. Respondent Bakary Fansu Conteh appeared *pro se*.

#### I. FORMAL COMPLAINT

Respondent was charged by formal complaint dated December 23, 2013, with 5 counts of violation of the rules of professional conduct. Counts 1-2 involve Respondent's representation of Ms. Saffie Badjie in an immigration matter. Counts 3-5 involve Respondent's representation of Mr. John Muthaka in a personal injury matter.

#### COUNT 1

By failing to file his appeal brief on time, and/or by failing to file a Motion to Accept Late-Filed Brief that complied with the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") rules, Respondent violated RPC 1.1 and/or RPC 1.3.

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#### COUNT 2

By failing to inform Ms. Badjie that he had filed his appeal brief after it was due, Respondent violated RPC 1.4.

#### **COUNT 3**

By failing to communicate the basis or rate of his fee to Mr. Muthaka, and/or by having a contingent fee agreement that was not in writing and/or did not communicate the information required under RPC 1.5(c)(2), Respondent violated RPC 1.5(b) and/or RPC 1.5(c).

#### **COUNT 4**

By failing to make reasonably diligent efforts to settle Mr. Muthaka's claim, by failing to protect Mr. Muthaka's interests by filing suit before the statute of limitations expired, and/or by failing to understand the significance of allowing the statute of limitations to expire, Respondent violated RPC 1.1 and RPC 1.3.

#### **COUNT 5**

By failing to keep Mr. Muthaka reasonably informed about the status of his claim, by failing to inform him when the statute of limitations would expire, and/or by failing to inform him that the statute of limitations had expired, Respondent violated RPC 1.4.

#### II. HEARING

At the hearing on January 14 and 15, 2015, six witnesses were sworn and presented testimony, and various exhibits were admitted into evidence. The transcript in this matter was received in late January, and post-hearing briefs and proposed finding of fact and conclusions of law were successfully received by mid-March.

#### III. FINDINGS OF FACT

After having considered the testimony of the witnesses and other exhibits, and having reviewed the post hearing written arguments of counsel and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer finds the following facts were established by a clear

preponderance of the evidence. ELC 10.14(b). The following findings regarding Counts 1 through 5 are based on the evidence presented at the hearing, specific exhibits or testimony reflected in the hearing record.

#### A. <u>Jurisdictional Facts.</u>

- 1. Respondent was admitted to practice law in Washington on June 21, 2004.
- 2. Respondent is a sole practitioner. More than 50% of his practice is in the area of immigration law. (TR 49). He also has a limited practice in family law and has done some very limited personal injury work (TR 49).

#### B. Findings of Fact Regarding Counts 1-2 of the Bar Complaint.

- 1. Saffie Badjie entered the United States in 2002 from the Gambia on a visitor visa and remained in the United States beyond the date authorized by her visa. (EX 106).
- 2. Concerned about Ms. Badjie's immigration status, Ms. Badjie's husband contacted Respondent in November 2008 about having him assist with her immigration matter. Ms. Badjie and her husband lived in Minnesota and had resided previously in Atlanta (TR 309), (TR 50-51).
- In January 2008, while travelling from Minnesota to Seattle, Ms. Badjie was arrested and detained by the United States Department of Homeland Security. Ms. Badjie then had her 11 month old United States Citizen daughter with her. She was placed in removal proceedings and issued a Notice to Appear at a date to be determined. (EX 106).
- 4. Ms. Badjie had previously received a letter from her mother that placed her in fear of returning to the Gambia. In the letter, her mother wanted to have Ms. Badjie's daughter subjected to female genital mutilation ("FGM"). (EX 107).
- 5. Respondent met with Ms. Badjie in January 2008. (TR 52).
- 6. Ms. Badjie had been subjected to FGM herself and did not want this for her daughter. Respondent advised her that this fear for her daughter, along with her own past persecution, gave Ms. Badjie a basis for seeking asylum. (TR 59-62, 311).
- 7. Respondent filed his Notice of Appearance in Ms. Badjie's case on April 20, 2009. (EX 109).
- 8. On November 12, 2009, Respondent filed an Application for Asylum on behalf of Ms. Badjie. (TR 68; EX 110).

- 9. On March 8, 2011, a Merits or Individual Hearing on Ms. Badjie's asylum case took place in the Immigration Court in Bloomington, Minnesota. Respondent represented Ms. Badjie at the hearing. Evidence was presented and testimony was taken. (TR 69).
- 10. On the same day, Immigration Judge Susan Castro delivered her oral decision denying Ms. Badjie's request for asylum and denying her request for voluntary departure. (TR 70; EX 115).
- 11. Respondent was present when the judge delivered her decision from the bench, including her reasoning, at the March 8, 2011 hearing and therefore knew the result of her decision and the reasons therefor. (TR 58).
- 12. Respondent received a copy of the Order of the Immigration Judge on the day of the hearing. The proof of service reflects that a copy was served on Respondent on March 8, 2011. (EX 116).
- 13. Following the hearing, Respondent and Ms. Badjie discussed the options available to her. Ms. Badjie decided to appeal the judge's decision. She hired Respondent to handle the appeal and agreed to pay him an additional \$1,500. (TR 71, 319).
- On March 25, 2011, Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal, EOIR Form 26 and Notice of Appearance with the BIA. (EX 116).
- 15. In item #8 of the Notice of Appeal, Respondent indicated that he intended to file a separate brief. Immediately below that statement, the following admonition appeared on the form:

WARNING: If you mark "Yes" in item #8, you will be expected to file a written brief or statement after you receive a briefing schedule from the Board. The Board may summarily dismiss your appeal if you do not file a brief or statement within the time set in the briefing schedule. (EX 116).

- 16. Respondent was aware of the warning when he signed the Notice of Appeal. (TR 73).
- 17. On April 6, 2011, the BIA sent Respondent an acknowledgement that it had received the appeal. The receipt contained the following language:

If you have any questions about how to file something at the Board, you should review the Board's <u>Practice Manual</u> at <u>www.justice.gov/eoir</u>. (EX 117).

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- 18. Respondent had access to the Practice Manual and was familiar with it. (TR 75).
- 19. The Practice Manual describes procedures, requirements, and recommendations for practice before the BIA. (EX 105, pg. 1).
- 20. The Practice Manual provides that the BIA date stamps all filings and strongly recommends that parties file as far in advance of the deadline as possible. (EX 105, pg. 31; TR 75).
- 21. The Practice Manual also states:

If a brief is untimely, it is rejected and returned to the party with an explanation for the rejection. Parties wishing to refile an untimely brief must file a motion asking the Board to accept the untimely brief and include documentary evidence to support their motion, including such evidence as affidavits and declarations under penalty of perjury. (EX 105, Ch. 3.1(c)(iii), pg. 32).

- 22. The BIA Practice Manual emphasizes the importance of timely filing of briefs. For example, "Briefs must arrive at the Board by the dates set in the briefing schedule," (EX 105, pg. 46, Sec. 4.2(e)). "Briefs must be timely." (EX 105, pg. 53, Sec. 4.6(a)). In non-detained cases, the appealing party has 21 calendar days to file their brief. If a brief is untimely, it is rejected. The Board may reject a brief as untimely at any time prior to the final adjudication of the appeal. (EX 105, pg. 60, Sec 4.7(a)(i) and (b)).
- On May 26, 2011, the BIA sent Respondent a "Notice-Briefing Schedule." The brief in Ms. Badjie's case was due on June 16, 2011. The briefing schedule contained a warning that the brief must be **RECEIVED** at the Board on or before that date. [emphasis in original]. There was also a warning that if the brief is not filed within the time set for filing in the briefing schedule, the appeal may be summarily dismissed. The Notice also stated that extensions of briefing time will only be granted for good cause, that it is the policy of the Board that no additional extensions will be granted. (EX 118).
- 24. The briefing schedule also refers to 8 CFR § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(E), which provides that an appeal may be summarily dismissed if a brief is not filed within the time set for filing. (EX 103).
- 25. Respondent knew of the BIA's requirements that briefs be timely filed. (TR 76-82).

- 38. The motion did not include affidavits or declarations as required by the BIA. Respondent testified that he knew that the Practice Manual stated that statements made in motions are not evidence. (TR 372).
- 39. In that motion, Respondent alleged that on July 6, 2011, the day before the brief was due, he had been "held up" in a bond hearing at the Immigration Court at the Detention Center in Tacoma, and he had been further delayed because of heavy traffic in Tacoma. He stated that he had attempted to send the brief by courier, but the "mails to the East Coast leave early in the afternoon." (EX 123).
- 40. The Immigration Judge Detainee Calendar shows that the hearing for Respondent's client, David Njenga, was scheduled to begin at 1:00 PM on July 6, 2011. (EX 132).
- 41. The Detention Center security procedures require visitors to the Detention Center, including attorneys, to sign in and be issued a pass and to sign out when finished. (TR 366).
- 42. The Attorney Visitation Log for July 6, 2011, shows that Respondent, who was assigned Pass #21, signed in on July 6, 2011, at 12:46 PM and signed out at 1:29 PM. Respondent spent a total of 43 minutes at the Detention Center. (EX 132).
- 43. Respondent had sufficient time to file the brief on or before July 6, 2011. His statement that he was delayed at the Detention Center is not credible and does not justify filing the brief late.
- 44. Respondent testified that he sent a copy of the brief and the motion to Ms. Badjie without any explanation. He testified that this was his ordinary practice and if Ms. Badjie had any questions, she would call him. (TR 373-374).
- 45. On August 23, 2012, Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for six months by the Washington State Supreme Court. Respondent sent a letter to Ms. Badjie notifying her of his suspension and advising her to seek new counsel. (EX 303; TR 320).
- 46. Ms. Badjie consulted with lawyer Elizabeth Holmes in August 2012. Ms. Badjie brought with her all of the documents she had received from Respondent, which she believed was her complete file. (TR 322).
- 47. Ms. Holmes telephoned the BIA's automated information system to obtain information about Ms. Badjie's case. Based on the information she obtained from the information system and the documents Ms. Badjie brought to her, Ms. Holmes concluded that the documents Ms. Badjie had provided her were not

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- 4. Respondent told Mr. Muthaka to get a copy of the police report, which he did. (TR 100).
- 5. The police report, which is dated October 30, 2009, clearly shows that the date of the collision was August 14, 2009. (EX 200).
- 6. Respondent admitted that Mr. Muthaka gave a copy of the police report to him. (TR 101, 127).
- 7. Respondent acknowledged that the police report reflects that the date of the collision was August 14, 2009. (TR 208).
- 8. Mr. Muthaka received a letter dated February 17, 2010, from Allstate Insurance, the insurer of the at-fault driver. The letter clearly also shows that the date of the loss was August 14, 2009. (EX 202).
- 9. Respondent admitted that Mr. Muthaka gave the letter to him. Respondent told Mr. Muthaka to continue with his medical treatment and he would handle the case for him. Mr. Muthaka thereby understood that Respondent was representing him in the matter. (TR 102, 209).
- 10. Respondent failed to enter into a written fee agreement with Mr. Muthaka, nor did he explain the basis or rate of his fee to him. Respondent told Mr. Muthaka that he would work with the insurance company and then he would tell him what his fee was when they received the insurance money. Respondent never sent Mr. Muthaka a billing statement for his services. (TR 102-103, 135-137).
- 11. Respondent initially testified at hearing that he told Mr. Muthaka that he would charge him on an hourly basis and when the case settled, they would work out "what payments will be done." (TR 214, 216).
- 12. Respondent later testified that his fee arrangement with Mr. Muthaka was a flat fee of \$3,000 plus an hourly component. (TR 223-224).
- 13. Respondent was deposed on August 16, 2013, as part of these disciplinary proceedings. At his deposition, Respondent testified that he and Mr. Muthaka did not have an exact fee agreement. He also testified that he told Mr. Muthaka that attorneys may charge up to 33 percent of the recovery and that 33 percent was the normal charge. Respondent also testified that it was his intention to charge some percentage of the recovery, but he and Mr. Muthaka had not agreed on the exact amount. Respondent further stated that if Mr. Muthaka did not recover anything, he would not have to pay Respondent anything. (TR 218-220; EX 406, pg. 19-22).

- Muthaka had filled out. The second page of the Authorization showed the date of loss was August 14, 2009. (EX 204).
- On July 13, 2010, Cindy Kinser sent Respondent an affidavit of theft to be filled out and returned. The affidavit would enable Allstate to establish the value of Mr. Muthaka's vehicle so they could make a settlement offer on the property damage aspect of the case. (TR 181).
- 27. Respondent did not return the affidavit to Allstate. On June 1, 2012, almost two years later, Ms. Kinser sent another affidavit to Respondent for Mr. Muthaka to complete. (EX 211).
- 28. On July 10, 2012, Allstate telephoned Respondent to ask questions about the vehicle to assist them in valuing Mr. Muthaka's car. Respondent did not return the call or provide the requested information. (TR 182; EX 206).
- 29. Allstate employees repeatedly telephoned Respondent and left messages with Respondent's staff or voice mail messages for Respondent to call them. Respondent did not return the calls. (EX 206).
- 30. On December 10, 2010, Respondent told Allstate employee Cindy Kinser that Mr. Muthaka was done treating and he would have a demand to them in 30 days. Ms. Kinser did not receive a demand and followed up on March 1, 2011, with a telephone message asking for a status update. Respondent did not get back to Ms. Kinser. (EX 206).
- 31. On April 22, 2011, Ms. Kinser followed up with a letter requesting an update. Ms. Kinser noted in the log that she had received no response to her prior attempts to reach Respondent. (EX 206, 207).
- 32. Ms. Kinser's December 8, 2011, entry in the Allstate log reflects her frustration in dealing with Respondent. She stated that she had been told for a year a demand is coming and that she either gets voicemail or if she sends a letter she gets no response. Ms. Kinser telephoned Respondent again and left a voice mail message. (EX 206).
- 33. On May 31, 2012, Ms. Kinser telephoned Respondent's office and spoke to Kingston. She told Kingston that a lawsuit had been filed by the second vehicle involved in the accident. (EX 206).
- 34. The claim report also shows that Allstate valued Mr. Muthaka's vehicle at \$2,427.81. (EX 206).

- to worry, that he was taking care of it, and he has a similar case and knows how it works. (TR 105-106).
- 47. Respondent testified that he knew the statute of limitation was three years. However, he did not advise Mr. Muthaka that the statute of limitation on his case would run on August 14, 2012. (TR 240-242).
- 48. Respondent testified that he mistook the date of his Notice of Appearance as the date of the accident and that he thought the statute would run in April 2013. (TR 27).
- 49. Even giving credence to this explanation, Respondent admitted he did not advise Mr. Muthaka that, by his own calculation, the statute of limitations would run in April 2013. (TR 238).
- 50. In his May 10, 2013, response to the grievance filed by Mr. Muthaka, Respondent explained that he was not certain that Mr. Muthaka's claim was barred even though he knew it was outside the August 2012 date, because there were other actions and that joinder was possible. He testified that he did legal research on this issue by searching Yahoo. (TR 247-248).
- 51. Respondent sent Mr. Muthaka a letter informing Mr. Muthaka that he had been suspended from the practice of law on August 23, 2012, for six months and that Mr. Muthaka needed to find a another lawyer. (TR 111).
- 52. The letter did not advise Mr. Muthaka that the statute of limitations had run on his claim. (TR 237).
- 53. Mr. Muthaka hired lawyer Cheryl Farrish to represent him. Ms. Farrish advised Mr. Muthaka to get a copy of his client file. (EX 212).
- Ms. Farrish spoke with Respondent on September 7, 2012. Respondent told her that there was still time under the statute and it did not run in the next 30 days. Ms. Farrish confirmed this information in a letter dated September 13, 2012. (TR 188; EX 213).
- 55. Ms. Farrish received client files from both Mr. Muthaka and Respondent. Ms. Farrish observed that although Mr. Muthaka had been done treating for ten months, there were no medical records from the chiropractor, only incomplete records from Mr. Muthaka's physician and incomplete records from Harborview. The files did not contain any documentation of the property damage and no witness statements. There was no demand in the file. There were only three or four pieces of paper in the file. Ms. Farrish reviewed the accident report and discovered that the statute of limitations had run on August 14, 2012. (TR 190).

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Appeals on September 24, 2012. (EX 308).

Respondent was suspended from the practice before the Board of Immigration

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- 68. Respondent was suspended from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on October 2, 2012. (EX 309).
- 69. Respondent was suspended from the U.S. District Court Western District of Washington on October 16, 2012. (EX 310).
- 70. Respondent was suspended for practicing before the Board of Immigration Courts and the Department of Homeland Security on October 22, 2012. (EX 311).

# IV. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON COUNTS OF THE COMPLAINT

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact found to have been established by a clear preponderance of the evidence, the Hearing Officer makes the following Conclusions of Law:

**COUNT 1:** By failing to file his appeal brief on time, and by failing to file a Motion to Accept Late-Filed Brief that complied with the BIA's rules, Respondent's conduct violated RPC 1.1 and RPC 1.3.

**COUNT 2:** By failing to inform Ms. Badjie that he had filed his appeal brief after it was due, Respondent's conduct violated RPC 1.4.

COUNT 3: By failing to communicate the basis or rate of his fee to Mr. Muthaka, and by having a contingent fee agreement that was not in writing and did not communicate the information required under RPC 1.5(c)(2), Respondent's conduct violated RPC 1.5(b) and RPC 1.5(c).

**COUNT 4:** By failing to make reasonably diligent efforts to settle Mr. Muthaka's claim, by failing to protect Mr. Muthaka's interests by filing suit before the statute of limitations expired, and by failing to ascertain the significance of allowing the statute of limitations to expire, Respondent's conduct violated RPC 1.1 and RPC 1.3.

**COUNT 5:** By failing to keep Mr. Muthaka reasonably informed about the status of his claim, by failing to inform him when the statute of limitations would expire, and by failing

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to inform him that the statute of limitations had expired, Respondent's conduct violated RPC 1.4.

#### V. PRESUMPTIVE SANCTIONS

A presumptive sanction must be determined for each ethical violation.<sup>1</sup> Applying the Presumptive Sanctions sections as the Hearing Officer is required to do under Washington law set forth in the American Bar Association ("ABA") Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("ABA Standards") is a two-step process. The first step is to determine the presumptive sanction, considering the ethical duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, and the extent of the harm caused by the misconduct.<sup>2</sup> The second step is to consider whether aggravating or mitigating factors should alter the presumptive sanction.<sup>3</sup>

#### ABA Standard 4.0 Violations of Duties Owed to Clients

#### ABA Standard 4.4 Lack of Diligence.

Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving a failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client:

- **4.41** Disbarment is generally appropriate when:
- (a) a lawyer abandons the practice and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client; or
- (b) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client; or
- (c) a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect with respect to client matters and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client.
- 4.42 Suspension is generally appropriate when:
- (a) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes injury or potential injury to a client, or

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> In re Anschell, 149 Wn.2d 484, 69 P.3d 844, 852 (2003).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> ABA Standard 3; *In re Whitt*, 149 Wn.2d 707, 717, 72 P.3d 173 (2003).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> In re Johnson, 118 Wn.2d 693, 701, 826 P.2d 186 (1992).

(b) a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect and causes injury or potential injury to a client.

**4.43** Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent and does not act with reasonable diligence in representing a client, and causes injury or potential injury to a client.

**4.44** Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent and does not act with reasonable diligence in representing a client, and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client.

#### ABA Standard 4.5 Lack of Competence.

Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving failure to provide competent representation to a client:

**4.51** Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer's course of conduct demonstrates that the lawyer does not understand the most fundamental legal doctrines or procedures, and the lawyer's conduct causes injury or potential injury to a client.

4.52 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an area of practice in which the lawyer knows he or she is not competent, and causes injury or potential injury to a client.

**4.53** Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer:

(a) demonstrates failure to understand relevant legal doctrines or procedures and causes injury or potential injury to a client; or

(b) is negligent in determining whether he or she is competent to handle a legal matter and causes injury or potential injury to a client.

**4.54** Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an isolated instance of negligence in determining whether he or she is competent to handle a legal matter and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client

#### ABA Standard 7.0 Violations of Duties Owed As a Professional

**ABA Standard 7.1** Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a

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violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client, the public or the legal system.

ABA Standard 7.2 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.

**ABA Standard 7.3** Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.

ABA Standard 7.4 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an isolated instance of negligence that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional, and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.

Having carefully weighed applicable presumptive sanctions and having considered aggravating and mitigating circumstances set forth in Section 9.22, the Hearing Officer finds the following aggravating factors present:

- (a) prior disciplinary offenses (Respondent received a reprimand in 2009 for violating RPC 8.4(c), and he was suspended for six months in 2012 for violating RPC 3.3, RPC 8.4(c), and RPC 8.4(d));
- (b) dishonest or selfish motive;
- (c) a pattern of misconduct;
- (d) multiple offenses;
- (g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct;

No mitigating factors are applicable.

Respondent acted knowingly in failing to diligently represent Ms. Badjie and Mr. Muthaka, resulting in injury to both Ms. Badjie and Mr. Muthaka. Mr. Muthaka has received no compensation for his bodily injuries or his property loss due to the running of the statute of limitations on his claims, and he has substantial medical bills that have been turned over to collection agencies. In Ms. Badjie's circumstance, there was injury to the legal system because

additional time and resources had to be expended on her case because Respondent filed her brief late. Ms. Badjie was injured because she suffered the anxiety of her case not proceeding as she thought it would and the emotional distress as a result of Respondent's actions. She also suffered potential injury in that her case might have been dismissed and ultimately possible deportation had she not obtained new counsel who filed a Motion to Remand. The presumptive sanction is suspension.

Respondent acted knowingly in failing to keep Mr. Muthaka reasonably informed about the status of his case, failing to inform him when the statute of limitations would run, and failing to inform him that the statute of limitations had expired. Mr. Muthaka was injured because had Respondent informed him about when the statute of limitations ran, he could have taken steps to ensure that his claim was protected. Instead, he was deprived of that opportunity.

Respondent also acted knowingly in failing to inform Ms. Badjie that he had filed the brief in her case late. Similarly, Respondent knowingly did not send Ms. Badjie a copy of the Motion for Permission to Accept Late Filed Brief, which would have alerted her to the fact that he had filed the brief late. She suffered potential injury as a result. If Ms. Holmes had not investigated her case and discovered the untimely brief, Ms. Badjie's appeal might have been dismissed, and she would have been subject to being deported.

Respondent also acted knowingly in failing to competently represent Ms. Badjie and Mr. Muthaka. Respondent lacked an understanding of and appreciation for the necessity of timely filing Ms. Badjie's brief. He also clearly lacked a basic understanding of how to handle a personal injury case. Further, he demonstrated that he did not understand the importance of the statute of limitations. Ms. Badjie and the legal system were injured. Ms. Badjie has suffered emotional distress and the legal system has been burdened because court time has been expended in the remand of Ms. Badjie's case. Mr. Muthaka was injured in that he has

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received no compensation for his injuries or property damage, even though Allstate would have compensated him potentially making him whole for his losses. The presumptive sanction is suspension.

Respondent acted knowingly in failing to communicate the basis or rate of his fee to Mr. Muthaka and by having a contingent fee agreement that was not in writing and did not communicate the information required by RPC 1.5(c)(2). Mr. Muthaka suffered potential injury. Had there been any monetary recovery on his case, it is unclear what fees would have been. This uncertainty constitutes injury. The presumptive sanction is suspension.

Based on this review of aggravating and mitigating factors, the Hearing Officer specifically finds, pursuant to the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the following conclusions under the Presumptive Section Standards, which are again set out by individual count.

**COUNT 1:** After finding Respondent engaged in an area of practice knowing he was not competent by failing to file his appeal brief on time and failing to file a Motion to Accept Late Filed Brief which complied with the BIA's rules, in violation of RPC 1.1 and RPC 1.3. The Hearing Officer, after weighing appropriate aggravating and mitigating factors, finds the presumptive ABA Standards of 4.4 and 4.5 apply, and in applying the mitigating and aggravating factors, also finds there is no basis to depart from the presumptive standard of suspension.

**COUNT 2:** After finding the Respondent knowingly failed to inform Ms. Badjie that he had filed his appeal brief after it was due in violation of RPC 1.4, the Hearing Officer, after weighing appropriate aggravating and mitigating factors, finds the presumptive ABA Standard 4.4 applies, and in applying the mitigating and aggravating factors, also finds there is no basis to depart from the presumptive standard of suspension.

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**COUNT 3:** After finding the Respondent knowingly failed to communicate the basis or rate of his fee to Mr. Muthaka and had a contingent fee agreement that was not in writing and did not communicate the information required under RPC 1.5(c)(2) in violation of RPC 1.5(b) and RPC 1.5(c), the Hearing Officer, after weighing appropriate aggravating and mitigating factors, finds the presumptive ABA Standard 7.0 applies, and in applying the mitigating and aggravating factors, also finds there is no basis to depart from the presumptive standard of suspension.

**COUNT 4:** After finding the Respondent knowingly failed to make reasonably diligent efforts to settle Mr. Muthaka's claim, failed to protect Mr. Muthaka's interests by filing suit before the statute of limitations expired, and failed to apprehend the significance of allowing the statute of limitations to expire in violation of RPC 1.1 and RPC 1.3, the Hearing Officer, after weighing appropriate aggravating and mitigating factors, finds the presumptive ABA Standards 4.4 and 4.5 apply, and in applying the mitigating and aggravating factors, also finds there is no basis to depart from the presumptive standard of suspension.

**COUNT 5:** Finally, after finding the Respondent knowingly failed to keep Mr. Muthaka reasonably informed about the status of his claim, failed to inform him when the statute of limitations would expire, and failed to inform him that the statute of limitations had expired in violation of RPC 1.4, the Hearing Officer, after weighing appropriate aggravating and mitigating factors, finds the presumptive ABA Standard 4.4 applies, and in applying the mitigating and aggravating factors, also finds there is no basis to depart from the presumptive standard of suspension.

#### VI. RECOMMENDATION SANCTION AND CONCLUSION, AND RESTITUTION

When multiple ethical violations are found, the ultimate sanction imposed should at least be consistent with the sanction for the most serious instance of misconduct. Based on the ABA Standards and the aggravating and mitigating factors evaluated at length above, the Hearing Officer recommends that Respondent Bakary Fansu Conteh be suspended for two years. Finally, I further recommend that restitution to grievant Mr. Muthaka be ordered in the amount of \$11,324.41 (which Respondent's own Closing Argument and Response to ODC's Proposed Findings, et al apparently accepts as "appropriate and fair here"), reflecting Mr. Muthaka's unpaid medical bills and that future reinstatement of Respondent from suspension be conditioned on the payment of restitution noted here.

DATED this 20<sup>th</sup> day of April, 2015

David W. Wiley, WSBA #08614 Hearing Officer

#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

to be delivered to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and to be mailed to MAN WHOM THE Counsel at 10 to 100 to 100

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> In re the Matter of the Disciplinary Proceeding Against Richard A. Peterson, 120 Wn.2d 833, 854 (1993); In re the Matter of the Disciplinary Proceeding Against Alec M. Schwimmer, 153 Wn.2d 752, 759, 108 P.3d 761 (2005); In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Romero, 152 Wn.2d 124, 135, 94 P.3d 939 (2004).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Respondent's Closing Argument, and Response to ODC's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Hearing Officer's Recommendation at p. 7.

#### **Allison Sato**

From:

Gruber, Maggi < MGruber@williamskastner.com>

Sent:

Tuesday, April 21, 2015 5:15 PM

To:

Allison Sato

Cc:

Wiley, Dave

Subject:

FW: Proceeding No. 13#00112 | Bakary Fansu Conteh Lawyer Bar #35098 | Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law and Hearing Officer's Recommendations

**Attachments:** 

WKG-#5377518-v3-Conteh\_FOF\_COL\_Hearing\_Officer\_s\_recommendations.pdf

Document attached.

From: Gruber, Maggi

Sent: Tuesday, April 21, 2015 5:14 PM

To: allisons@wsba.org
Cc: Wiley, Dave

Subject: Proceeding No. 13#00112 | Bakary Fansu Conteh Lawyer Bar #35098 | Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law and Hearing Officer's Recommendations

Ms. Sato,

Please see attached Findings of Fact, conclusions of Law, and Hearing Officer's Recommendations signed by Hearing Officer David Wiley for filing today in the above-referenced proceeding. The original will be sent via US mail.

Thank you.

#### Maggi Gruber

Williams Kastner | Legal Assistant to David Wiley 601 Union Street, Suite 4100 Seattle, WA 98101-2380 P: 206.233.2972 | F: 206.628.6611 www.williamskastner.com

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