		FILED	
		Jul 1, 2021	
1		Disciplinary	
2		Board	
		Docket # 051	
3			
4			
5			
6			
7		ARY BOARD TE BAR ASSOCIATION	
8			
9	In re	Proceeding No. 20#00020	
10	SOUPHAVADY BOUNLUTAY,	FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF	
	Lawyer (Bar No. 30552).	LAW AND HEARING OFFICER'S RECOMMENDATION	
11	Lawyer (Bar 110, 50552).	RECOMMENDATION	
12			
13	The undersigned Hearing Officer held t	he hearing on May 4 through May 6, 2021 under	
14	Rule 10.13 of the Washington Supreme Court's Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct		
15	(ELC). Respondent Souphavady Bounlutay	appeared at the hearing with her lawyer, Mark	
16	Choate. Senior Disciplinary Counsel Fran	ncesca D'Angelo appeared for the Office of	
17	Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) of the Washington State Bar Association.		
18	FORMAL COMPLAINT FILED BY DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL		
19	The Formal Complaint filed by Disc	iplinary Counsel charged Respondent with the	
20	following counts of misconduct:		
21	Count 1: By converting funds from one	e or more of her clients' settlement funds,	
22	Respondent violated RPC 1.15A(b) ar committing the crime of theft in violation	nd/or RPC 8.4(c) and/or RPC 8.4(b) (by on of RCW 9A.56.010-050).	
23		ts with false accountings and/or by	
24	misrepresenting to her clients that she	had paid their medical liens and money	

1	owed to Roxbury, when she had not, and/or by failing to inform her clients that she had taken settlement funds designated for third parties for herself, Respondent violated RPC 1.4(b), and/or RPC 8.4(c).		
2	Respondent violated RPC 1.4(b), and/or RPC 8.4(c).		
3	Count 3 : By representing AC and MG in Roxbury and Clayman's lawsuits against them when there was a significant risk that the representation would be		
4	limited by her own personal interest, without gaining either client's informed consent, confirmed in writing, Respondent violated RPC 1.7(a).		
5	Count 4: By filing an answer in the litigation between AC and Roxbury in		
6	which she falsely denied that AC had failed to pay Roxbury when her case had settled, Respondent violated RPC 3.1 and/or RPC 3.3(a).		
7			
8	Based on the pleadings in the case, the testimony and exhibits at the hearing, the Hearing		
o 9	Officer makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: ¹		
,	FINDINGS OF FACT		
10	1 Descendent was admitted to the america of law in the State of Washington on		
11	1. Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in the State of Washington on		
12	November 17, 2000. At all relevant times, Respondent was a solo practitioner, practicing under		
	the name of Bounlutay Law Firm.		
13 14	2. In 2004, Respondent married Lawrence Clayman (Clayman). Clayman is a		
17	chiropractor and owns Roxbury Chiropractic Clinic (Roxbury).		
15	3. During their marriage, Clayman referred approximately 40 patients to Respondent		
16 17	for representation in their personal injury cases. When the cases settled, Respondent's practice		
17	was to obtain the clients' consent to pay Roxbury's chiropractic bills from their settlement		
19	proceeds. Respondent then paid Roxbury directly.		
20	4. Beginning in 2011, in six matters, contrary to this ordinary practice, Respondent did		
21	not pay Roxbury from clients' settlements, even when authorized by the clients to pay Roxbury.		
22			

¹ These Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were proposed by ODC, and Respondent had no objection as to the form.

1 Client SP

2	5. The first matter related to client SP. In January 2011, Respondent settled SP's case		
3	for \$22,750. Respondent prepared a disbursement of funds letter for SP, representing that the		
4	settlement funds would be disbursed as follows:		
5	\$10,947.83 Medical Liens \$7,508 attorney fee		
6	\$683 costs \$4,294 to client		
7	6. The medical liens of \$10,947.83 were owed to Roxbury.		
8	7. SP agreed to the distribution of funds as set forth in the disbursement of funds letter.		
9	8. Respondent did not pay Roxbury; instead, Respondent converted the funds		
10	designated for medical liens by issuing a trust account check in the amount of \$10,620 to the		
11	Bounlutay Law Firm.		
12	9. Respondent did not tell SP, Roxbury, or Clayman that the funds had not been used to		
13	pay Roxbury but had instead been paid to Bounlutay Law Firm.		
14 15	10. Respondent and Clayman separated on November 16, 2012.		
15	11. On November 20, 2012, Clayman filed a petition for dissolution. Clayman v.		
10	Bounlutay, King County Superior Court No. 12-3-07726-0.		
18	12. After Respondent and Clayman separated, Respondent settled four more cases for		
19	clients who had outstanding bills to Roxbury (clients AC, AT, LB, and MG). In each case,		
20	Respondent obtained client consent to pay Roxbury's chiropractic bills from the clients'		
21	settlement proceeds as set forth below. In each case, Respondent did not pay Roxbury the funds		
22	but instead converted the funds through checks made out to Bounlutay Law Firm.		
23	Client AC		
24	13. Respondent settled AC's personal injury case for \$27,500 in October 2013.		

1	14. On November 25, 2013, AC signed a final accounting prepared by Respondent. The
2	accounting represented that Respondent would distribute the settlement funds as follows:
3	\$11,000 attorney's fees \$800 costs
4	\$5,700 PIP \$3,000 Chiropractor
5	\$7,000 client
6	15. The \$3,000 designated for the chiropractor was owed to Roxbury. AC agreed to the
7	distribution of funds as set forth in the final accounting.
8	16. Respondent paid Bounlutay Law Firm, the PIP carrier, and AC as indicated in the
9	final accounting. Respondent did not pay Roxbury, but instead converted the funds as set forth
10	in ¶¶ 36-37 and 39, below.
11	17. Respondent did not inform AC that Roxbury had not been paid.
12	Client AT
13	18. In May 2013, Respondent settled AT's case for \$15,500.
14	19. On May 30, 2013, Respondent prepared a final accounting stating that the
15	disbursement would be as follows:
16	\$5,115 attorney's fees \$465 costs
17	\$2,187 payment to Roxbury Spine and Wellness Clinic \$7,733 to client
18	
19	20. AT agreed to the distribution of funds as set forth in the final accounting.
20	21. Respondent disbursed \$5,580 to Bounlutay Law Firm and \$7,733 to AT, but did not
21	make any payment to Roxbury. Respondent instead converted the funds as set forth in ¶¶ 36-37
	and 39, below.
22	22. Respondent did not inform AT that Roxbury had not been paid.
23	
24	

1 Client LB

2	23. In December 2012, Respondent settled LB's personal injury claim for \$20,000.	
3	24. In a final accounting prepared by Respondent, Respondent told LB that the	
4	settlement funds would be disbursed as follows:	
5	\$6,600 in attorney's fees	
6	\$10,000 chiropractor \$3,400 to client	
7	25. The \$10,000 designated for the chiropractor in the final accounting was owed to	
8	Roxbury.	
9	26. LB agreed to the distribution of funds as set forth in the final accounting.	
10	27. In December 2012, Respondent paid \$6,600 to Bounlutay Law Firm and \$3,400 to	
11	LB, but she did not pay any funds to Roxbury or any other chiropractor. Respondent instead	
12	converted the funds as set forth in \P 36-37 and 39, below.	
13	28. Respondent did not inform LB that Roxbury had not been paid.	
14	Client MG	
15	29. In July 2013, Respondent settled MG's case for \$16,750. Respondent prepared a	
16	final accounting that stated Respondent would distribute the settlement funds as follows:	
17	Attorney's fees \$5,527.50 Costs \$502.50	
18	Chiropractor \$9,000 Client \$2,000	
19	30. The \$9,000 designated for the chiropractor was owed to Roxbury. MG agreed to this	
20	distribution of funds.	
21		
22	31. In July 2013, Respondent paid Bounlutay Law Firm \$6,030 and paid \$2,000 to MG,	
23	but she did not pay any funds to Roxbury. Respondent instead converted the funds as set forth	
24	in ¶¶ 36-37 and 39, below.	

32. Respondent did not inform MG that Roxbury had not been paid.

2 Arbitration Decision and Respondent's Removal of the Funds Designated for Roxbury

3 33. Respondent and Clayman went to arbitration for their dissolution on February 3,
2014. At the time of the arbitration, Respondent was holding \$24,187 in trust for Roxbury bills
5 for AC, AT, LB, and MG.

6 34. At the arbitration, Clayman claimed that Respondent collected money that was due 7 to Roxbury from Bounlutay Law Firm's client settlement proceeds, but that Respondent failed 8 to remit the funds to Roxbury. Respondent did not disclose that Respondent currently had funds 9 in trust that clients had authorized from their settlements for Respondent to pay Roxbury. 10 Instead, Respondent testified that Respondent had "paid [Clayman] when her clients authorized 11 her to do so." Respondent's testimony was false, and Respondent knew it was false when she 12 testified.

13 35. On July 5, 2014, the arbitrator entered a decision, which held, in relevant part:

14 <u>DECISION:</u> After considering the evidence and testimony of the parties, this Arbitrator FINDS [Clayman] has provided services to clients of [Respondent] for
 15 which he has not been paid. However, based on the evidence submitted, this arbitrator cannot FIND [Clayman] has a contract with [Respondent] or her clients
 16 that obligates [Respondent] to pay [Clayman] for the services he provided to her clients. The Arbitrator FINDS [Clayman] will need to seek payment directly
 17 from the person to whom he provided services.

36. On December 15, 2014, Respondent disbursed \$20,000 of the trust funds that the
clients had designated for Roxbury to Bounlutay Law Firm. Respondent was not entitled to the
\$20,000.

21 37. On January 5, 2015, Respondent disbursed an additional \$2,000 of the client trust

22 funds to Bounlutay Law Firm. Respondent was not entitled to the \$2,000.

- 23
- 24

1	38. On January 9, 2015, the parties' dissolution became final. The decree of dissolution
2	awarded Clayman all interest in Roxbury, including all receivables.
3	39. On January 14, 2015, Respondent disbursed \$1,000 of the remaining client trust
4	funds that had been designated for Roxbury to Bounlutay Law Firm. Respondent was not
5	entitled to the \$1,000.
6	40. Respondent did not tell any of the clients that the funds that had been withheld from
7	their settlements had not been used to pay Roxbury but had instead been paid to Bounlutay Law
8	Firm.
9	Client TM
10	41. After the court entered Respondent's decree of dissolution, Respondent settled two
11	cases for Client TM. In both of these cases, Respondent withheld funds from TM's settlement to
12	pay money that TM owed to Roxbury, but Respondent did not pay the funds to Roxbury.
13	42. One of the cases settled in April 2015 for \$13,700.
14	43. On April 21, 2015, Respondent emailed TM a final accounting and stated that
15	"[a]fter all the deductions and medical liens are paid off, you take home the total amount of of
16	[sic] \$1,595.88."
17	44. The final accounting stated that the funds would be distributed as follows:
18	\$4,521 Attorney's fees \$66.20 Medical records – St. Joseph
19	\$39.42 Medical records – Biojunction \$617 BioJunction PT
20	\$1,534.50 St. Joseph's Medical Center \$5,326 Roxbury Spine and Wellness
21	\$1,595.88 client
22	45. TM agreed to the distribution of funds as set forth in the final accounting.
23	
24	

1	46. Respondent issued checks to Bounlutay Law Firm for \$4,521 in fees and \$105.60 in
2	costs. Respondent also issued a \$617 check to BioJunction and a \$1,534.50 check St. Joseph's
3	Medical Center. Respondent issued a \$1,595.88 check to TM. After making these
4	disbursements, Respondent was still holding \$5,326 from TM's settlement in trust.
5	47. Respondent did not disburse any funds to Roxbury.
6	48. Respondent did not inform TM that Roxbury had not been paid the funds designated
7	for Roxbury in the final accounting.
8	49. On May 2015, Respondent settled another personal injury matter for TM.
9	50. On June 2, 2015, Respondent emailed TM and stated, "your \$8,200 settlement came.
10	I will be waiving my cost for your case. So after the medical lien and attorney's fees are paid;
11	you [sic] take home amount will be \$2,122.00."
12	51. With the email, Respondent attached a final accounting which stated that the
13	settlement funds would be disbursed as follows:
14 15	\$2,702 Attorney's fees \$3,372 Roxbury Spine and Wellness Clinic \$2,122 client
16	52. TM agreed to the distribution of funds as set forth in the final accounting.
17	53. On June 8, 2015, Respondent disbursed \$2,702 to herself and \$2,122 to TM.
18	54. After making the disbursements, Respondent still held \$3,372 from TM's second
19	settlement in trust.
20	55. Respondent did not make any payment to Roxbury.
21	56. Respondent did not inform TM that Roxbury had not been paid.
22	
23	
24	

1 Roxbury Collection Lawsuits

57. In May 2015, Clayman referred the SP, AC, AT, LB, and MG accounts to a collection lawyer to try to collect the money that the clients owed to Roxbury. Roxbury subsequently filed suit against SP, AC, AT, LB, and MG for their unpaid chiropractic bills, plus interest, attorney's fees and costs.

6 Respondent's Representation of AC in the Roxbury Lawsuit

58. On May 26, 2015, Roxbury filed a lawsuit against AC in King County District Court
demanding that AC pay Roxbury \$8,767.42, plus interest from the last date of service,
attorney's fees, and costs.

10 59. Respondent represented AC in the lawsuit.

60. There was a significant risk that Respondent's representation of AC would be
materially limited by Respondent's own personal interest in hiding the fact that Respondent had
paid Bounlutay Law Firm, and not Roxbury, the funds from AC's settlement.

14 61. Respondent's representation of AC in the Roxbury lawsuit constituted a conflict of15 interest.

62. Respondent could not reasonably believe that Respondent would be able to providecompetent and diligent representation to AC.

18 63. Respondent did not obtain AC's informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the19 conflict of interest.

64. On June 11, 2015, Respondent filed an answer with counterclaims on AC's behalf.
In the answer, Respondent denied the allegation in Roxbury's lawsuit that AC had failed to pay
Roxbury when her case settled, even though Respondent knew that Respondent had failed to
pay the funds.

2 Roxbury when AC's personal injury case settled was a knowingly false statement to a tribunal. 3 Respondent's failure to include any statement about Respondent's own actions in taking the funds was a failure to disclose a material fact. 4 5 66. There was no basis in fact or law for Respondent's denial of the allegation in 6 Roxbury's lawsuit that AC had failed to pay Roxbury when AC's personal injury case settled. 7 Respondent's Representation of MG in the Roxbury Lawsuit 8 67. On September 14, 2015, Roxbury sued MG for \$16,398.16 on MG's unpaid bill. In 9 the lawsuit, Roxbury requested interest from the last date of service, attorney's fees, and costs. 10 68. Respondent represented MG in the lawsuit. 11 69. There was a significant risk that Respondent's representation of MG would be 12 materially limited by Respondent's own personal interest in hiding the fact that Respondent had 13 paid Bounlutay Law Firm, and not Roxbury, the funds from MG's settlement. 14 70. Respondent's representation of MG in the Roxbury lawsuit constituted a conflict of 15 interest. 16 71. Respondent could not reasonably believe that Respondent would be able to provide 17 competent and diligent representation to MG. 18 72. Respondent did not obtain MG's informed consent, confirmed in writing to the conflict of interest. 19 20 **Respondent's Misrepresentations to Clients** 21 73. On August 19, 2015, Respondent wrote AT, LB, MG, and SP each a letter stating: This is to give you a notice that I have been advised that my former husband, 22 Lawrence Clayman who provided chiropractic services as Roxbury Spine & Wellness Clinic has hired an attorney to send out collection letter [sic] to my 23 24

65. Respondent's denial of the allegation in Roxbury's lawsuit that AC had failed to pay

1	clients claiming that money is still owed to him for services provided in matters in which I was an attorney.
2	·
3	This is an alarming development; any and all bills and medical liens were paid on our clients' behalf from the settlement proceeds.
4	My attorneys are looking into this situation and hope to get to the bottom of this as soon as possible.
5	I am requesting you notify me, if you received anything from anything [sic] from
6	Pieck/ Boyer Law Group PS, regarding Roxbury Spine Wellness Clinic.
7	74. On December 14, 2015, Respondent sent an email to TM stating:
8	My former husband, Lawrence Clayman (dba Roxbury Spine and Wellness Clinic) hired an attorney to send out collection letter [sic] to all of my former
9	clients claiming money is still owed to him for services provided in matters in which I was attorney. All bills and medical liens were paid on our client's behalf
10	from the settlement proceeds.
11	75. Respondent's statements to AT, LB, MG, SP, and TM that any and all bills and
12	medical liens were paid on the clients' behalf from the settlement proceeds were intentionally
13	false and misleading. These misrepresentations deprived the clients of the ability to make
14	informed decisions related to the collection actions instituted by Roxbury.
15	76. Respondent's representations to AT, LB, MG, SP, and TM in their final accountings
16	that their funds would be used to pay Roxbury were also intentionally false and misleading.
17	Respondent's actions deprived the clients of the ability to make informed decisions related to
18	their settlements.
19	77. On December 21, 2015, Respondent and Clayman entered into a CR 2A agreement
20	in Clayman v. Bounlutay, King County Superior Court No. 12-3-07726-0, whereby Clayman
21	agreed to cease all collection actions against Respondent's clients.
22	
23	

78. On September 15, 2016, Respondent removed \$9,452 from her trust account by way
 of a check to Bounlutay Law Firm. Of the funds, taken \$8,698 were funds that Respondent had
 withheld from TM's settlements to pay Roxbury.

79. Respondent did not inform TM that Roxbury had not been paid the funds designated
for Roxbury in the settlement statement or that Respondent disbursed the funds to Respondent's
law firm.

80. On December 26, 2016, Respondent removed the last of the funds that Respondent
had withheld from the clients' settlements to pay Roxbury by writing a check to Motorsports
Unlimited. The payment to Motorsports Unlimited was for Respondent's personal benefit.

81. Respondent did not tell any of the clients that the funds that had been withheld from
their settlements had not been used to pay Roxbury, but had instead been paid to Bounlutay Law
Firm.

13 82. Respondent knowingly and intentionally took client funds designated for Roxbury 14 without entitlement and used the funds for Respondent's benefit. Respondent's state of mind is 15 apparent from Respondent's attempts to hide the disposition of the funds from the various actors 16 involved, including the clients, the dissolution arbitrator, Roxbury, and Clayman.

17 83. Respondent knowingly and intentionally deceived clients AT, LB, MG, SP, and TM 18 in providing them with false accountings, by misrepresenting to clients that Respondent had 19 paid their medical liens, and by failing to inform the clients that their funds had been disbursed 20 to Bounlutay Law Firm, instead of Roxbury. Respondent's actions were taken with the intent to 21 benefit Respondent.

84. There was actual and potential injury to the clients who lost the use of their funds,
were subjected to unnecessary lawsuits, and were misinformed about important information

regarding their settlement funds. The legal profession was also injured in that Respondent's
 actions reflected badly on the reputation of the profession.

3 85. Respondent represented AC and MG in the Roxbury lawsuits knowing that 4 Respondent's interests were adverse to the clients. In each case, Respondent took on the 5 representation with the intent to obscure the fact that Respondent had converted the funds that 6 the clients had directed Respondent to pay Roxbury. AC and MG were potentially seriously 7 injured by Respondent's conduct.

8 86. Respondent submitted an answer on behalf of AC, knowing that the denial that AC 9 had failed to pay Roxbury was false. Respondent knowingly withheld the information that AC 10 had authorized Respondent to pay the funds from AC's settlement, but that Respondent had 11 taken the funds. AC was potentially injured by Respondent's conduct.

12 87. Respondent had a dishonest and selfish motive in committing the misconduct.

13 88. Respondent engaged in a pattern of misconduct involving multiple offenses.

14 89. During the time of the misconduct, Respondent was experiencing personal or15 emotional problems.

90. On June 18, 2019, Respondent's license to practice law was suspended for 30 months following a stipulation signed on March 1, 2019, in Proceeding No. 17#00085. The stipulated misconduct included altering fee agreements and submitting them to ODC during a grievance investigation, charging unreasonable fees, failing to explain matters to a client, failing to deposit advanced fees into a trust account, failing to provide notice to clients before withdrawing fees, and failing to appear at two hearings.

- 22
- 23
- 24

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1

2 Violation Analysis

3

The Hearing Officer finds the following:

91. ODC has proven Count 1 by a clear preponderance of the evidence. By converting
client settlement funds, Respondent violated RPC 1.15A(b), RPC 8.4(c), and RPC 8.4(b) (by
committing the crime of theft in violation of RCW 9A.56.010-050).

92. ODC has proven Count 2 by a clear preponderance of the evidence. By providing
clients with false accountings, by misrepresenting to clients that Respondent had paid their
medical liens and money owed to Roxbury, and by failing to inform clients that she had taken
settlement funds designated for third parties, Respondent violated RPC 1.4(b) and RPC 8.4(c).

93. ODC has proven Count 3 by a clear preponderance of the evidence. By representing AC and MG in Roxbury and Clayman's lawsuits against them when there was a significant risk that the representation would be limited by Respondent's own personal interest, without gaining either client's informed consent, confirmed in writing, Respondent violated RPC 1.7(a).

94. ODC has proven Count 4 by a clear preponderance of the evidence. By filing an
answer in the litigation between AC and Roxbury in which Respondent falsely denied that AC
had failed to pay Roxbury when AC's case had settled when Respondent knew the denial was
false, Respondent violated RPC 3.1 and RPC 3.3(a).

19 Sanction Analysis

95. A presumptive sanction must be determined for each ethical violation. *In re Anschell*, 149 Wn.2d 484, 69 P.3d 844, 852 (2003). The following standards of the American
Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("ABA Standards") (1991 ed. &
Feb. 1992 Supp.) are presumptively applicable in this case:

1	96. AB	A <u>Standards</u> 4.1 and 5.1 apply to Count 1.
2		Iure to Maintain Personal Integrity
3		 Disbarment is generally appropriate when: (a) a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which includes intentional interference with the administration of institution.
4		which includes intentional interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or
5		theft; or the sale, distribution or importation of controlled substances; or the intentional killing of another; or an attempt or conspiracy or
6		 solicitation of another to commit any of these offenses; or (b) a lawyer engages in any other intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the
7		lawyer's fitness to practice.
		Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in
8		criminal conduct which does not contain the elements listed in Standard 5.11 and
9		that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice.
9		Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in any other conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and
10		that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.
		Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other conduct
11		that reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.
10	1 1 E ai	lung to Duggomus the Client's Duggatu
12		<i>Iure to Preserve the Client's Property</i> Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly converts client
13		property and causes injury or potential injury to a client.
		Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows or should know that he
14		is dealing improperly with client property and causes injury or potential injury to
		a client.
15		Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in dealing with
10		client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client.
16		Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in dealing with client property and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client.
17		cheft property and causes fittle of no actual of potential injury to a cheft.
- /	97. Res	pondent knowingly and intentionally committed theft and conversion of client
18		
19	funds. Respond	dent's clients were both actually injured and potentially seriously injured. The
20	presumptive sa	nction under ABA Standards 4.1 and 5.11 is disbarment.
21	98. AB.	A <u>Standard</u> 4.6 is most applicable to Count 2:
- 1	4.6 <i>Lac</i>	ek of Candor
22	4.61	Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly deceives a client with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious injury or
23		potential serious injury to a client.
24		

1	4.62	Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly deceives a client, and causes injury or potential injury to the client.
2	4.63	Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently fails to provide a client with accurate or complete information, and causes injury or potential
3	4.64	injury to the client.
4	4.04	Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an isolated instance of negligence in failing to provide a client with accurate or complete information, and causes little or no actual or potential injury to the client.
5	00 P.	espondent knowingly and intentionally deceived clients AT, LB, MG, SP, and TM
6	<i>)).</i> R	spondent knowingly and intentionally deceived enents AT, DD, MG, ST, and TM
7	with the inte	nt to benefit Respondent. The clients were actually injured in that they were
8	deprived of	the ability to make informed decisions and potentially seriously injured in the
9	collection act	ions that they faced. The legal profession was also injured in that Respondent's
	actions reflec	ted badly on the reputation of the legal profession.
10	100.	The presumptive sanction under ABA Standard 4.61 is disbarment.
11	101	ADA Standard 4.2 is applicable to Count 2.
12	101.	ABA <u>Standard</u> 4.3 is applicable to Count 3:
	4.3 F a	uilure to Avoid Conflicts of Interest
13	4.31	Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, without the informed consent of client(s):
14		 (a) engages in representation of a client knowing that the lawyer's interests are adverse to the client's with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another,
15		and causes serious or potentially serious injury to the client; or
16		(b) simultaneously represents clients that the lawyer knows have adverse interests with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client; or
17		(c) represents a client in a matter substantially related to a matter in which
18		the interests of a present or former client are materially adverse, and knowingly uses information relating to the representation of a client with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another and causes serious or
19		potentially serious injury to a client.
20	4.32	Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows of a conflict of interest and does not fully disclose to a client the possible effect of that conflict, and
0.1	4.22	causes injury or potential injury to a client.
21	4.33	Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in determining whether the representation of a client may be materially affected by the lawyer's
22		own interests, or whether the representation will adversely affect another client, and causes injury or potential injury to a client.
23	4.34	Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an isolated instance of negligence in determining whether the representation of a client may

- 1 be materially affected by the lawyer's own interests, or whether the representation will adversely affect another client, and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client. 2 3 102. Respondent represented AC and MG in the Roxbury lawsuits knowing that Respondent's interests were adverse to the clients and with the intent to benefit Respondent. AC 4 and MG were potentially seriously injured. The presumptive sanction under ABA Standard 5 6 4.31(a) is disbarment. 7 103. ABA Standard 6.1 is most applicable to Count 4: 8 6.1 False Statements, Fraud, and Misrepresentation Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, with the intent to deceive the 6.11 court, makes a false statement, submits a false document, or improperly 9 withholds material information, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, or causes a significant or potentially significant adverse effect on the 10 legal proceeding. Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows that false statements or 11 6.12 documents are being submitted to the court or that material information is improperly being withheld, and takes no remedial action, and causes injury or 12 potential injury to a party to the legal proceeding, or causes an adverse or potentially adverse effect on the legal proceeding. 13 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent either in 6.13 determining whether statements or documents are false or in taking remedial 14 action when material information is being withheld, and causes injury or potential injury to a party to the legal proceeding, or causes an adverse or 15 potentially adverse effect on the legal proceeding. Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an isolated 6.14 16 instance of neglect in determining whether submitted statements or documents are false or in failing to disclose material information upon learning of its falsity, 17 and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a party, or causes little or no 18 adverse or potentially adverse effect on the legal proceeding. 19 104. Respondent submitted an answer on behalf of AC, knowing that the denial that
- 20 AC had failed to pay Roxbury was false. Respondent knowingly withheld the information that
- 21 AC had authorized Respondent to pay the funds from AC's settlement, but that Respondent had
- 22 taken the funds. AC was potentially injured. The presumptive sanction under ABA Standard
- 23 6.12 is suspension.
- 24

1	105.	When multiple ethical violations are found, the "ultimate sanction imposed
2	should at lea	st be consistent with the sanction for the most serious instance of misconduct
3	among a num	ber of violations." In re Petersen, 120 Wn.2d 833, 854, 846 P.2d 1330 (1993).
4	106.	Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and application of the
5	ABA Standar	ds, the appropriate presumptive sanction is disbarment.
6	107.	The following aggravating factors set forth in Section 9.22 of the ABA Standards
7	are applicable	e in this case:
8	(b) (c)	dishonest or selfish motive; a pattern of misconduct;
9	(d)	multiple offenses;
10	(g) (i)	refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct; substantial experience in the practice of law [Respondent was admitted to practice on November 17, 2000].
11	108.	In addition to the above, Respondent's other discipline is an aggravating factor in
12	this case.	
13	109.	The following mitigating factor set forth in Section 9.32 of the ABA Standards is
14	applicable to	this case:
15	(c)	personal or emotional problems.
16	Recommenda	ition
17 18	110.	Based on the ABA Standards and the applicable aggravating and mitigating
	factors, the H	earing Officer recommends that Respondent Souphavady Bounlutay be disbarred.
19 20	Ľ	Dated this 1st day of July, 2021.
20		
21		Cer-
22		André M. Peñalver, Bar No. 43073 Hearing Officer
23 24		
•		

1	Electronic Service Stamp
2	
3	
4	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
5	
6	By order of Washington Supreme Court Order No. 25700-B-609, I certify that I caused a
7	copy of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Hearing Officer's Recommendation
8	to be emailed to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and to Respondent's Counsel Mark
9	Choate, at mark@choatelawfirm.com, on the 1st day of July, 2021.
10	
11	
12	
13	Dailere heuman
14	Dariene Neumann,
15	Acting Clerk to the Disciplinary Board
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	

1		FILED	
2		Jul 02 2020	
3		Disciplinary	
4		Board	
5		Docket # 005	
6		ARY BOARD TE BAR ASSOCIATION	
7 8	In re	Proceeding No. 20#00020	
	SOUPHAVADY BOUNLUTAY,	FORMAL COMPLAINT	
9 10	Lawyer (Bar No. 30552).		
11			
12	Under Rule 10.3 of the Washington Supreme Court's Rules for Enforcement of Lawye		
12	Conduct (ELC), the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) of the Washington State Bar		
13	Association charges the above-named lawyer	with acts of misconduct under the Washington	
	Supreme Court's Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) as set forth below.		
15	ADMISSION	TO PRACTICE	
16	1. Respondent Souphavady Bounlutay	was admitted to the practice of law in the State	
17	of Washington on November 17, 2000.		
18	FACTS REGARDING COUNTS 1 - 4		
19	2. In 2004, Respondent married Lawre	nce Clayman (Clayman).	
20	3. Clayman is a chiropractor and owns	Roxbury Chiropractic Clinic (Roxbury).	
21	4. During their marriage, Clayman	referred several patients to Respondent for	
22	representation in their personal injury cases.	1 1	
23	5. Respondent and Clayman separated	on November 16, 2012	
	Formal Complaint Page 1	OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASSOCIATION	

1325 4th Avenue, Suite 600 Seattle, WA 98101-2539 (206) 727-8207

1	6. On or about November 20, 2012, Clayman filed a petition for dissolution. <i>Clayman</i>		
2	v. Bounlutay, King County Superior Court No. 12-3-07726-0.		
3	7. At issue in Respondent and Clayman's marital dissolution were payments that		
4	Respondent's personal injury clients owed to Roxbury.		
5	8. Clayman claimed that Respondent collected money that was due to Roxbury from		
6	her clients' settlement proceeds, but failed to remit the funds to Roxbury.		
7	9. Respondent testified at an arbitration that she paid Roxbury and/or Clayman when		
8	her clients authorized her to do so.		
9	10. On January 9, 2015, the parties' dissolution became final.		
10	11. The decree of dissolution awarded Clayman all interest in Roxbury, including all		
11	receivables.		
12	<u>Client AC</u>		
13	12. Client AC hired Respondent on September 17, 2010 to represent her in a personal		
14	injury action resulting from a motor vehicle accident.		
15	13. AC received chiropractic treatment from Roxbury for the injuries that she suffered.		
16	14. On October 11, 2013, Respondent settled AC's case for \$27,500.		
17	15. On November 25, 2013, AC signed a final accounting prepared by Respondent.		
18	16. The accounting prepared by Respondent represented that she would distribute the		
19	settlement funds as follows:		
20	\$11,000 attorney's fees \$800 costs		
21	\$5,700 PIP \$3,000 Chiropractor		
22	\$7,000 client		
23	17. Respondent paid herself, the PIP carrier, and AC as indicated in the final accounting.		
	Formal Complaint OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL Page 2 WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 1325 4th Avenue, Suite 600 Seattle, WA 98101-2539		

(206) 727-8207

	2
	3
	4
	5
	6
	7
	8
	9
1	0
1	1
1	2
1	3
1	4
1	5
1	6
1	7
1	8
1	9
2	0
2	1

18. Respondent did not pay Roxbury or any other chiropractor.

19. Respondent used the \$3,000 designated for the chiropractor for her own benefit, knowing that she was not entitled to the funds.

20. Respondent did not inform AC that she had not paid Roxbury or any other chiropractor the funds designated for the chiropractor in the final accounting.

21. Respondent did not inform AC that she had used the funds for her own benefit.

22. On May 8, 2015, Roxbury sent AC a letter, stating that she owed Roxbury \$8,767.42, including 12% interest, and demanded that she pay Roxbury within 10 days.

23. On May 26, 2015, Roxbury filed a lawsuit against AC in King County District Court demanding that AC pay Roxbury \$8,767.42.

24. Respondent represented AC in the lawsuit.

25. Respondent never explained to AC that Roxbury was trying to collect funds from her directly because Respondent had failed to pay Roxbury from the settlement funds.

26. Respondent did not advise AC that she had a potential claim against Respondent for failing to pay Roxbury the funds that she had withheld from AC's settlement funds.

27. There was a significant risk that Respondent's representation of AC in Roxbury's lawsuit would be materially limited by Respondent's own personal interest.

28. Respondent did not obtain AC's informed consent, confirmed in writing to the conflict of interest created by her representation of AC in Roxbury's lawsuit.

29. On June 11, 2015, Respondent filed an answer with counterclaims on AC's behalf and signed the document as the lawyer for AC.

30. In the answer, Respondent denied the allegation in Roxbury's lawsuit that AC had
failed to pay Roxbury when her case settled, even though Respondent knew that she herself had

1	failed	to pay	the	funds.
---	--------	--------	-----	--------

31. Respondent's denial of the allegation in Roxbury's lawsuit that AC had failed to pay
Roxbury when her case settled was false.

32. Respondent knew that the denial of the allegation in Roxbury's lawsuit that AC had
failed to pay Roxbury when her case settled was false.

33. There was no basis in fact or law for Respondent's denial of the allegation in
Roxbury's lawsuit that AC had failed to pay Roxbury when her case settled.

8 34. In December 2015, Respondent and Clayman entered into a Civil Rule (CR) 2A
9 agreement in *Clayman v. Bounlutay*, King County Superior Court No. 12-3-07726-0, whereby
10 Clayman agreed to cease all collection actions against Respondent's clients.

35. On March 8, 2016, Roxbury dismissed the lawsuit against AC.

Client AT

11

12

13

14

15

36. Respondent represented AT in a personal injury matter.

37. AT had received chiropractic treatment from Roxbury.

38. In May 2013, Respondent settled AT's case for \$15,500.

39. On May 30, 2013, Respondent prepared a final accounting stating that thedisbursement would be as follows:

18	\$5,115 attorney's fees \$465 costs
19	\$2,187 payment to Roxbury Spine and Wellness Clinic \$7,733 to client
20	40. Respondent disbursed \$5,580 to herself and to \$7,733 to AT.
21	41. Respondent did not make any payment to Roxbury.
22	42. Respondent used the funds designated for Roxbury for her own benefit, knowing that

23

she was not entitled to the funds.

1	43. Respondent did not inform AT that she had not paid Roxbury the funds designated		
2	for Roxbury in the settlement statement.		
3	44. Respondent did not inform AT that she had used the funds for her own benefit.		
4	45. On May 26, 2015, Roxbury sued AT, alleging that AT owed Roxbury \$3,346.		
5	46. On August 19, 2015, Respondent wrote to AT the following:		
6	This is to give you a notice that I have been advised that my former husband, Lawrence Clayman who provided chiropractic services as Roxbury Spine &		
7	Wellness Clinic has hired an attorney to send out collection letter [sic] to my clients claiming that money is still owed to him for services provided in matters		
8	in which I was an attorney.		
9	This is an alarming development; any and all bills and medical liens were paid on our clients' behalf from the settlement proceeds.		
10			
11	My attorneys are looking into this situation and hope to get to the bottom of this as soon as possible.		
12 13	I am requesting you notify me, if you received anything from anything [sic] from Pieck/ Boyer Law Group PS, regarding Roxbury Spine Wellness Clinic.		
	47. Respondent's claim that any and all bills and medical liens were paid from AT's		
14	settlement proceeds was false.		
15	48. Respondent knew that her claim that any and all bills and medical liens were paid		
16 17	from AT's settlement proceeds was false.		
17	49. In December 2015, Respondent and Clayman entered into a CR 2A agreement in		
19	Clayman v. Bounlutay, King County Superior Court No. 12-3-07726-0, whereby Clayman		
20	agreed to cease all collection actions against Respondent's clients.		
20	50. Roxbury's lawsuit against AT for the unpaid chiropractic bill is still pending, subject		
22	to a clerk's motion to dismiss for want of prosecution.		
23	<u>Client LB</u>		
	51. Respondent represented LB in a personal injury matter.		

1	52. LB received chiropractic treatment from Roxbury.			
2	53. In December 2012, Respondent settled LB's personal injury claim for \$20,000.			
3	54. Respondent represented to LB that she would disburse the settlement funds as			
4	follows:			
5	\$6,600 in attorney's fees			
6	\$10,000 chiropractor \$3,400 to client			
7	55. In December 2012, Respondent paid \$6,600 to herself and \$3,400 to LB.			
8	56. Respondent did not pay any funds to Roxbury or any other chiropractor.			
9	57. Respondent used the funds designated for the chiropractor for her own benefit,			
10	knowing that she was not entitled to the funds.			
11	58. Respondent did not inform LB that she did not pay Roxbury the funds designated for			
12	the chiropractor in the settlement statement.			
13	59. Respondent did not inform LB that she had used the funds for her own benefit.			
14	60. On August 19, 2015, Respondent sent LB a letter stating that Clayman had hired an			
15	attorney to send out collection letters to her clients for money owed to him.			
16	61. In the letter, Respondent falsely represented that "any and all bills and medical liens			
17	were paid on our clients' behalf from the settlement proceeds."			
18	62. Respondent knew that her representation that "any and all bills and medical liens			
19	were paid on our clients' behalf from the settlement proceeds" was false.			
20	<u>Client MG</u>			
21	63. Respondent represented MG in a personal injury matter.			
22	64. MG received treatment from Roxbury.			
23	65. In July 2013, Respondent settled MG's case for \$16,750.			
	Formal Complaint OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL			

1	66. On or about July 3, 2013, Respondent prepared and signed a final accounting that			
2	stated Respondent would distribute the settlement funds as follows:			
3 4	Attorney's fees \$5,527.50 Costs \$502.50 Chiropractor \$9,000 Client \$2,000			
5	67. In July 2013, Respondent paid herself \$6,030 and paid \$2,000 to MG.			
6	68. Respondent did not pay any funds to Roxbury or any other chiropractor.			
7 8	69. Respondent used the \$9,000 designated for the chiropractor for her own benefit,			
° 9	knowing that she was not entitled to the funds.			
9	70. Respondent did not inform MG that she had not paid Roxbury or any other			
	chiropractor the funds.			
11 12	71. Respondent did not inform MG that she had used the funds for her own benefit.			
12	72. On August 19, 2015, Respondent sent MG a letter informing her that Clayman had			
	hired an attorney to send out collection letters to her clients for money owed to him.			
14	73. In the letter, Respondent falsely represented that "any and all bills and medical liens			
15	were paid on our clients' behalf from the settlement proceeds."			
16	74. On September 14, 2015, Roxbury sued MG for \$16,398.16 on its unpaid bill.			
17	75. Respondent represented MG on the matter.			
18	76. Respondent did not explain to MG that the reason Roxbury had sued MG was			
19	because Respondent failed to pay Roxbury the funds that she had withheld from MG's			
20	settlement funds.			
21	77. Respondent did not advise MG that he had a potential claim against her for failing to			
22	pay Roxbury the funds that she had withheld from his settlement funds.			
23	78. There was a significant risk that Respondent's representation of MG in Roxbury's			
I	Formal Complaint OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL			

lawsuit would be materially limited by Respondent's own personal interest.			
79. Respondent did not obtain MG's informed consent, confirmed in writing to the			
conflict of interest created by her representation of MG in Roxbury's lawsuit.			
80. In December 2015, Respondent and Clayman entered into a CR 2A agreement in			
Clayman v. Bounlutay, King County Superior Court No. 12-3-07726-0, whereby Clayman			
agreed to cease all collection actions against Respondent's clients.			
81. On February 26, 2016, Roxbury dismissed the lawsuit against MG.			
<u>Client SP</u>			
82. In 2010, Respondent represented SP in a personal injury matter.			
83. SP received treatment from Roxbury in relation to the accident.			
84. In December 2010, Respondent settled SP's case for \$22,750.			
85. On or about January 18, 2011, Respondent prepared a settlement statement for SP in			
which she represented that she would disburse the settlement funds as follows:			
\$10,947.83 Medical Liens \$7,508 attorney fee			
\$7,508 attorney fee \$683 costs \$4,294 to client			
86. On February 7, 2011, Respondent paid herself \$7,508 and paid SP \$4,294.			
87. Respondent did pay any medical liens on SP's behalf.			
88. Respondent used the funds designated for medical liens for her own benefit,			
knowing that she was not entitled to the funds.			
89. Respondent did not inform SP that she did not pay any medical liens on his behalf.			
90. Respondent did not inform SP that she had used the funds for her own benefit.			
91. On May 22, 2015, Roxbury filed a lawsuit against SP seeking \$16,398.16 in unpaid			
chiropractic fees.			

1	92. On August 19, 2015, Respondent wrote to SP informing him that Clayman had hired			
2	an attorney to send out collection letters to her clients for money owed to him.			
3	93. In the letter, Respondent falsely claimed that "any and all bills and medical liens			
4	were paid on our clients' behalf from the settlement proceeds."			
5	94. Respondent knew that her claim that "any and all bills and medical liens were paid			
6	on our clients' behalf from the settlement proceeds" was false.			
7	95. In December 2015, Respondent and Clayman entered into a CR 2A agreement in			
8	Clayman v. Bounlutay, King County Superior Court No. 12-3-07726-0, whereby Clayman			
9	agreed to cease all collection actions against Respondent's clients.			
10	96. On June 19, 2017, the case against SP was dismissed for want of prosecution.			
11	<u>Client TM</u>			
12	97. Respondent represented TM on three separate personal injury matters.			
13	98. TM received treatment for her injuries at Roxbury.			
14	99. In or around November 2013, an arbitrator awarded TM \$27,483.96 in one of the			
15	personal injury matters.			
16	100. In a final accounting signed on January 21, 2014, TM and Respondent agreed			
17	Respondent would distribute \$11,818 to herself for fees and costs and \$15,665.87 to TM.			
18	101. Respondent distributed the funds in accordance with the final accounting.			
19	102. In or around April 2015, Respondent settled the second personal injury matter for			
20	\$13,700.			
21	103. On April 21, 2015, Respondent emailed TM a final accounting and stated that			
22	"After all the deductions and medical liens are paid off, you take home the total amount of of			
23	[sic] \$1,595.88."			

1	10	4.	The final accounting stated that the funds would be distributed as follows:
2		·	Attorney's fees
3	\$66.20 Medical records – St. Joseph \$39.42 Medical records – Biojunction \$617 Dis Impetian DT		
4	\$617 BioJunction PT \$1,534.50 St. Joseph's Medical Center		
5			Roxbury Spine and Wellness 88 client
6	10	5.	Respondent issued checks to her law firm for \$4,521 in fees and \$105.60 in
7	costs.		
8	10	6.	Respondent issued a \$1,595.88 check to TM.
9	10	7.	Respondent also issued checks to BioJunction and St. Joseph's Medical Center.
10	10	8.	Respondent did not disburse any funds to Roxbury.
11	10	9.	Respondent did not inform TM that she had not paid Roxbury the funds
12	designated for Roxbury in the final accounting.		Roxbury in the final accounting.
13	11	0.	On or about May 2015, Respondent settled TM's third personal injury matter for
14	\$8,200.		
15	11	1.	On June 2, 2015, Respondent emailed TM and stated, 'your \$8,200 settlement
16	came. I w	ill be	e waiving my cost for your case. So after the medical lien and attorney's fees are
17	paid; you [sic] take home amount will be \$2,122.00."		take home amount will be \$2,122.00."
18	11	2.	With the email, Respondent attached an accounting which stated that she would
19	disburse the funds as follows:		
20			Attorney's fees
21			Roxbury Spine and Wellness Clinic client
22	11	3.	On June 8, 2015, Respondent disbursed \$2,702 to herself and \$2,122 to TM.
23	11	4.	Respondent did not make any payment to Roxbury.
	Formal Comp Page 10	olaint	OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASSOCIATION

Page 10

1	115. Respondent d	id not inform TM that she had not paid Roxbury the funds.	
2	116. On December	14, 2015, Respondent sent an email to TM stating:	
3	My former husband, Lawrence Clayman (dba Roxbury Spine and Wellness Clinic) hired an attorney to send out collection letter [sic] to all of my former		
4	clients claiming money is still owed to him for services provided in matters in which I was attorney. All bills and medical liens were paid on our client's behalf		
5	from the settlement p	roceeds.	
6	117. Respondent's	statement that all bills and medical liens were paid from the	
7	settlement proceeds was fals	e.	
8	118. Respondent k	new that her statement that all bills and medical liens were paid	
9	from the settlement proceeds	s was false.	
10	119. On September	er 15, 2016, Respondent removed \$9,452 from her trust account.	
11	The check contained a memo	o that the funds were for cost reimbursement for TM.	
12	120. On Septembe	r 15, 2016, TM did not owe Respondent costs or any other funds.	
13	121. Respondent v	vas not entitled to all or part of the \$9,452 that she took.	
14	122. At least \$8,69	98 of the \$9,452 that Respondent took were funds that Respondent	
15	told TM would be paid to Ro	oxbury.	
16	123. Respondent	did not inform TM that she had not paid Roxbury the funds	
17	designated for Roxbury in th	e settlement statement.	
18	124. Respondent u	sed the funds for her own benefit, knowing she was not entitled to	
19	the funds.		
20	125. Respondent d	id not inform TM that she had used the funds for her own benefit.	
21		COUNT 1	
22	126. By convertin	ng funds from one or more of her clients' settlement funds,	
23	Respondent violated RPC 1	.15A(b) and/or RPC 8.4(c) and/or RPC 8.4(b) (by committing the	

3

4

crime of theft in violation of RCW 9A.56.010-050).

COUNT 2

127. By providing her clients with false accountings and/or by misrepresenting to her clients that she had paid their medical liens and money owed to Roxbury, when she had not, and/or by failing to inform her clients that she had taken settlement funds designated for third parties for herself, Respondent violated RPC 1.4(b), and/or RPC 8.4(c).

COUNT 3

128. By representing AC and MG in Roxbury and Clayman's lawsuits against them when there was a significant risk that the representation would be limited by her own personal interest, without gaining either client's informed consent, confirmed in writing, Respondent violated RPC 1.7(a).

COUNT 4

129. By filing an answer in the litigation between AC and Roxbury in which she falsely denied that AC had failed to pay Roxbury when her case had settled, Respondent violated RPC 3.1 and/or RPC 3.3(a).

THEREFORE, Disciplinary Counsel requests that a hearing be held under the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct. Possible dispositions include disciplinary action, probation, restitution, and assessment of the costs and expenses of these proceedings.

Dated this 2nd day of July, 2020.

cancer Dange

Francesca D'Angelo, Bar No. 22979 Senior Disciplinary Counsel

OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 1325 4th Avenue, Suite 600 Seattle, WA 98101-2539 (206) 727-8207