

Seattle, WA 98101-2539 (206) 727-8207

1 Seattle Police Department, in violation of RPC 8.4(b) (by violating RCW 9A.76.175), RPC 2 8.4(c) and/or 8.4(d). Count III - Misrepresenting to the court clerk that Michelle King did not wish to pursue 3 4 the petition for anti-harassment against her clients, in violation of RPC 8.4(c) and/or 8.4(d). 5 Based on the pleadings in the case, the testimony and exhibits at the hearing, the Hearing 6 Officer makes the following: 7 FINDINGS OF FACT 8 1. Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in the State of Washington on 9 November 4, 2002. 10 2. Respondent has not previously been disciplined. 11 3. Respondent is a solo practitioner, and her practice is focused exclusively in the area 12 of family law. 13 4. Respondent represented the father, Frank Jonathan Miller, in In re the De Facto 14 Parentage and Custody of Mason Miller, Snohomish County Superior Court Cause Number 09-15 3-02834-8. Janal Marie Rich represented the de facto father. Richard Llewelyn Jones 16 represented the mother. 17 5. During pretrial matters, Respondent would slam objects and make loud comments when Judge Farris ruled against her. 18 19 6. During the trial, which took place in 2011, Respondent was disruptive during court 20 proceedings, including blurting out remarks about testifying witnesses and other counsel, 21 interrupting opposing counsel and the judge. These comments were not of a private nature made 22 to her client, but rather so that the judge and the other lawyers would hear them. Respondent's 23 pattern of conduct made it difficult for the attorneys representing other parties to examine 24 FoFs, CoLs, and Recommendation WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASSOCIATION

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witnesses.

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7. Respondent repeatedly was admonished by the judge to stop interrupting other counsel, but Respondent did not comply, doing this behavior even more. When warned by the judge about making loud statements that interrupted the proceedings, Respondent would falsely say, "I did not say anything." Respondent would refer to the judge's decisions as wrong and stupid in front of court staff.

8. Judge Farris observed that Respondent was able to exercise complete control over
the volume of her speech, getting loud or soft at will. Respondent was able to say things to her
client in a soft tone that Judge Farris could not hear. Respondent got loud because she was
angry, not because she did not know that she was being loud.

9. During the time this matter was pending, Respondent was abusive to Ms. Rich's staff
over the phone. Ms. Rich implemented an office-wide policy of screening Ms. Abele's
telephone calls, having them put through to her voicemail,

14 10. In post-trial proceedings, Respondent generally exhibited good conduct until the end
15 of an August hearing that preceded the presentation hearing of September 28, 2011. At the
16 preceding hearing, after Judge Farris would not sign Respondent's proposed findings,
17 Respondent became angry, saying words to the effect of, "We have to take a break now."

18 11. After the judge left the bench, it is undisputed that Respondent made a loud
19 screaming noise that could be heard in other rooms of the courthouse. There was conflicting
20 testimony on the cause of this and it remains unclear. Judge Farris herself was not present in her
21 courtroom at the time and did not find the Respondent in contempt for this scream.

12. On September 28, 2011, a two-hour hearing was held to resolve the final parenting
plan in *In re the De Facto Parentage and Custody of Mason Miller*. Ms. Rich was present. Mr.

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Jones attended the hearing by phone. When Respondent interrupted the court, Judge Farris
 asked Respondent not to. When Respondent persisted, Judge Farris stated on the record her
 impressions of the scream Respondent made after the end of the August hearing. At this point,
 Respondent interrupted at a high volume, further disrupting the proceeding.

13. A member of the Snohomish County Superior Court bench since March, 1994, Judge
Farris was concerned about Respondent's pattern of behavior and hoped that a warning would
prevent further transgressions. Respondent's interruptions prevented the judge from
accomplishing this or making the necessary changes in the parenting plan.

9 14. Sheralyn Barton was the court reporter that day. Unbeknownst to Respondent, a
10 backup system in Ms. Barton's court reporting equipment audio-recorded the proceedings.
11 Respondent did not learn of this until part way through her deposition in these disciplinary
12 proceedings.

13 15. Once Respondent began screaming at the hearing on September 28, 2011, Judge 14 Farris asked for security to be called. Respondent turned to face the courtroom door, began to 15 walk, and yelled, "I'm going to jail, I'm going to jail!" Respondent repeatedly placed her hands 16 above her head, crossed at the wrists or with her wrists close so as to reflect being handcuffed. 17 Respondent dramatically rocked her hands around, making occasional upward body thrusts with 18 a motion and speed similar to calisthenics. Respondent's later testimony was not credible that 19 she placed her hands in a prayerful position and said the words, "I'm going to jail," in the form 20 of a question,

21 16. While the court was still in session, Respondent abruptly exited the courtroom,
22 causing the proceedings to come to a halt. The court then took a recess. Respondent re-entered
23 the courtroom, told Ms. Rich that she was abstaining from further proceedings and then left

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17. Security was asked to locate Respondent and bring her back to the courtroom. When approached by Marshal Miles, Respondent was angry and stated that she would not do so. Notwithstanding her words, Respondent voluntarily returned to the courtroom. Marshals Miles and Hayes followed her in.

18. When the hearing reconvened, Respondent continued to talk in a loud voice,
interrupting the court multiple times, despite being requested to stop. Marshal Miles saw furtive
looks of concern on the faces of court staff, but did not take further action at that time.
Respondent yelled loudly to demonstrate what it sounded like when she really yells. Respondent
continued to display loud, disrespectful conduct, interrupting the judge, waving her arms around
in a histrionic and defiant manner. She defiantly invited being taken away in handcuffs.

12 19. An order was entered finding Respondent in contempt of court for her conduct on
13 September 28, 2011. Respondent was ordered to purge her contempt by contacting the Lawyers'
14 Assistance Program (LAP). While Respondent stated that she would not do this, she in fact did
15 comply with this order of Judge Farris in a timely manner.

20. Judge Farris's discipline of the Respondent in her courtroom was triggered by the
accumulation and continuation of prior problems during the trial of the same matter, primarily
Respondent's loud running commentary that disrupted the proceedings. Judge Farris never had
seen this kind of conduct from a lawyer before. In her nearly 20 years on the bench, Judge
Farris only has held two lawyers in contempt. Respondent's was the only one that remained
until it was purged by her contacting the LAP.

22 21. Respondent's conduct made the court staff ill at ease, unsure what to expect from
23 her. Court reporter Sheralyn Barton never had seen this kind of conduct in an attorney before.

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22. Respondent has represented many times that she has a hearing disability. However,
 throughout the trial and subsequent proceedings, Respondent demonstrated the ability to
 deliberately modulate the volume of her voice. She presented no medical evidence to support
 her claim of a hearing disability. She was observed during these disciplinary proceedings
 communicating with her counsel in low voices that could not be heard by others. Respondent
 had the ability to control the volume of her voice at the September 28, 2011, hearing and her
 testimony to the contrary is not credible.

23. Respondent's conduct adversely affected the proceedings before Judge Farris,
requiring recess, security, and extensive colloquy that would not have otherwise been necessary.
Her behavior was not necessitated in any way by the conduct of the court. Judge Farris spoke to
the Respondent in a calm, low-key manner, trying to secure her compliance with basic decorum.

24. After the hearing, Respondent exited the courtroom and yelled, "that bitch!"

25. Ms. Rich, who had been present for the entirety of the hearing, requested an escort from one of the marshals, shaken by Respondent's conduct at this hearing.

26. Directly after the September 28<sup>th</sup> hearing, Respondent went to the Snohomish County Bar Association office, continuing to behave in an agitated, unprofessional manner, swearing at one of the marshals at one point.

27. Respondent timely purged the contempt by contacting the Lawyers' AssistanceProgram.

28. Respondent's conduct on September 28, 2011, was intentional. She decided to not obey the tribunal. She walked out of the courtroom during the proceedings. She repeatedly interrupted the judge during the hearing on or about September 28, 2011. In addition, the audio recording (Exhibit A-2) and the testimony of witnesses demonstrate that Respondent

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deliberately modulated the volume of her voice for effect. In addition to her voice, Respondent
 made disruptive physical gestures during the hearing.

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29. Respondent's conduct on September 28, 2011, caused injury to the legal proceeding because it disrupted—rather forced the abrupt halt of—the proceeding itself. Respondent's conduct also caused potential injury to Respondent's client, because she left the courtroom and thereby potentially subjected her client to a lack of representation during ongoing proceedings for the entry of final orders. Respondent's conduct inside the courtroom fell below the minimum standards of professionalism expected of attorneys. Nothing occurred during the hearing that justified this behavior.

30. On or about May 16, 2011, Respondent was representing a client at the King County Courthouse. King County Sheriff's Court Marshal Samuel Copeland was dispatched to Room W-278 for standby backup. Upon arriving, the bailiff pointed out the Respondent as a subject of concern. Marshal Copeland observed at the back of the courtroom for about ten minutes. The Respondent went in and out several times. When he heard a loud, agitated female voice in the hallway, Marshal Copeland went out to investigate. He encountered Respondent and asked her to quiet down. Respondent was angry at this, believing it infringed on her prerogatives as an attorney.

31. Marshal Copeland told Respondent that she would be asked to leave if she continued
to be loud and disruptive. Marshal Copeland then decided to stop the exchange and leave the
area, in order to de-escalate the situation.

32. While Marshal Copeland was on his way to the 4<sup>th</sup> Avenue security checkpoint,
Respondent re-engaged him by the central elevator bank and yelled at him. Among other things,
Respondent said words to the effect of, "someone should fart in your face!" Marshal Copeland

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disengaged a second time from Respondent and walked down to the security checkpoint, where
 Marshal Greg Webb was present. Marshal Webb had never met Respondent before. Respondent
 then followed Marshal Copeland, over to where Marshal Webb was seated.

33. Respondent, seeing the stripes on Marshal Webb's uniform, believed that he was
Marshal Copeland's superior. When Respondent approached Marshal Webb, she was animated,
loud, and aggressive. Respondent conveyed that she was upset with Marshal Copeland. After
listening to Respondent for a short time, Marshal Webb told Respondent to go about her
business. Respondent told Marshal Webb that he had to speak with her, and he responded that
he did not have to.

34. During this conversation, Marshal Webb was seated with his back against the
hallway wall, and Marshal Copeland was facing him, standing about one foot away from
Marshal Webb. Marshal Webb is about 6'2" tall. The seat of the stool was about 30" from the
floor. The front of the podium was not touching the hallway wall and was about 1–2 inches
away.

15 35. Following Marshal Webb's statement to Respondent that she should go about her
16 business, despite the fact that there was ample room (about six to eight feet) in the hallway to
17 walk around them, Respondent deliberately pushed between them. Just before doing so,
18 Respondent yelled, "Are you going to get out of my way?"

36. Respondent's choice of aggressively coming in between the narrow space between
Marshall Webb and Marshall Copeland caused Respondent to brush Marshal Copeland's body
and Marshal Webb's knee. When Respondent's body pushed Marshal Copeland, she caused him
to move.

37. Immediately thereafter, Respondent turned counterclockwise to face Marshal

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Copeland. She then pointed at Marshal Webb and yelled at him, falsely accusing him of trying 1 2 to trip her.

38. Marshal Webb did not extend his leg or try to trip Respondent. Respondent did not stumble or fall.

39. Respondent knew that Marshal Webb did not trip her, but was angry at him for failing to take action on her complaints against Marshal Copeland after their interaction in the hallway outside W-278.

40. The surveillance video from the courthouse (Exhibit A-6) does not support 8 9 Respondent's claim that she was tripped. Respondent's version of the incident is not credible. 10 Respondent's interactions and behavior with Marshal Copeland and Marshal Webb 11 demonstrates that Respondent was the aggressor, moving into them when there was ample room 12 to take another route in the hallway.

13 41. Soon thereafter, Respondent called 911 using her mobile phone. Seattle Police 14 Officer Ritter arrived, and Respondent reported that Marshal Webb intentionally tripped her. 15 This statement was false and misleading.

42. An internal investigation was conducted because of Respondent's false report. 16 17 Marshal Webb received a letter stating that Respondent's charge was unsubstantiated.

18 43. Respondent offered telephonic testimony from a man named Rakesh Pai, who 19 claimed to have witnessed Marshal Webb trip Respondent. Contrary to the surveillance video, 20 Mr. Pai testified that Ms. Abele got tripped "a little bit" and held onto the metal detector post or 21 the security bar. The surveillance video demonstrates that the metal detector and security station were several feet from where the incident occurred and that Respondent could not have held onto them. Mr. Pai's testimony was not credible.

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44. Respondent's conduct on May 16, 2011, was intentional. She knowingly gave a false
 report to law enforcement personnel, falsely accusing Marshal Greg Webb of assault.
 Respondent was not tripped, and she knew that she had not been tripped. In addition, the
 surveillance video and testimony of witnesses demonstrates that Respondent deliberately sought
 multiple exchanges with the Marshals in order to justify the filing of a complaint against one or
 both of them.

7 45. Respondent's conduct on May 16, 2011, wasted law enforcement resources and
8 subjected Marshal Webb to an internal investigation that never should have taken place.

9 46. Respondent's conduct on May 16, 2011 also injured the image of the legal
10 profession. Respondent's conduct inside and outside of the courtroom was far afield from the
11 minimum standards of professionalism expected of attorneys. The image of the legal profession
12 is clearly damaged when lawyers are not truthful. Respondent's actions also adversely reflect on
13 her fitness to practice law.

47. Several aggravating factors apply in this matter. Respondent demonstrated a
dishonest or selfish motive by interrupting the judge, yelling in court, walking out of court, and
submitting a false police report. There are multiple offenses in this case. Respondent has
substantial experience in the practice of law (*i.e.*, between nine and ten years of practice at the
time of the misconduct). In addition, Respondent refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of
conduct; Respondent's explanations of and excuses for her conduct were not credible.

48. One mitigating factor applies in this matter: Ms. Abele does not have a prior
disciplinary record. Respondent has the burden of proving mitigation. But Respondent did not
prove, with admissible evidence, any other basis for mitigation.

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## CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

## Violations Analysis

The Hearing Officer finds that the Association proved the following:

49. Respondent engaged in the behavior that resulted in the court finding her in contempt, in violation of RPC 3.4(c), 3.5(d), 8.4(d), and RPC 8.4(j). Count I is proven by a clear preponderance of the evidence.

50. Respondent knowingly made a false and misleading statement to an officer of the Seattle Police Department, in violation of RPC 8.4(b) (by violating RCW 9A.76.175), RPC 8.4(c), and 8.4(d). Count II is proven by a clear preponderance of the evidence.

51. Count III is dismissed. The Association did not prove by a clear preponderance of the evidence that Ms. Abele engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation or engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice when she communicated to court clerk Mary McHugh.

4 || Sanction Analysis

5 52. A presumptive sanction must be determined for each ethical violation. In re
Anschell, 149 Wn.2d 484, 69 P.3d 844, 852 (2003). The following standards of the American
Bar Association's <u>Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions</u> ("ABA <u>Standards</u>") (1991 ed. &
Feb. 1992 Supp.) are presumptively applicable in this case:

53. The presumptive ABA <u>Standard</u> for Count I is:

6.2 Abuse of the Legal Process

Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving failure to expedite litigation or bring a meritorious claim, or failure to obey any obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists:

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6.21 **Disbarment** is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly violates a court order or rule with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious injury or potentially serious injury to a party or causes serious or potentially serious interference with a legal proceeding.

6.22 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows that he or she is violating a court order or rule, and causes injury or potential injury to a client or a party, or causes interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding.

6.23 **Reprimand** is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently fails to comply with a court order or rule, and causes injury or potential injury to a client or other party, or causes interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding.

6.24 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an isolated instance of negligence in complying with a court order or rule, and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a party, or causes little or no actual or potential interference with a legal proceeding.

54. The presumptive ABA Standard for Count II is:

5.1 Failure to Maintain Personal Integrity

Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving commission of a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, or in cases with conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation:

5.11 **Disbarment** is generally appropriate when:

(a) a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which includes intentional interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, distribution or importation of controlled substances; or the intentional killing of another; or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of these offenses; or

(b) a lawyer engages in any other intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice.

5.12 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in criminal conduct which does not contain the elements listed in Standard 5.11 and that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice.

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1	5.13 <b>Reprimand</b> is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in any other conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
2	misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.
3	5.14 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in
4	any other conduct that reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.
5	55. When multiple ethical violations are found, the "ultimate sanction imposed should at
6	least be consistent with the sanction for the most serious instance of misconduct among a
7	number of violations." In re Petersen, 120 Wn.2d 833, 854, 846 P.2d 1330 (1993).
8	56. Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and application of the ABA
9	Standards, the appropriate presumptive sanction is a suspension.
10	57. "A period of six months is generally the accepted minimum term of suspension." In
11	<u>re Cohen</u> , 149 Wn.2d 323, 67 P.3d 1086, 1094 (2003).
12	58. A six-month suspension is appropriate in a case where there are either no
13	aggravating factors and at least some mitigating factors, or where the mitigating factors clearly
14	outweigh any aggravating factors. In re Halverson, 140 Wn.2d 475, 497, 998 P.2d 833 (2000).
15	This is not the case here.
16	59. The following aggravating factors set forth in Section 9.22 of the ABA Standards are
17	applicable in this case:
18	<ul> <li>(b) dishonest or selfish motive;</li> <li>(g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct; and</li> </ul>
19	<ul> <li>(g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct; and</li> <li>(i) substantial experience in the practice of law [admitted 2002].</li> </ul>
20	60. The following mitigating factors set forth in Section 9.32 of the ABA Standards are
21	applicable to this case:
22	(a) absence of a prior disciplinary record;
23	Recommendation
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1	61. Based on the ABA <u>Standards</u> and the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors,
2	the Hearing Officer recommends that Respondent Kathryn B. Abele be suspended for a period
3	of twelve months.
4	62. Additionally, the Hearing Officer recommends that, as a condition precedent to
5	reinstatement, Respondent must undergo a fitness to practice evaluation and be deemed fit to
6	practice law, and she also must bear all costs relating to the fitness to practice evaluation.
7	63. Additionally, the Hearing Officer recommends that Respondent must reimburse the
8	Association's costs incurred in this matter.
9	Dated this 18th day of December, 2013.
10	2. 8R.
11	William S. Bailey, WSBA No. 730
12	Hearing Officer
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16	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
17	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE FIF. UN & HUN PELOMINIACTION
18	to be delivered to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and to be mailed CAM TAMFILL A WARK CAM Bespondent/Respondent's Counsel
19	at $1/1$ and $1/2$ and $1$
20	Clerk/Counselito the Disciplinary Board
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