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**FILED**

AUG 17 2011

**DISCIPLINARY BOARD**

BEFORE THE  
DISCIPLINARY BOARD  
OF THE  
WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASSOCIATION

In re

ROBERT JACKSON

Lawyer Bar No. (18945)

Public No. 10#00018

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF  
LAW AND HEARING OFFICER'S  
RECOMMENDATION

**AS REDACTED PURSUANT TO  
PROTECTIVE ORDER**

Pursuant to Rule 10.13 of the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct (ELC), a hearing was held before the undersigned Hearing Officer from April 4, 2011 to April 18, 2011. The Association was represented by Ms. Christine Gray and Ms. Francesca D'Angelo. The Respondent was present and was represented by Mr. Leland Ripley. The parties agreed to waive the 20 day requirement for filing of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Recommendations. The parties also provided multiple post hearing briefing on legal issues that arose during the hearing.

**I. FACTUAL SUMMARY**

This complex case was heard over a period of two weeks and involves thousands of

1 pages of exhibits. Therefore, to allow the reader to understand specific factual findings in  
2 context, a factual summary has been included setting forth the general facts and the issues in  
3 dispute. This introduction should be used only for context. The specific findings contained in  
4 the individually numbered paragraphs constitute this Officer's official Findings of Fact.

5 **A. The Bankruptcy Dispute: Counts 1-5**

6 Counts 1-5 involve the Respondent's activities providing legal advice to Douglas  
7 Simonson while representing Michael & Rowan Levenhagen, Mark & Sylvia Laing, and David  
8 Laning & Nancy Laning.<sup>1</sup>

9 Although Simonson first consulted Respondent in April 2005, the events pertinent to this  
10 hearing began with Simonson's activities the year before. In 2004, Douglas and Karen  
11 Simonson owned a residence at 11609 Holmes Point Drive, Kirkland and a related rental  
12 property at 11615 Holmes Point Drive. Attorney Kevin Magorien represented Simonson at this  
13 time. On Simonson's behalf, Magorien filed a petition for bankruptcy in April 2004.  
14 Magorien then filed a motion seeking abandonment of the real property by the trustee in July  
15 2004. Based on representations that the properties had little or no value above the secured  
16 loans, Magorien persuaded the bankruptcy court to abandon the properties. In August 2004,  
17 Simonson received a discharge of all his debts.

18 Simonson worked for a company called Global Financial Services (GFS). This  
19 company structured creative real estate investments that paired investors with good credit with  
20 investment properties. Subsequent to the order granting the motion to abandon, Simonson  
21 conducted a number of transfers of relating to the Holmes Point Drive property using the buying  
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23 <sup>1</sup> Douglas Simonson did not appear at this hearing, although a great number of the exhibits and  
24 testimony pertained to his financial problems and Respondent's role in them.

1 partner format. Only the first of these transactions involved GFS.

2 In June and July 2004, GFS was in negotiations with Michael and Rowan Levenhagen as  
3 potential purchasers of the property. Simonson conducted those negotiations. On July 13,  
4 2004, the bankruptcy court entered an order of abandonment of the property, freeing it from the  
5 control of the bankruptcy court. On or about November 24, 2004, Simonson sold his residence  
6 to Michael and Rowan Levenhagen for \$200,000 more than the value Simonson had placed on  
7 it in his affidavit to the bankruptcy court. At the time of the purchase, the Levenhagens  
8 believed they were contracting with GFS. Douglas Simonson was their contact point with GFS.  
9 The arrangement involved use of the Levenhagens' credit for a fixed fee. Douglas Simonson  
10 negotiated that fee. The Levenhagens understood that cash payouts obtained from the new  
11 loans would be used to fund the buying partnership fee and mortgage payments on the loans  
12 until final disposition of the property.

13 The Levenhagens encountered substantial performance issues with GFS. GFS failed to  
14 pay the buying partnership fee and failed to make payments on the mortgages that the  
15 Levenhagens had entered into as part of the purchase of Simonson's property. Mike  
16 Levenhagen contacted Simonson. Simonson blamed GFS for all of the issues and cast himself  
17 as a fellow victim of GFS, asserting that it had engaged in an equity skimming scam.

18 Simonson drafted a new scheme involving additional transfers of the property using the  
19 same buying partner model. Mark and Sylvia Laing and David Laning are individuals who  
20 were involved in these subsequent transfers of Simonson's properties. Like the Levenhagens,  
21 their transactions involved buying agreements that exposed them to liability on the mortgages  
22 but vested control of the properties in Simonson and/or his associates.

23 Beginning in April 2005, Simonson retained Respondent to assist in various real estate  
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1 transactions and disputes with GFS. Respondent's first assignments included drafting many of  
2 the documents that ultimately were used in transactions with the Levenhagens, Laings and  
3 Lanings. His firm served as trustee on a deed of trust that allowed Simonson to obtain a third  
4 loan on the property in June of 2006. An escrow firm, in which Respondent shared profits,  
5 handled the escrow for this and other transactions.

6 Late in 2005 and early in 2006, the Simonsons' activities regarding their tax liabilities  
7 and the Holmes Point properties came under the scrutiny of the bankruptcy trustee. The  
8 bankruptcy trustee learned first that Simonson had transformed a huge tax liability into a major  
9 tax refund, using a tax shelter to retroactively grant a tax refund. This transaction involved a  
10 company called Merendon Mining. The trustee retained attorney Denice Moewes to conduct  
11 further investigation into the Simonsons' financial dealings.

12 Moewes discovered a 2004 appraisal for the 11609 Holmes Point Drive property that  
13 predated the filing of the petition for bankruptcy. She reviewed county records and learned that  
14 the process of obtaining a boundary line adjustment and short plat had probably begun before  
15 the bankruptcy petition. Those transactions and the tax shelter scheme caused Moewes to  
16 suspect that Simonson had fraudulently obtained the initial order of abandonment. This  
17 conclusion thus made any subsequent transfer of the properties suspect as well.

18 The investigation led the trustee to file two actions involving Simonson's assets.  
19 Moewes filed the first action [hereafter "first adversarial proceeding."] against Simonson in  
20 January 2006. This proceeding involved the allegedly fraudulent tax shelter agreement with  
21 Merendon Mining. Immediately upon filing the action, Moewes sought a series of restraining  
22 orders to prevent Simonson from dissipating any funds that might eventually be used to repay  
23 his creditors.

1 Respondent's high school friend, Greg Cavagnaro, was Simonson's attorney of record in  
2 the first adversarial proceeding. The Association alleged, however, that Respondent was the  
3 person Simonson relied upon for coordinating his defense. Respondent disputed the nature and  
4 extent of his representation of Simonson. Those disputes involved: 1) the role Respondent  
5 played, if any, in assisting Simonson in the adversarial actions arising from the bankruptcy  
6 proceeding, 2) his knowledge of various orders entered by the court and 3) his role, if any, in  
7 helping Simonson evade restraining orders. The most serious of these disputes involved the  
8 charge that Respondent used his business and personal accounts to funnel money to Simonson  
9 after the bankruptcy judge entered the various restraining orders.

10 Respondent denied he assisted in a bankruptcy fraud. He testified that he did not know  
11 of the restraining orders at the time of the transfers and alleged that the transfers were not of the  
12 type precluded by the order. Findings 33 to 161 trace the various issues associated with the  
13 bankruptcy fraud allegations and this officer's resolution of the underlying factual disputes.

14 After tracking the real estate transactions, Ms. Moewes filed a second proceeding,  
15 [hereafter "second adversarial proceeding"]. Ms. Moewes filed this action in April 2006, against  
16 a number of individuals and entities that participated in the real estate transactions after  
17 Simonson obtained his discharge. Simonson was not named as an individual defendant in this  
18 proceeding until September 2006. However, Michael and Rowan Levenhagen, Mark and  
19 Sylvia Laing, and David and Nancy Laning were all named in the first complaint filed in this  
20 proceeding. There was evidence that Simonson and his business partner, Kenny North, directed  
21 these couples to Respondent in order to control their defense and ensure that it was compatible  
22 with Simonson's interest in the matter.

23 The Association alleged that Respondent had conflicts of interest that precluded him  
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1 from representing these individuals. The allegations arising from the representation of these  
2 individuals involved Respondent's role in the production of documents and questions of  
3 conflicts of interest arising out of the dual representation of Simonson and the three couples  
4 who were victims of his fraudulent activity.

5 The findings of fact as to these counts, track the specific events and issues raised by the  
6 charges. The findings dealing with the conflicts of interest are Findings 162 to 250. The  
7 findings discussing the discovery violations are contained in Findings 251 to 297.

8 **B. The Dainard Grievance: Counts 6-14**

9 A second set of charges involve Respondent's business and professional dealings with a  
10 couple who had been both his friends and his clients. Rob and Claire Dainard had consulted  
11 Respondent about a number of legal issues through the years. In late 2005, the Dainards located  
12 an investment property at 115 Webster, Chelan Washington. The Dainards put \$25,000 down  
13 as earnest money on the property and a plan was developed between the couples that involved  
14 joint ownership of the property through a limited liability company, RPC Enterprises LLC.

15 Factual disputes exist regarding whose idea it was to enter into this arrangement. It is  
16 undisputed that Respondent organized that entity that he and his wife were members of the LLC  
17 with the Dainards, and that, at least for some purposes, Respondent provided some legal  
18 services to the LLC.

19 The property at 115 Webster sits between two other prime lots, the "Mack" property and  
20 the "duplex" property or lot. The issues in the second set of charges relate to various real estate  
21 transactions involving these three properties. The Association contended Respondent was acting  
22 on his own behalf and to benefit another client, Kenny North. Counts 8-14 raise conflict of  
23 interest issues that allegedly arose when Respondent entered into certain transactions relating to  
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1 the 115 Webster property and these two neighboring parcels. Respondent defended these  
2 charges primarily by contending that he was not acting as the attorney for RPC Enterprises but  
3 rather acting as one of its members. He also denies that he was engaged in self-dealing in  
4 entering into the various real estate transactions. He asserts that his actions were taken to benefit  
5 the company and with knowledge and consent of the Dainards. Findings 330 to 391 resolve  
6 the factual issues relating to the conflicts of interest.

7 In June of 2006, Respondent and his wife purchased the 115 Webster property and  
8 signed mortgage papers to fund the purchase. Counts 6 and 7 raise issues regarding the  
9 documents executed in connection with that loan. Findings 298 to 329 resolve the factual issues  
10 relating to those issues.

## 11 II. FORMAL COMPLAINT

12 The Association charged Respondent with multiple violations of the Rules of  
13 Professional Responsibility arising from his activities in connection with various business  
14 clients. These charges are divided between transactions associated with the bankruptcy of  
15 Douglas Simonson and those associated with the business dealings between Respondent and his  
16 clients, Robert and Claire Dainard.

17 As to the Simonson matter, the Association alleged five counts of misconduct.

18 **COUNT 1** alleged that Respondent signed a real estate excise tax affidavit on which he  
19 represented that he had authority to sign the document as an agent of Michael Levenhagen. The  
20 Association asserted that Respondent was not Levenhagen's agent and did not have authority to  
21 sign the document. The Association charged that by falsely representing that he was  
22 Levenhagen's agent when signing the excise tax affidavit, Respondent violated RPC 8.4(c).<sup>2</sup>

23  
24 <sup>2</sup> The RPC's were amended effective September 1, 2006. The Formal Complaint charges Respondent  
with violating the RPC in effect as of the date of the alleged conduct.

1 The Respondent admitted that he signed the challenged document but denied that he did so  
2 without authority.

3 **Count 2** alleged that Respondent transferred money belonging to Simonson into  
4 Respondent's business and personal accounts and then disbursed it according to Simonson's  
5 instructions at a time when Simonson's funds were subject to a restraining order entered in the  
6 bankruptcy court. The Association charged that the Respondent knew of the restraining order  
7 and worked with Simonson to evade its terms. The Association alleged this conduct violated  
8 RPC 8.4(b) (by violating Title 18, United States Code, Section 152 and/or Title 18, United  
9 States Code, Section 2), RPC 8.4(c), RPC 8.4(d), and/or RPC 8.4(j). Respondent denied that he  
10 knew of the restraining order and/or its terms at the time he transferred funds on Simonson's  
11 behalf.

12 **Count 3** alleged a specific violation of the bankruptcy court's orders involving the  
13 repayment of a loan Respondent had made to Simonson in early 2006. Respondent admitted  
14 that he loaned Simonson \$50,000 in February 2006. At the time, the restraining order was in  
15 place. Later in the year, the bankruptcy court ruled that Simonson's attorneys, including  
16 Respondent, were required to disclose all financial transactions during the applicable period.  
17 Respondent filed the required report, but did not disclose to the bankruptcy trustee and the court  
18 that he had transferred \$55,000 of Simonson's funds from an escrow account to his wife, Patti  
19 Jackson. The \$55,000 repaid the original \$50,000 loan and paid Respondent and his wife an  
20 additional \$5,000 as a loan fee and interest. The Association alleged this conduct violated  
21 former RPC 3.3(a), RPC 8.4(c), RPC 8.4(d), and/or RPC 8.4(j).

22 **COUNT 4** alleged that the Respondent engaged in wholesale discovery violations that  
23 involved intentionally withholding highly relevant documents and deliberate redaction of  
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1 documents responsive to specific discovery requests. The Association charged that Respondent  
2 was motivated by a desire to conceal his role in the alleged fraud on the court. The Association  
3 alleged this conduct violated current RPC 3.4(a), RPC 8.4(c) and/or RPC 8.4(d). Respondent  
4 denied that he intentionally redacted or omitted documents.

5 **COUNT 5** charged misconduct based on Respondent's representation of the  
6 Levenhagens, the Laings and the Lanings in the second adversarial proceeding. The  
7 Association alleged the existence of conflicts of interest between those of the Levenhagens,  
8 Laings and/or Lanings and the Respondent's personal interests and/or his responsibilities to  
9 Simonson. The Association also alleged Respondent failed to provide the Levenhagens, the  
10 Laings and the Lanings with the information they needed to assess and consent to said conflicts.  
11 The Association contended Respondent's conduct in representing these individuals violated  
12 former RPC 1.7(b), and/or current RPC 1.7(a).

13 Respondent defended this charge primarily by asserting that the interests of Simonson,  
14 the Levenhagens, Laings and Lanings were not adverse and therefore, there was no significant  
15 risk of an improper conflict of interest. Respondent also contended that he fully informed these  
16 clients of the potential conflicts and obtained their written consent prior to his firm entering a  
17 notice of appearance.

### 18 **Dainard Grievance**

19 The second set of grievances arise from Respondent's business dealings with Robert and  
20 Claire Dainard and his conduct relating to the purchase of property located at 115 Webster,  
21 Chelan Washington. As part of this transaction, Respondent and his wife entered into a joint  
22 venture with the Dainards as equal owners in RPC Enterprises, LLC. At the time of that  
23 transaction, Respondent was representing Claire Dainard in a personal injury matter. The  
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1 Association alleged that Respondent acted in such a way as to place his interests in conflict with  
2 those of the LLC and/or the Dainards.

3 **COUNT 6** alleged that Respondent made a false statement on a mortgage application  
4 regarding 115 Webster and/or on a second home rider regarding 115 Webster. The Association  
5 alleged that this conduct violated RPC 8.4(b) (by violating Title 18, United States Code, Section  
6 1344) and/or RPC 8.4(c). Respondent denied the existence of the necessary mental state for  
7 fraud and denied his conduct violated the law.

8 **COUNT 7** alleged that Respondent failed to inform the Dainards and RPC Enterprises  
9 of the false statements made on his mortgage application and related documents. The  
10 Association alleged that this conduct limited the ability of RPC Enterprises to develop the  
11 property and that, therefore, Respondent violated former RPC 1.4(b). The Respondent denied  
12 these allegations.

13 **COUNT 8** alleged a violation of the rules pertaining to business transactions with or  
14 adverse to a client. The Association alleged that Respondent used RPC Enterprises to enter  
15 into a purchase and sale agreement for the "Mack property" which he then assigned to Chelan  
16 Landing, LLC, a company in which he held an interest. The Association alleged that the terms  
17 of the assignment were not fair and reasonable to RPC Enterprises and that the transaction was  
18 not fully disclosed to RPC Enterprises and/or the Dainards. The Association alleged that this  
19 conduct violated RPC 1.8(a). Respondent admitted that he assigned the purchase and sale  
20 agreement but denied the Dainards were not aware of his conduct. He also denied that his  
21 conduct violated RPC 1.8(a).

22 **COUNT 9** alleged an additional count of conflicts associated with business transactions  
23 adverse to a client. In this count, the Association alleged that Respondent acquired an interest  
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1 in the duplex property that bordered the 115 Webster property owned by RPC Enterprises. The  
2 Association alleged that Respondent had an ownership interest in Jackson-Field, the company  
3 that entered into agreement to purchase the duplex. It alleged specifically that Respondent  
4 acquired this interest in the duplex on terms that were not fair and reasonable to RPC  
5 Enterprises and that he did not disclose the transaction to RPC Enterprises and/or the Dainards.  
6 The Association alleged this conduct violated RPC 1.8(a). Respondent denied this allegation.

7 **COUNT 10** alleged that the Respondent used information that he learned during his  
8 representation of RPC Enterprises and/or the Dainards to the disadvantage of RPC Enterprises  
9 and/or the Dainards. The Association alleged that this conduct violated RPC 1.8(b).

10 **COUNT 11** alleged a conflict of interest with concurrent clients. The Association  
11 alleged that the Respondent violated current RPC 1.7(a) by representing RPC Enterprises in  
12 making an offer for the sale of 115 Webster in March and April 2007, and/or in considering an  
13 offer from Chelan Landing for the sale of 115 Webster in September 2007 at a time when there  
14 was a significant risk his representation would be materially limited by his personal interests  
15 and/ or his responsibilities to Chelan Landing and/or Kenny North. The Association further  
16 alleged that Respondent could not reasonably believe that he would be able to provide  
17 competent and diligent representation to RPC Enterprises and that he did not obtain the required  
18 informed consent to the conflicts from either RPC Enterprises or the Dainards.

19 **Count 12** alleged Respondent violated RPC 1.7(a) when he entered into a purchase and  
20 sale agreement for the Mack property in the name of RPC Enterprises and transferred the  
21 purchase and sale agreement for the Mack property. The Association alleged this was done at a  
22 time when there was a significant risk that the representation would be materially limited by his  
23 personal interest and/or his responsibilities to Chelan Landing and/or North. The Association  
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1 alleged that Respondent could not reasonably believe that he would be able to provide  
2 competent and diligent representation to RPC Enterprises and that he did not obtain informed  
3 consent in writing of RPC Enterprises and/or the Dainards.

4 **COUNT 13** alleged that Respondent violated the duty to keep his clients informed. The  
5 Association alleged Respondent violated RPC 1.4 and/or RPC 8.4(c) by failing to inform RPC  
6 Enterprises and/or the Dainards that he was entering into a purchase and sale agreement for the  
7 Mack property in the name of RPC Enterprises. It asserted further that he violated this rule by  
8 failing to inform RPC Enterprises and/or the Dainards that he was assigning RPC Enterprises'  
9 purchase and sale agreement for the Mack property to Chelan Landing. Finally, the Association  
10 alleged that Respondent failed to inform RPC Enterprises and/or the Dainards of the extent of  
11 his involvement with North and/or Chelan Landing.

12 **COUNT 14** alleged Respondent violated RPC 8.4(c) by making one or more  
13 misrepresentations to the Dainards regarding and during various transactions.

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15 **III. HEARING & PROCEDURAL MATTERS**

16 **A. Motion to Continue Hearing**

17 Approximately 6 weeks before the hearing, Respondent moved for a 60 Day continuance  
18 of the hearing date of April 4, 2011. This date had been selected by mutual agreement of the  
19 parties in November 2010. Respondent's motion contended that necessary witnesses, including  
20 his wife, Patti Jackson, and Clay Terry were not available during the hearing. This motion was  
21 denied pursuant to ELC 10(1) (c). The declarations filed in support of the motion did not  
22 establish good cause for the continuance and failed to support the contention that the  
23 Respondent would be prejudiced if the hearing proceeded on the scheduled date.

1 Witness Clay Terry was available to testify by telephone, however, Respondent  
2 eventually elected not to have him testify. Respondent's wife was present and testified.

3 **B. ELC 10.13 Issues**

4 On March 24, 2011, the Association filed and served its Revised ELC 10.13(c) Demand  
5 for Documents to be produced the first day of the disciplinary hearing, April 4, 2011. That  
6 demand required Respondent to produce, among other things:

- 7 1. Any and all original client ledgers for clients whose funds were in his IOLTA  
8 account;
- 9 2. The original check register for 2006 transactions in the IOLTA account;
- 10 3. Any document in which Respondent notified the clients of the fact that the sum of  
11 \$14,017.05 had been received;
- 12 4. Any documents that the clients had authorized the disbursement of the above funds;
- 13 5. Any document that established that Respondent had notified one or more of the  
14 clients of the above disbursement.

15 This document, Exhibit A-293, also requested documentation regarding billing  
16 statements and time entries for several clients and a Uniform Residential Loan Application.

17 During the hearing, Respondent was questioned concerning the above items. As to item  
18 one, he indicated that the records were in storage and that he was not able to retrieve them. [RP  
19 822]. This officer directed Respondent to produce the items.

20 As to item #2, Respondent asserted the records were in electronic format and that he  
21 could not retrieve them from his computer. [RP 832]. Ultimately this issue was resolved by an  
22 order for Respondent to produce his desktop computer. Upon inspection by the Association  
23 staff, the records were located.

1 As to items 2, 4, and 5, the Respondent asserted no such documents existed. [RP 295-  
2 296].

3 **C. Attorney/Client Privilege Issues**

4 A large number of the exhibits submitted in this case involve attorney/client  
5 communications between Douglas Simonson, Respondent's firm and Gregory Cavagnaro, the  
6 other attorney representing Mr. Simonson. Privileges associated with these communications  
7 have not been waived. In addition, a factual dispute existed regarding whether Respondent was  
8 acting as an attorney in his dealings with Kenny North. Respondent asserted that he was not  
9 Kenny North's attorney, and therefore there was no need to consider communications between  
10 he and Mr. North as privileged. Mr. North did not testify at the hearing. Based on the  
11 documents, testimony and legal authority presented on this issue, this Officer resolves this issue  
12 against Respondent.

13 Consequently, in the public document, the findings that discuss the contents of those  
14 exhibits have been redacted. Where those redactions occur, the original finding of fact number  
15 appears with the designation that it is subject to the Protective order. The exhibits pertaining to  
16 those communications are also being filed under seal. The parties are directed to cooperate in  
17 determining which portions of the transcripts must also be filed under seal.

18 **D. Hearing**

19 The hearing in this matter began April 4 and concluded April 18, 2011. Witnesses were  
20 sworn and presented testimony, and numerous exhibits were admitted into evidence. Having  
21 considered the evidence and argument of counsel, the Hearing Officer makes the following  
22 findings of facts, conclusions and recommendations.  
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1 **IV. FINDINGS OF FACT**

2 The following facts were proven by a clear preponderance of the evidence. ELC 10.4 (b).

3 **A. Findings Identifying Participants & Relationship to Case**

4 1. Respondent Robert B. Jackson was admitted to the practice of law in the State of  
5 Washington on November 16, 1989. Respondent has had no prior discipline.

6 2. At the time of the events alleged in the complaint, Respondent practiced in a firm  
7 known as Herman, Recor, Araki, Kaufman, Simmerly & Jackson, PLLC, located at 2100 116<sup>th</sup>  
8 Ave. N.E., Bellevue, Washington.

9 3. This firm is a liability sharing PLLC. Its members share expenses but do not  
10 share income. Each lawyer maintains their own individual trust account.

11 4. The majority of Respondent's practice involves business and real estate matters.

12 5. Stephen T. Araki is a member of this group and practices at this location. In  
13 addition to his law practice, Mr. Araki runs Araki Escrow Services. For some of the matters  
14 processed by Araki Escrow Services, Respondent and Mr. Araki share fees earned. At the time  
15 of the hearing, a disciplinary case arising from Mr. Araki's role in these events had been  
16 ordered to hearing.

17 6. Beginning at a date uncertain, but no later than September 15, 2004, Robert  
18 Jackson was the registered agent for Global Financial Solutions, LLC. [Hereafter "GFS".] This  
19 company was instrumental in a number of the transactions discussed below. Sometime in 2005,  
20 Respondent appeared on behalf of this company. Respondent resigned as registered agent for  
21 GFS on May 3, 2006.

22 7. In 2004, attorney Kevin Magorien filed a petition for bankruptcy and other  
23 documents in that proceeding on behalf of Douglas Simonson.

1 8. Douglas Simonson became Respondent's client on April 20, 2005. Respondent  
2 provided legal advice on various business entities, drafted documentation for the formation of a  
3 number of companies and assisted in settlement negotiations on disputed matters.

4 9. Gregory Cavagnaro is Respondent's high school friend and a lawyer.  
5 Respondent directed Mr. Simonson to Mr. Cavagnaro for legal advice in subsequent  
6 bankruptcy proceedings. Although Gregory Cavagnaro was the attorney of record for these  
7 proceeding, the overwhelming evidence established that Simonson relied upon Respondent to  
8 be the primary attorney providing legal advice to him in all phases of his dispute with the  
9 bankruptcy trustee. The evidence also established that the Respondent was the primary  
10 attorney drafting legal pleadings for the two adversarial proceedings arising from Simonson's  
11 disputes with the bankruptcy trustee.

12 10. Douglas Simonson was an agent of Global Financial Services, a company that  
13 paired investors and real property opportunities through "buyer partnership agreements."

14 11. Tiffany Doty was an agent of Global Financial Services and an associate of  
15 Simonson. Ms. Doty also owned a company called Manna Funding. Ms. Doty did not appear at  
16 the hearing.

17 12. Dave Langford was another agent of Global Financial Services. Mr. Simonson  
18 blamed many of the events on the conduct of Mr. Langford. Mr. Langford did not appear at the  
19 hearing.

20 13. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-16].

21 14. Douglas Simonson owned Moss Bay Partners, a company that offered buying  
22 partnership agreements. Certain funds were transferred to Moss Bay Partners.

23 15. Douglas Simonson owned, at various times, Network Builders, LLC. Network  
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1 Builders was used as a company to transfer Simonson's residence and to obtain hard money  
2 loans.

3 16. Network Builders, Douglas Simonson and KC North Family Trust—Kenney  
4 North, formed Cedar Hollow Development in July 2005. Respondent drafted the formation  
5 documents and served as its attorney. [Ex. A-21]. Cedar Hollow Development, LLC, was one of  
6 the main companies used to transfer funds from Kenney North to Douglas Simonson in early  
7 2006. [Ex. A-33].

8 17. In May and June 2006, the firm of Herman, Recor, Araki, Kaufman, Simmerly &  
9 Jackson, PLLC formed attorney/client relationships with Michael and Rowan Levenhagen,  
10 David and Nancy Lanning, and Mark and Sylvia Laing in order to represent these individuals  
11 in an second adversarial proceeding filed in the Simonson bankruptcy matter. On July 17,  
12 2006, Stephen Araki entered a notice of appearance on behalf of these individuals in U.S.  
13 Bankruptcy Court #06-1235-MLB,

14 18. Although Mr. Araki was the attorney of record, the evidence established that  
15 Respondent was responsible for drafting the majority of the pleadings and making tactical  
16 decisions regarding the direction the defense would take.

17 19. Beginning in 2000 and continuing through 2007, Respondent was the for Robert  
18 and Claire Dainard. During this period of time, Respondent worked on a number of different  
19 matters on behalf of the Dainards. The Dainards, Respondent and Patricia Jackson,  
20 Respondent's wife, became friends during this period.

21 20. On November 11, 2005, Respondent entered into a business relationship with the  
22 Dainards through the formation of a limited liability corporation, RPC Enterprises, LLC. [Ex.  
23 353]. Respondent was listed as the organizer of this company, a manager and as the registered  
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1 agent for the LLC. His office address was also the registered office for RPC Enterprises LLC.

2 21. On June 12, 2006, RPC Enterprises LLC held an organizational meeting.  
3 Documents drafted by Respondent listed Respondent Robert Jackson as the company's  
4 attorney. Robert Dainard was listed as the President/CEO. Ownership of the company was  
5 divided into two 50% shares. Robert and Patricia Jackson owned 50% of the company and  
6 Rob and Claire Dainard owned the other 50% share. [Ex. 362].

7 22. On January 17, 2006, Respondent participated in the formation of Jackson-Field  
8 Enterprises, LLC. Respondent was the organizer of this LLC, its registered agent, and one of  
9 its two managers. [Ex.354]. The first organizational meeting of this LLC was January 25, 2006.  
10 According to the organizational minutes, Respondent was both the President/CEO of the LLC  
11 and the LLC's attorney. Ownership of Jackson-Field Enterprises was vested 50% in  
12 Respondent and his wife Patricia Jackson and 50% in the name of Morgan and Desiree Field.  
13 [Ex. 355].

14 23. Jackson-Field Enterprises entered into various real estate transactions that form  
15 the basis of the charges relating to the Dainards, including an attempted purchase of the duplex  
16 property adjacent to 115 Webster, owned by RPC Enterprises, LLC.

17 24. Beginning at a date uncertain, Respondent formed an attorney client relationship  
18 with Kenny North and his business enterprises. At hearing, Respondent denied such a  
19 relationship existed with Mr. North but did admit he represented one or more of North's  
20 companies. This Hearing Officer resolves this issue against the Respondent. The exhibits  
21 document numerous incidents of Respondent drafting documents for Mr. North and/or his  
22 companies, providing advice to Mr. North and maintaining funds that belonged to Mr. North in  
23 Respondent's Trust Account. These activities would create a reasonable belief on the part of  
24

1 Mr. North that Mr. Jackson was his attorney.<sup>3</sup>

2 25. On April 11, 2007, Respondent participated in the formation of Chelan Landing,  
3 LLC. Respondent was the registered agent and organizer of this company. His company,  
4 Jackson-Field Enterprises, LLC, was a member of the Chelan Landing, LLC and entitled to  
5 participate in its management. The other member/manager of Chelan Landing, LLC, was KC-  
6 Family Trust—Kenny North. [Ex. A-390].

7 26. Chelan Landing, LLC, participated in the purchase of the Mack property. This  
8 property also adjoined that owned by RPC Enterprises, LLC.

9 **B. General Credibility Findings**

10 27. Respondent testified extensively regarding the facts of the various charges. His  
11 testimony was supported primarily by the testimony of his wife, Patti Jackson. Much of his  
12 testimony was directly contradicted by the Association's witnesses and the available exhibits.

13 28. This officer found neither Respondent nor Patti Jackson to be credible witnesses.  
14 Before reaching this conclusion, this officer extensively examined the hundreds of exhibits  
15 submitted in this matter. In order to better understand the timing of events, information  
16 pertaining to each of the exhibits was placed in a master table and sorted by date. Added to  
17 this master table were dates of events gleaned from Respondent's billing records and trust  
18 accounts. The documents and dates were then compared to each witness's testimony in the  
19 transcript. On numerous occasions, the documents directly contradicted one or both of the  
20 sworn statements of these two witnesses. Specific examples of these contradictions will be  
21 discussed throughout these findings.

22 \_\_\_\_\_  
23 <sup>3</sup> Unlike the cases cited in Respondent's post hearing brief, Respondent provided legal advice to multiple  
24 legal entities owned in whole or part by Mr. North and was active in forming new companies as the need  
arose. These and other facts lead this Officer to conclude that the scope of representation went beyond  
the individual North companies.

1           29. Finally, this officer also evaluated the testimony of the Association's witnesses  
2 against the dates and facts established by the exhibits and timeline of events. The testimony of  
3 those parties who might be inferred to have an interest in the outcome of this hearing was  
4 consistent with the exhibits, the timing of events established by those exhibits, and with the  
5 testimony of witnesses who could have no vested interest in the outcome of this hearing.

6           **C. Findings Relating to Cooperation With Investigation**

7           30. Throughout the hearing, Respondent resisted attempts by the Association to  
8 obtain pertinent records, including ledgers associated with his trust accounts. During the  
9 hearing, this officer ordered the Respondent to comply with the Association's request.  
10 Respondent first claimed that the documents were in storage and that he could not retrieve them  
11 because he did not have a correct index of the records in storage. [RP 822-826; 831]. After  
12 determining that Respondent had made no real effort to retrieve the documents from storage,  
13 this officer ordered Respondent to do so and provided a time certain for complying with the  
14 request. [RP 842]. The physical records were finally delivered to the hearing room and the  
15 Association during the second week of the hearing.

16           31. The Association's demand included records that Respondent stated he could not  
17 retrieve from his computer accounting program. [RP 827; 832-33]. Respondent first provided a  
18 disk of the materials that did not contain records of the year in question. [RP 1170]. Respondent  
19 was ordered to produce the computer itself. [RP 1171]. The computer was produced at the  
20 hearing. With Respondent and his counsel supervising the access, the pertinent records were  
21 located as an attachment to Respondent's email. [RP 1795].

22           32. The Association located at least one inculpatory document after Respondent was  
23 forced to comply with the ELC 10.13(c) demand.



1 abandoning the property on July 13, 2004. [See docket entry on Ex. 294].

2 39. Two weeks later, (July 29, 2004) Simonson sent Levenhagen an email that  
3 detailed GFS's Buying Partnership program and the specific property that was being offered.  
4 [Ex. 163, p. 1]. That email described the property as a "very nice Lake Washington waterfront  
5 home." There was no reference to the fact Simonson owned and resided in the property in  
6 question. There is no reference to the fact the property had recently been part of Simonson's  
7 bankruptcy.

8 40. Simonson informed Levenhagen that the property had an appraised value of 1.1  
9 million "or more," that the proposed loan would be for 1 million dollars, that GFS would cover  
10 "100%" of the costs of ownership, and that GFS paid "all closing costs commissions etc. upon  
11 sale of the home to a new end buyer." [Ex. A-163, p. 1]. Simonson signed the email "Doug  
12 Simonson, Partner, Income Property Zone, a GFS Company."

13 41. The buying partnership agreement provided that GFS would pay a fee in return  
14 for the use of the Levenhagens' credit for the transaction. Simonson negotiated the amount of  
15 the fee on behalf of GFS. [RP p. 48, lines 21-25; p. 49, line 1].

16 42. Mike Levenhagen expressed concerns about the loan to value ratio involved in  
17 the transaction. Simonson then arranged to have the buying partnership fee increased. [RP 49,  
18 lines 10-19]. Based on Simonson's representations and the increased fee, the Levenhagens  
19 agreed to purchase the property.

20 43. Simonson did not inform Levenhagen that the property had been in bankruptcy,  
21 that it was Simonson's home, that Simonson intended to remain in the home and buy it back  
22 and/or that GFS would be taking equity out of the home after arranging a short sale with the  
23 lender. Simonson did not reveal that he was receiving a commission as a result of the  
24

1 agreement. [RP 51-52].

2 44. Simonson forwarded the GFS buying partner agreement to the Levenhagens for  
3 their signature. He requested that the agreement be returned by fax to his attention. Again,  
4 Simonson signed the email "Doug Simonson, Partner, Income Property Zone, A GFS  
5 Company." [Ex. 163, p. 2].

6 45. On July 30, 2004, Simonson faxed a copy of a "Specific Buying Partner  
7 Agreement" and the Purchase and Sale agreement for the house located at 11609 Holmes Point  
8 Drive N.E. The fax cover sheet indicated the documents were coming from GFS. [Ex. A-163,  
9 p. 3].

10 46. On August 4, 2004, Simonson's remaining financial obligations were discharged  
11 in the bankruptcy proceeding. [Ex. A-294].

12 47. Additional correspondence between Levenhagen and Simonson showed that  
13 Simonson acted on behalf of GFS from the initial approach to Levenhagen through November  
14 10, 2004. Simonson's activity included offering Levenhagen an increase in the amount of the  
15 Buying Partnership fee in return for the Levenhagens' agreement to sign a loan with a higher  
16 loan to value. [Ex. 163, p. 9].

17 48. The sale to the Levenhagens was originally scheduled to close on July 30, 2004.  
18 The parties agreed to extend this date. Throughout this time, Levenhagen understood that  
19 Simonson was a part of GFS and that GFS was selling the property.

20 49. The sale closed in November 2004. The Levenhagens, residents of Minnesota,  
21 signed documents in front of a local notary and returned the documents via UPS. [RP p. 53].

22 50. As part of this transaction, GFS/Simonson arranged for the prior loan to be paid  
23 off in a short sale. Two new loans, one for \$800,000, and one for \$200,000, were placed on the  
24

1 property so that cash would come back on the transaction. Levenhagen believed that the  
2 agreements he had signed required that the loan proceeds be held in a secure account to pay his  
3 buying partnership agreement and to fund the loan payments for the 18 months he might be  
4 required to hold the property. [RP pp. 50-51].

5 51. Levenhagen did not receive any proceeds from the second mortgage. The papers  
6 he had signed, however, made him responsible for both loans. It is unclear as to whether  
7 Simonson<sup>4</sup> or GFS, or a combination thereof, received the proceeds of the second  
8 mortgage. Neither Simonson nor the closing agent testified in this proceeding and no exhibits  
9 track the movement of the funds following the closing.

10 52. The Levenhagens first learned that Simonson was the seller of the property when  
11 they received their copies of the signed agreements in the mail a week or two after the closing.  
12 [RP p. 53, lines 19-23].

13 53. GFS did not honor its agreement with Levenhagen. It did not pay Levenhagen  
14 the buying partnership fee within the required time. [RP p. 54, lines 17-24]. It did not make  
15 payments on the loans. [Id.]

16 54. Concerned about his investment, Levenhagen traveled to Washington to view the  
17 property and to meet with GFS and Simonson. At that time, Simonson revealed that the  
18 property was his residence and that it had been in Simonson's bankruptcy proceeding. [RP 55,  
19 lines 2-19]. Levenhagen and Simonson met with a principal in GFS, Dave Langford, who  
20 assured Levenhagen that both the buying partnership fee and the mortgage payment issues  
21  
22  
23  
24



1 would be addressed. [RP p. 55, lines 22-25; p. 56, lines 1-10].

2 55. At this point, Levenhagen was concerned enough about the situation that he and  
3 his wife began exploring other possible solutions. The Levenhagens considered moving to  
4 Seattle to occupy the house and/or selling it. Simonson convinced Levenhagen, however, that  
5 the property did not have value over and above the 1 million dollars in combined loans and that  
6 he had a plan to solve the problem.

7 56. Levenhagen relied upon Simonson's representation regarding the value of the  
8 property and his assertion that Simonson was also a victim of GFS. To protect his own credit  
9 rating, Levenhagen made the loan payments when it appeared that neither GFS nor Simonson  
10 were going to do so. During this entire period of time, Simonson and his family continued to  
11 reside in the house.

12 57. During the first portion of 2005, Simonson and Levenhagen exchanged emails  
13 concerning the situation. These emails contain multiple references to Simonson and his dispute  
14 with GFS. The general theme of the emails was that Simonson was simply another victim of  
15 GFS and Dave Langford's misconduct. [See e.g., Ex. A-163, pp. 13-28].

16 58. Simonson suggested that the property boundaries of the two properties be  
17 adjusted and then a short plat be done in order to obtain an additional lot. In fact, Simonson had  
18 actually begun this process prior to his initial petition for bankruptcy.

19 59. Simonson retained Respondent on April 20, 2005. Although there was no  
20 specific written agreement regarding the scope of representation, it appears that Simonson

21  
22 <sup>4</sup> Respondent has consistently argued that Simonson was a victim of GFS, and therefore the interests of  
23 Simonson and Levenhagen were not adverse. **See Respondent's Post Hearing Brief Re: Fraudulent**  
24 **Transfers & Defenses.** Although Respondent presented hearsay evidence regarding statements from a  
party involved in the initial closing, this evidence did little to resolve the issue. Circumstantial evidence  
suggests that even if the proceeds did not go directly to Simonson, it may have come to him indirectly in

1 consulted Respondent in order to obtain his legal expertise in handling real estate and business  
2 matters, including those specific to transactions relating to Michael and Rowan's ownership of  
3 his residence.

4 60. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-2, p. 1].

5 61. [Subject to Protective Order].

6 62. On June 7, 2005, Simonson sold Levenhagen his ownership in a limited liability  
7 company known as Network Builders. [Ex. A-9]. This document was not recorded.

8 63. On June 9, 2005, the Levenhagens signed a quit claim deed that transferred their  
9 ownership interest in 11609 Holmes Point Drive to Network Builders LLC. [Ex. A-11].

10 Levenhagen testified that he returned the quit claim deed and other documents directly to  
11 Respondent. [RP 77; lines 4-19].

12 64. [Subject to Protective Order].

13 65. On June 9, 2005, Respondent prepared a real estate excise tax affidavit  
14 documenting the sale of the 11609 property from the Levenhagens to Network Builders LLC.  
15 [Ex. A-12]. This document was necessary in order for the quit claim deed to be recorded as part  
16 of the plan to obtain the third loan on 11609 Holmes Drive N.E. Upon completion of the real  
17 estate excise tax affidavit, Respondent signed, under penalty of perjury, that he was the  
18 Levenhagens agent. On June 10, 2005, Respondent arranged to have the quit claim deed and  
19 the real estate excise tax affidavit recorded.

20 66. Respondent completed the box on the quit claim deed that specified where the  
21 recorded document was to be sent. Rather than putting the Levenhagen's Minnesota address on  
22 the document, Respondent completed the form so that it would be returned to 11609 Holmes

23  
24 the same fashion as he constructed other transactions. Given his behavior relating to other transactions,  
this officer cannot conclude that Simonson was an innocent victim of GFS/Langford.

1 Point Drive N.E., where Simonson was residing.<sup>5</sup>

2 67. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-13].

3 68. On June 13, 2005, Simonson, as manager of Network Builders, LLC, signed a  
4 deed of trust securing a third loan against 11609 Holmes Drive N.E. The loan, from Daniels  
5 Capital was in the amount of \$167,775.56.

6 69. Respondent testified that Daniels Capital prepared the deed of trust. [RP 1532,  
7 lines 5-6.

8 70. In fact, Respondent either drafted the deed of trust document for the loan or  
9 provided the form which was used to draft it. Respondent's law firm was the trustee the final  
10 deed. [Ex. A-14]. Araki Escrow, the company in which he shared profits, did the escrow  
11 paperwork for the loan and the transfer of funds. [RP 1532, lines 1-12]. Simonson received the  
12 proceeds of this loan.

13 71. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Exhibit A-13, p. 1].

14 72. The Levenhagens did not consent to Simonson using 11609 Holmes Drive N.E.  
15 as collateral for a third loan. Neither Simonson nor Respondent informed the Levenhagens of  
16 the proposed loan. No copies of the deed of trust or any other document relating to this loan  
17 were sent to the Levenhagens. [See generally RP 85-86].

18 73. This officer rejects Respondent's contention that the Levenhagens were aware of  
19 the transactions and consented to the loan. Mr. Levenhagen provided the more credible  
20 testimony on this issue. His testimony was also consistent with the contemporaneous emails  
21 relating his concern about when the transactions would close. *See e.g.*, Ex. A-20; A-163, p. 78.

22  
23 <sup>5</sup> At hearing, Respondent testified that he couldn't remember why he completed the form in this manner.  
[RP 1527; lines 24-25].

1           74.     Respondent knew that as of the date of the loan the property on which the loan  
2 was being taken belonged to Michael and Rowan Levenhagen, not Douglas Simonson.

3 Respondent acted intentionally to benefit Simonson.

4           75.     On June 16, 2005, the Levenhagens transferred Network Builders LLC back to  
5 the Simonsons. [Ex. A-18]. Simonson informed Levenhagen that this transfer was necessary  
6 because Kenny North wanted the Simonsons to be the seller to a new buying partner. [Ex. A-  
7 163, p. 40]. The Levenhagens agreed to this proposal based on their understanding that the  
8 documents would be held until it was time to close on the sale of the property to a new buyer  
9 who would release the Levenhagens from the mortgages. [RP 97-98]. They understood that  
10 this transaction was to occur very soon after the transfer back to Simonson.

11           76.     [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-17].

12           77.     Email correspondence between Simonson and Levenhagen established that  
13 Simonson did not inform Levenhagen of the loan and, in fact, concealed that information.  
14 Throughout his correspondence with Levenhagen, he continued to tell Levenhagen that the  
15 closing on loans would occur sometime in the future. Simonson led Levenhagen on in this  
16 matter from mid June 2005 until arrangements were finally made for sale of the property to new  
17 buying partners in late 2005.

18           78.     During this time, Simonson repeatedly represented to Levenhagen that he had no  
19 funds to pay the loan payments on the first two mortgages. The Levenhagens were forced to  
20 make the payments in order to protect their credit rating. Michael Levenhagen testified that  
21 because of the length of time the proposed sale was taking, he borrowed money to make the  
22 payments. [RP 101; lines 22-24].

23           79.     Respondent was aware of the harm caused by the delay in selling the property.  
24

1 Levenhagen testified about multiple contacts with Respondent regarding the updating of escrow  
2 instructions to reflect his additional loan payments and his concern about the timing of closing.  
3 [RP 102, lines 1-6; 106; lines 16-19]. Respondent's testimony established that he was aware of  
4 the Levenhagens' financial stresses and the fact that they were making mortgage payments on  
5 the property. [RP 1526, lines 4-12; 1531, lines 8-14].

6 80. On August 10, 2005, Simonson sold Network Builders LLC to Mark Laing of  
7 Cody, Wyoming. [Ex. A-22]. This sale was part of a plan to use Laing's credit to arrange a  
8 sale of the property at 11609 Holmes Point Drive. Mark Laing also signed a Specific Buying  
9 Agreement dated October 22, 2005. Laing understood that he was simply a straw buyer who  
10 would be paid a fee for the use of his credit. The property was to be controlled by Kenny North  
11 who would divide it into two, demolish the home that was on the lot, and build two new  
12 residences. The documents provided that the LLC would hold title to the property and that the  
13 LLC would then be purchased by Simonson. Any proceeds from the refinance of the property  
14 were to payable to Laing and Simonson and then assigned to Simonson. [Ex. A-26; RP 261].

15 81. Mr. Laing also signed a second set of buying agreements. On October 11, 2005,  
16 he signed a General Buying Agreement with New Century Builders, a Kenny North Company.  
17 [Ex. A-177, pp. 302-307]. That same day he signed a specific buying agreement with the same  
18 company. [Ex. A-177, p. 308].

19 82. A second set of buying partnership agreements were created between another  
20 Kenny North company, Lake Front Development and David and Nancy Laning, Illinois  
21 residents. [Ex. A-200, pp. 6-11]. These agreements allowed funding of construction loans for  
22 the newly created lot.

23 83. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-2, pp. 2-3].

24 84. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-28].

1           85.     In December 2005, Simonson sold Network Builders to Mark Laing (“Laing”)  
2 and his wife, Sylvia, pursuant to the documents described above. Laing then refinanced the  
3 residence and ceded control of the residence to New Century Builders (“New Century”), a  
4 company owned by Simonson’s business partner, Kenny North (“North”).

5           86.     During this transaction, one of the title companies insisted upon a hold back of  
6 the loan proceeds pending resolution of a title issue.

7           87.     In December 2005, Network Builders quitclaimed the new lot to David Laning  
8 (“Laning”) who then obtained a construction loan in his name and ceded control of the new lot  
9 to New Century.

10          88.     Also in December 2005, Levenhagen was repaid for the mortgage payments that  
11 he had made pursuant to irrevocable escrow agreements drafted by Respondent. Levenhagen  
12 assumed that the business transaction was completed with this repayment of the mortgage  
13 payments he had made on the 11609 property.

14           **E. Findings Relating to False Representations on Excise Tax Affidavit**

15          89.     Count one relates to the June 9, 2005 real estate excise tax affidavit, Exhibit A-  
16 12 described further in Finding 65. As noted therein, Respondent prepared and recorded the  
17 document as part of the sale of the 11609 property from Levenhagen to Network Builders LLC  
18 and the plan to get the loan from Daniels Capital to Simonson. [Ex. A-12]. Upon completion of  
19 the real estate excise tax affidavit, Respondent signed, under penalty of perjury, that he was  
20 Levenhagen’s agent.

21          90.     The Levenhagens did not receive a copy of the excise tax affidavit and the other  
22 documents relating to the loan Simonson took out on the 11609 property. [RP 81-82; 97, lines  
23 13-22]. Levenhagen did not authorize Respondent to sign Exhibit A-12 or any other documents  
24

1 on his behalf. [RP 80, lines 10-20].

2 91. Respondent testified at the Hearing that he did have authority, as someone  
3 handling the escrow of these transactions, to sign the excise tax affidavit.<sup>6</sup> He also testified that  
4 “we talked about it before it was even sent. . . .” [RP 1528, line 15].

5 92. This Officer concludes that Respondent was not being truthful during his  
6 testimony at the hearing. His testimony is contradicted by that of Michael Levenhagen<sup>7</sup> and is  
7 not supported by any documentation. No emails exist establishing that these conversations took  
8 place. There are no entries on his Timeslips at this time indicating a telephone conference with  
9 Michael Levenhagen. [See Ex. A-2]. Finally, Levenhagen’s version of events is supported by  
10 other testimony and exhibits.

11 93. Moreover, had Respondent been acting on behalf of Levenhagen, he would have  
12 had a duty to disclose the full nature of his relationship to Simonson regarding that transaction.  
13 There is no evidence that any type of disclosure took place. To the contrary, there is evidence  
14 that shortly after this transaction Levenhagen requested that Jackson provide him with  
15 information and copies of the signed agreements. Instead of sending the documents, all of  
16 which were in his possession both as the attorney and as part of the in house escrow file,  
17 Respondent stated that Simonson would send him the documents. [Ex. A-15].

18 **F. Findings Relating To Bankruptcy Fraud**

19 94. Cedar Hollow Development Company is a company that Respondent and  
20 Simonson used to conceal disbursement of funds on behalf of Douglas Simonson.

21 95. In July 2005, Respondent assisted Simonson in in the formation of three entities.  
22 Cedar Hollow Development LLC was one of these entities. This company was formed on July  
23

24 <sup>6</sup> RP 1529, lines 4-11.

1 19, 2005. Respondent was listed as the registered agent for Cedar Hollow. The members of  
2 this LLC were Network Builders LLC, Doug Simonson, and KC North Family LLC—Kenny  
3 North. Douglas Simonson signed the documents as the organizer. Respondent notarized that  
4 signature. [Ex. A- 21].

5 96. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-2, pp. 4-5].

6 97. On January 19, 2006, the bankruptcy trustee instituted an adversary proceeding  
7 against Simonson based on activity associated with his obtaining a tax refund. The following  
8 day, the attorney representing the trustee obtained a temporary restraining order prohibiting  
9 Simonson, Network Builders LLC, and anyone acting on their behalf from assigning,  
10 conveying, transferring, using, modifying, or taking any action with respect to any and all of the  
11 debtors' assets. [Ex. A-35; RP 333].

12 98. [Subject to Protective Order].

13 99. Based on the totality of the evidence, inconsistencies with Respondent's  
14 testimony, his manner and demeanor during testimony, along with other circumstantial  
15 evidence, this officer concludes that Respondent learned of the bankruptcy court's orders  
16 regarding Simonson's assets on or about January 20, 2006.

17 100. [Subject to Protective Order [Ex. A-2, p. 5] [Ex. A-36].

18 101. On January 27, 2006, the bankruptcy court held a hearing and concluded that the  
19 temporary order should be made permanent, pending the outcome of the adversarial proceeding.  
20 [Ex. 291].

21 102. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-37].

22 103. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-37, p.3]. [Ex. A-39]. [See also Ex. A-  
23 40.]



1 104. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-41]. [Emphasis added.]

2 105. Following this email, \$170,488.86 was transferred from the Cedar Hollow  
3 closings escrow accounts (held by Araki Escrow) directly into Respondent's IOLTA Trust  
4 Account. [Ex. A-33, pp. 38; 41; 44][Ex. A-44].

5 106. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-37].

6 107. On February 14, 2006, \$55,000 from the Cedar Hollows closings was directed to  
7 Patti Jackson. [Ex. A-33, p. 38].

8 108. Respondent testified that this transaction represented repayment of a \$50,000  
9 loan he and his wife had made to Simonson. [Ex. 46, p. 109]. This money was apparently  
10 advanced for Mr. Simonson's benefit on February 7, 2007 through use of one of the Jacksons'  
11 personal accounts. [Ex. A-45]. A week later it was returned to the Jacksons with an additional  
12 \$5,000, apparently as "interest and loan fees." [Ex. A-35][Ex. A-46, p. 109, lines 18-22].

13 Respondent said that he wired the money to "somebody I didn't know to exercise an option on  
14 behalf of one of the companies in which I understood Mr. Simonson had an interest." [RP  
15 1556, lines 9-18]. Respondent did not have a promissory note documenting this transaction. *Id.*

16 109. On February 17, 2006, the bankruptcy judge signed a formal restraining order.  
17 This order froze Simonson's banking accounts, thus restricting his access to approximately  
18 \$67,000 in cash. The court ordered the financial institutions who held the funds to forward

19 110. The order provided that until the outcome of the adversarial proceeding,  
20 Simonson could use his assets only in the ordinary course of business, and stated that he could  
21 draw only \$4,000 per month for his personal use. [Ex. A-43]. Network Builders was to provide  
22 the Trustee with copies of all bank statements and canceled checks within two days of their  
23 receipt by Network Builders. [Ex. A-43, p. 3]. Finally, the court ruled: "Ordered that the  
24 debtors, Network Builders, LLC., and any other entities in which the debtors have a controlling

1 interest or anyone acting on their behalf, are enjoined from assigning, conveying, transferring,  
2 using, modifying, or taking any action in respect to any and all of the debtors [sic] assets or the  
3 assets of any entity in which the debtor has a controlling interest.” [Ex. A-43, p. 3].

4 111. Respondent testified that he became “aware” of the February 17, 2006 order  
5 “probably about a month later, if I remember correctly.” [RP 1562; lines 10-14; lines 19-24].

6 112. Respondent’s testimony is not credible. From April 2005 on, Simonson  
7 consulted Respondent frequently, and in depth, regarding multiple business transactions  
8 involving the subject companies and assets. Simonson relied upon Respondent to provide the  
9 name of an attorney to handle the bankruptcy case. Emails and time records after the January  
10 19<sup>th</sup> hearing are consistent with Respondent being aware of the orders. Moreover, a reasonable  
11 attorney, learning that his client was having bankruptcy issues which required referral to a  
12 bankruptcy attorney, would be suspicious of any attempt to use trust accounts to transfer large  
13 sums of money on behalf of the debtor. Nonetheless, On February 17, 2006, the same day that  
14 the bankruptcy court entered the permanent restraining order, \$170,488.86 was deposited into  
15 Respondent’s trust account. [Ex. A-44; RP 1557].

16 These funds were disbursed as follows:

17 113. On 2/27/2006 Respondent issued a check in the amount of \$4,000 to Velma  
18 Timmons and a \$2,000 check to Simonson’s son. [Exhibits A-49; A-50].

19 114. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-53].

20 115. On the same day, Respondent disbursed \$4,000 directly to Simonson. [Ex. A-  
21 51].

22 116. [Subject to Protective Order] [Ex. A-54].

23 117. The next day, March 3, 2006, Respondent issued two IOLTA checks on  
24

1 Simonson's behalf to Encompass and two checks in the amount of \$5,000 each to Simonson.

2 [Exhibits A-55; A-56; A-57; A-58].

3 118. The bankruptcy court's restraining order had placed a monthly limit of \$4,000  
4 for Simonson. [Ex. A-43]. Nonetheless, on March 6<sup>1</sup>, Respondent issued two checks to  
5 Simonson. Each of those checks exceeded the monthly limitation contained in the restraining  
6 order.

7 119. The use of Respondent's IOLTA account allowed the payments to Simonson and  
8 those made on his behalf, to go undetected<sup>8</sup> by the trustee.

9 120. Despite his knowledge of the restraining order, on March 8, 2006, Respondent  
10 issued an IOLTA account check to Key Bank to purchase a cashier check. The check was in the  
11 amount of \$79,057.45 and was payable to Merendon Mining. This company was the tax shelter  
12 that was the apparent source of Simonson's retroactive tax refund.

13 121. On the same day, Respondent purchased a second certified check in the amount  
14 of \$34,056.50, also payable to Merendon Mining. The funds to purchase both checks originated  
15 in the Araki Escrow account as a result of closings associated with Kenny North's company,  
16 Cedar Hollow. The funds were deposited in Respondent's trust account and then used to  
17 purchase the cashier's checks on Simonson's behalf.

18 122. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-2, p. 6].

19 123. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-70].

20 124. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-71].

21 125. On March 9, 2006, Respondent issued an IOLTA check for \$8,341.67 to the  
22 Ritchie Group. The memo line stated that it was for "Manna Funding." [Ex. A-72].

23 \_\_\_\_\_  
24 <sup>8</sup> The order required that Simonson provide copy of bank statements and any checks received within two days of their receipt. [Ex. A-43].

1           126.    On March 10, 2006 Respondent issued an IOLTA check in the amount of \$5,000  
2 for payment of the retainer for Greg Cavagnaro. [Ex. A-73]. Five days later he cut a check to  
3 Simonson's son in the amount of \$7,000. [Ex. A-74].

4           127.    Respondent paid himself \$5,000 in fees from the IOLTA account on the same  
5 day, using the check to pay one of his credit cards. [Ex. A-75].

6           128.    At the same time these transactions were occurring, Araki Escrow was paying  
7 itself substantial fees for escrow services. Respondent was also receiving \$1,000 in fees for  
8 each closing. There are a total of 27, \$1,000 payments to Respondent from this account. [Ex.  
9 A-33].

10          129.    Respondent acknowledged the above transactions but claimed that he followed  
11 the court's orders once he learned of them. He stated that he informed the closing person that  
12 "as anything relates to Mr. Simonson, you can't close any transactions, release any monies or do  
13 anything basically without first speaking with his bankruptcy counsel, Mr. Cavagnaro, to make  
14 sure that he was in compliance . . . ." [RP 1563, lines 1-6]. As noted above, Respondent  
15 learned of the restraining orders on or about January 20, 2006. Respondent's testimony  
16 suggesting compliance with the orders is rejected as not credible.

17          130.    On March 27, 2006, the bankruptcy trustee's lawyer, Denice Moewes, wrote  
18 Cavagnaro expressing her concern that Simonson had violated the court's order by transferring  
19 \$113,080 to Merendon Mining following the February order. [Ex. A-78]. Moewes stated her  
20 intent to seek an immediate contempt hearing. She also requested that Cavagnaro have his  
21 client "bring all records indicating where the money came from and whose account it was in and  
22 out of which account the cashier's checks were issued." *Id.*

23          131.    [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-78].  
24

1           132.    On March 28, 2006, Moewes filed "Trustee's Emergency Motion for Immediate  
2 Hearing on Trustee's Motion for Contempt and Order Freezing All Bank Accounts." [Ex. A-  
3 79].

4           133.    On the same day, additional checks were issued from the Cedar Hollow closing  
5 accounts. Two checks totaling \$11,000 were issued to Simonson. [Ex. A-35, check numbers  
6 3757; 3758]. A third check was issued for attorney's fees to Respondent. Still another check  
7 was issued to Araki Escrow Services. [Ex. A-33, p. 71].

8           134.    Respondent issued a fifth check in the amount of \$21,119.63, to Moss Bay  
9 Partners LLC. [Ex. A-35, check #3760]. Moss Bay Partners LLC was a Simonson company.

10          135.    Following the hearing on this matter, the bankruptcy court issued a "Second  
11 Restraining Order" on March 30, 2006. [Ex. A-81]. In this order, the court reserved ruling on  
12 the question of whether or not the funds Respondent disbursed on behalf of Simonson would be  
13 brought back into the estate. Again the order enjoined any actions regarding Simonson's assets  
14 and liabilities.

15          136.    On May 10, 2006, the bankruptcy court issued a letter ruling in the first  
16 adversarial proceeding relating to Simonson's use of the tax refund. The court ruled that  
17 Simonson had violated the February 16, 2006 restraining order by borrowing money, having  
18 the money deposited in his attorney's trust account and then disbursed. [Ex. A-88].

19          137.    The court ruled that Simonson was required to return the proceeds of the tax  
20 refund, that he was in contempt of court by violating the restraining order, and that attorneys  
21 Jackson and Cavagnaro were to turn over "all funds in their possession paid to them after the  
22 entry of the Agreed Restraining Order on account of the debtors and from whatever source."  
23 [Emphasis added.] The court also noted that "it appears that Cavagnaro received funds from the  
24

1 debtors that he knew or should have known would not comply with the terms of the Agreed  
2 Restraining Order.” The court ordered Cavagnaro to file a report indicating what date he  
3 received the funds and how much he received.

4 138. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-89].

5 139. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-94].

6 140. At the beginning of June, 2006, the bankruptcy court directed Respondent and  
7 his firm to account for any funds that had been deposited in accounts on behalf of Simonson.  
8 The order directed Respondent to create a report “setting forth the date and amount of each and  
9 every payment he has received from the debtors, their entities, or from any other party on behalf  
10 of the debtors or for the benefit of the debtors, since January 20, 2006” and directed Jackson to  
11 turnover to the trustee all funds he had in his possession or control that “belong to the debtors,  
12 that are within the control of the debtors, or any entity in which the debtors have an interest.”  
13 [Ex. A-95]. [Emphasis added]. This order did not limit the disclosure to funds in Respondent’s  
14 trust account.

15 141. On June 12, 2006, Respondent sent a letter, an accounting and a trust account  
16 check in the amount \$7,985.74 to the trustee. [Ex. A-97]. The accounting did not reveal that  
17 the Jacksons had made a \$50,000 loan on behalf of Simonson and that in return they had been  
18 repaid \$55,000 a week later. Respondent intentionally concealed this information in order to  
19 hide his involvement in the fraud being perpetrated on the bankruptcy court.

20 142. On June 21, 2006, Respondent’s wife issued a check from an account in the  
21 name of RPC Enterprise to Manna Funding, LLC. The testimony at the hearing established that  
22 RPC Enterprises did no business with Manna Funding and that Manna Funding was a Tiffany  
23 Doty entity. Tiffany Doty was another person to whom Respondent directed funds on  
24

1 Simonson's behalf.

2 143. On August 11, 2006, Respondent disbursed a total of \$14,017.05 from his trust  
3 account from funds that had been held back by the title company in the Laing transaction. The  
4 money was disbursed as follows:

- 5 a. \$4,000 to Stephen Araki for attorney fees
- 6 b. \$3,000 to Spec's Ltd for expert retainer fees
- 7 c. \$1,500 to Robert Jackson for reimbursement
- 8 d. \$5,517.05 to Robert Jackson for attorney's fees.

9 [Ex. A-280].

10 144. The trustee learned of the existence of the money in early 2008 and subpoenaed  
11 the records. In response, Respondent sent the checks and the above information. The cover  
12 letter stated that "we were authorized by Mr. Laing to disburse the funds . . . ." [Ex. 280, p. 1].

13 145. That statement was false. Laing testified that no one notified him that there was  
14 money belonging to him in Respondent's trust account and that he did not authorize anyone to  
15 make the above disbursements.<sup>9</sup> He also testified that it was his understanding that he would  
16 not be charged for the legal services and that to his knowledge he did not owe attorney's fees to  
17 Robert Jackson.<sup>10</sup> Finally, Respondent could produce no documents in response to the  
18 Association's ELC 10.13(c) demand that notified Laing of the existence of the money or  
19 established that Laing consented to having it disbursed in that manner.

20 146. These funds were in fact being disbursed on behalf of Simonson for fees being  
21 incurred by Simonson and as part of the scheme to conceal expenditures of funds on his behalf.  
22 Respondent knew that these funds belonged to Simonson because he had participated in  
23

24 <sup>9</sup> RP 293-294.

1 structuring the sales agreements and escrow accounts in which the transaction occurred.

2 147. Respondent knowingly and intentionally violated the January 19, 2006 and  
3 February 16, 2006 restraining orders by agreeing to deposit \$170,488.86 into his IOLTA  
4 account as an advance from the Cedar Hollow closings on behalf of Douglas Simonson.  
5 Respondent accepted this money with full knowledge that his conduct was prohibited by a valid  
6 restraining order. He then disbursed the funds pursuant Simonson's specific directions, again  
7 with full knowledge that the disbursements of the funds violated the restraining order.

8 148. Respondent acted willfully and intentionally to benefit himself and his client.

9 149. On November 2, 2006, Respondent colluded with Simonson to further violate the  
10 restraining order.<sup>11</sup>

11 150. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-170]. [Ex. A-170, p. 2]

12 151. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-170, p. 2].

13 152. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-170, p. 1].

14 153. The day after Respondent and Simonson colluded to hide additional funds from  
15 the bankruptcy court by having Jackson borrow the funds, the attorneys filed a response to the  
16 trustee's motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether Simonson's 2004 discharge  
17 should be revoked. [Ex. A-172]. On page 3 of that document, Simonson's counsel asserted  
18 that revocation was improper because there was no evidence that Simonson's lack of  
19 compliance with the order was "willful and intentional." [Ex. A-172, p. 3]. Counsel argued  
20 "Trustee cannot meet its burden since the Debtors have testified that any actions in which they  
21 engaged in borrowing money were not done to willfully and intentionally violate the Court's

22 <sup>10</sup> [RP 286-87].

23 <sup>11</sup> This conduct is not part of the charges brought by the Association. Nonetheless, it is being included as  
24 additional information relevant to Respondent's credibility and other appropriate ER 404(b)  
considerations.



1 February 16, 2006 Order.”

2 154. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-173].

3 155. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-174].

4 156. Although it is not clear from the evidence what became of the transactions  
5 discussed in these emails, Respondent’s willingness to participate in these discussions  
6 illustrates a total contempt for his obligations as an officer of the court.

7 157. This officer concludes that Respondent actively and intentionally participated in  
8 the fraud on the bankruptcy court, using multiple accounts, to conceal the trail of money.  
9 Respondent’s conduct harmed the judicial system and the creditors of Douglas Simonson.  
10 Funds rightfully belonging to the estate were diverted to Douglas Simonson.

11 158. The bankruptcy trustee’s lawyer spent a substantial amount of time attempting to  
12 protect the assets by repeated motions before the bankruptcy court based on the facts as she  
13 discovered them. Had Respondent not chosen to use his trust account and personal accounts to  
14 hide these funds, neither the court nor the attorney representing the bankruptcy trustee would  
15 have had to invest the time and effort necessary to halt Simonson’s fraudulent transactions.

16 159. In actively and intentionally participating in the fraud on the bankruptcy court,  
17 Respondent violated 18 U.S.C., Section 152.

18 160. Based on the totality of Respondent’s demeanor during his testimony, the  
19 contradictions between his testimony and the exhibits, and the testimony of other, credible  
20 witnesses, this Officer concludes that Respondent intentionally provided false testimony during  
21 the hearing relating to his knowledge of the restraining orders in order to conceal his role in  
22 perpetrating the fraud on the bankruptcy court.

23 161. That false testimony included: 1) his denial that he knew the of the existence of  
24 the various bankruptcy orders; 2) his denial of the role he played as the chief attorney in the

1 Simonson's bankruptcy action; and 3) his denial that he transferred funds with knowledge of  
2 the existence of the orders.

3 **G. Facts Relating to Conflicts of Interests**

4 162. During late 2005 and early 2006, the trustee's attorney was attempting to obtain  
5 information regarding the real property transactions associated with the 11609 Holmes Point  
6 Drive property and actively investigating the specific property transfers involving Mike and  
7 Rowan Levenhagen, the Laings and the Lanings. The conflict of interest charges arise from  
8 Respondent's conduct in relationship to these individuals and his relationship with Simonson.

9 163. Exhibit A-37 and other emails established that Respondent was Simonson's  
10 primary legal advisor, for all issues, including those relating to his bankruptcy.<sup>12</sup>

11 164. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-2, p. 5]. [Ex. A-38.] [Ex. A-2, p. 5].

12 165. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-59].

13 166. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-2, p. 6]. [Ex. A-60].

14 167. [Subject to Protective Order]. [See exhibits A-62; 65; 66; 67].

15 168. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-2, p. 7].

16 169. [Subject to Protective Order].

17 170. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-82]. [Ex. A-82, p. 2].

18 171. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-2, p. 7].

19 173. On April 29, 2006, Moewes formally filed what has been referred to as the  
20 "Second Adversarial proceeding." This lawsuit named a number of individuals and entities who  
21 had played some role in the property transfers. Of concern to this hearing is the fact that this  
22 complaint named Global Financial Systems Inc., Michael and Rowan Levenhagen, David and

---

23 <sup>12</sup> It is thus not believable that given this reliance, Simonson and/or Cavagnaro did not discuss the court's  
24 order. This fact also contributed to this officer finding that Respondent gave false testimony regarding  
his knowledge of the orders.

1 Nancy Lanning, and Mark and Sylvia Laing.

2 174. At the time this complaint was filed, Respondent was the registered agent for  
3 Global Financial Systems, Inc. He continued as its registered agent until May 3, 2006.<sup>13</sup>

4 175. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-90].

5 176. On May 16, 2006, Mike Levenhagen contacted Respondent. His email stated  
6 that he had been given a heads up regarding the fact that he was being named in the lawsuit and  
7 that Simonson had recommended Jackson as the best one for the job. Levenhagen expressed  
8 concerns about the potential for conflicts of interest. Levenhagen informed Respondent that "I  
9 do have a concern about any conflict of interest you might have with Doug or any other party  
10 involved in this. I know, however, that Doug has separate representation for his bankruptcy  
11 proceedings." [Ex. A-91].

12 177. Respondent did not inform Levenhagen that he had actively participated in  
13 defending Simonson in the first adversarial proceeding. He did not inform Levenhagen that he  
14 and his firm had been the subject of various demands for documentation regarding allegedly  
15 fraudulent transfers of funds.

16 178. The Laings and the Lanings also conferred with Respondent regarding  
17 representation. Again, Respondent failed to inform these potential clients of his role in the first  
18 adversarial proceeding.

19 179. On June 21, 2006, Respondent and another member of his firm, Stephen Araki,  
20 sent a letter to the Levenhagens, Lanings and Laings discussing potential conflict issues. [Ex.  
21 A-108]. The letter nominally set out the applicable Rules of Professional Conduct and  
22 discussed their applicability.

23 <sup>13</sup> It is not clear why Respondent remained as GFS's registered agent during the 2005 disputes Simonson  
24 and Doty were having with this company and David Langford.

1           180. This letter did not comply with the terms of RPC 1.7(b). Repeatedly, the letter  
2 referred to the fact that the firm did not believe that there were conflicts. The letter stated that  
3 “We do not believe that any of the issues presented in this lawsuit create any conflicts with  
4 respect to Mr. Simonson or Network Builders . . . .” [Ex. A-108, p. 1]. The letter stated that it  
5 “appears as though there are no claims that are likely to develop between you or any other  
6 client. . . .” [Ex. A-108, p. 2]. The letter further reassured the reader that “we believe that our  
7 representation of each of you will not be adversely affected by our representation of the other  
8 party because, to the extent that conflicts are possible, there are only potential conflicts at this  
9 time and we do not see that a real conflict is likely.” [Ex. A-108, p. 3]. These statements were  
10 false.

11           181. As of the date of this letter, Robert Jackson had actual conflicts that precluded  
12 him and his firm from accepting representation of the Levenhagens. The facts discussed  
13 above and the others established by the exhibits and testimony support the conclusion that an  
14 irreconcilable conflict existed between the interests of the Levenhagens on one hand and those  
15 of Respondent and Simonson on the other. These conflicts created a significant risk that the  
16 representation would be limited by his personal interest and/or his responsibilities. As of June  
17 21, 2006, these facts precluded representation:

- 18           a. Respondent had fraudulently signed paperwork representing that he was an agent  
19           of Levenhagen in June of 2005 when he was not an agent and was not authorized  
20           to sign that document;
- 21           b. Respondent failed to inform the Levenhagens that he had signed the above  
22           document.
- 23           c. Respondent drafted documents on behalf of Doug Simonson that allowed  
24           Simonson to obtain additional funds using the property owned by Levenhagen.  
            Levenhagen neither knew of this transaction nor received any benefit from it.
- d. Respondent’s firm held the deed of trust on the above loan and Respondent had

1 an interest in the fees generated by the in house escrow firm that handled this  
2 escrow and subsequent transactions.

- 3 e. Respondent had assisted and participated in Simonson's attempts to defraud the  
4 bankruptcy court by concealing the movement of funds in violation of valid  
5 orders of the bankruptcy court and by using his trust account as a vehicle of the  
6 fraudulent activity.
- 7 f. Respondent had personally benefited by the payment of fees and a usurious  
8 interest on the \$50,000 loan made on behalf of Douglas Simonson.
- 9 g. Respondent had been acting as the attorney in fact, if not name, for Douglas  
10 Simonson in all matters relating to his bankruptcy as of January 2006. The  
11 activities associated with this representation were inconsistent with the interests  
12 of the Levenhagens.
- 13 h. The Levenhagens had valid potential claims against both Simonson and Robert  
14 Jackson.

15 182. Even assuming that the above facts did not create an irreconcilable conflict,  
16 neither Respondent nor members of the firm could move forward on the representation until  
17 such time as they had fully informed the Levenhagens of the above facts and obtained their  
18 written consent to waive those conflicts. None of this information was provided to the  
19 Levenhagens. To the contrary, the actual conflict letter summarily and inaccurately dismissed  
20 the notion that any conflicts existed.

21 183. As of the date of this letter, Robert Jackson had actual conflicts that precluded  
22 him and his firm from accepting representation of the Laings. The facts discussed above and  
23 the others established by the exhibits and testimony support the conclusion that an  
24 irreconcilable conflict existed between the interests of the Laings on one hand and those of  
Respondent and Simonson on the other. These conflicts created a significant risk that the  
representation would be limited by his personal interest and/or his responsibilities to Simonson.  
As of June 21, 2006, these facts precluded representation of the Laings:

- a. Respondent had assisted and participated in Simonson's attempts to defraud the

1 bankruptcy court by concealing the movement of funds in violation of valid  
2 orders of the bankruptcy court and by using his trust account as a vehicle of the  
fraudulent activity;

- 3 b. Respondent had personally benefited by the payment of fees and usurious  
4 interest on the \$50,000 loan made on behalf of Douglas Simonson;
- 5 c. Respondent had been acting as the attorney in fact, if not name, for Douglas  
6 Simonson in all matters relating to his bankruptcy as of January 2006. The  
activities associated with this representation were inconsistent with the interests  
of the Laings;
- 7 d. The Laings had valid potential claims against both Simonson and Robert  
8 Jackson.

9 184. Even assuming that the above facts did not create an irreconcilable conflict,  
10 neither Respondent nor members of the firm could move forward on the representation until  
11 such time as they had fully informed the Laings of the above facts and obtained their written  
12 consent. In fact, this information was not provided to the Laings. To the contrary, the actual  
13 conflict letter summarily and inaccurately dismissed the notion that any conflicts existed.

14 185. As of the date of this letter, Robert Jackson had actual conflicts that precluded  
15 him and his firm from accepting representation of the Lanings. The facts discussed above and  
16 the others established by the exhibits and testimony support the conclusion that an  
17 irreconcilable conflict existed between the interests of the Lanings on one hand and those of  
18 Respondent and Simonson on the other. These conflicts created a significant risk that the  
19 representation would be limited by Respondent's personal interest and/or his responsibilities to  
20 Simonson. As of June 21, 2006, these facts precluded representation:

- 21 a. Respondent had assisted and participated in Simonson's attempts to defraud the  
22 bankruptcy court by concealing the movement of funds in violation of valid  
orders of the bankruptcy court and using his trust account as a vehicle of the  
fraudulent activity;
- 23 b. Respondent had personally benefited by the payment of fees and usurious  
24 interest on the \$50,000 loan made on behalf of Douglas Simonson;

1  
2 c. Respondent had been acting as the attorney in fact, if not name, for Douglas  
3 Simonson in all matters relating to his bankruptcy as of January 2006. The  
4 activities associated with this representation were inconsistent with the interests  
5 of the Lanings;

6  
7 d. The Lanings had valid potential claims against both Simonson and Robert  
8 Jackson.

9  
10 186. Even assuming that the above facts did not create an irreconcilable conflict,  
11 neither Respondent nor members of the firm could move forward on the representation until  
12 such time as they had fully informed the Lanings of the above facts and obtained their written  
13 consent to waive the conflicts. In fact, this information was not provided to the Lanings. To  
14 the contrary, actual conflict letter summarily and inaccurately dismissed the notion that any  
15 conflicts existed.

16  
17 187. Respondent acted knowingly and intentionally in securing the Levenhagens as  
18 clients in order to protect his own interests and the interests of Douglas Simonson.

19  
20 188. Respondent acted knowingly and intentionally in securing the Laings as clients  
21 in order to protect his own interests and the interests of Douglas Simonson.

22  
23 189. Respondent acted knowingly and intentionally in securing the Lanings as clients  
24 in order to protect his own interests and the interests of Douglas Simonson.

187  
188  
189  
190. Despite the existence of these conflicts, between July 17, 2006 and June 8, 2007,  
Respondent represented the Levenhagens in the second adversary proceeding and purported to  
act on their behalf.

191. Despite the existence of these conflicts, between July 17, 2006 and June 21,  
2007, Respondent represented the Lanings in the second adversary proceeding and purported to  
act on their behalf.

192. Despite the existence of these conflicts, between July 17, 2006 and June 21,

1 2007, Respondent represented the Laings in the second adversary proceeding and purported to  
2 act on their behalf.

3 193. Simonson and/or North agreed to pay the attorney fees for the Levenhagens, the  
4 Laings and/or the Lanings regarding the second adversary proceeding.

5 194. During all or part of Respondent's representation of the Levenhagens, the Laings  
6 and/or the Lanings, there was a significant risk that Respondent's representation of the  
7 Levenhagens, the Laings and/or the Lanings would be materially limited by his personal interest  
8 and/or his responsibilities to Simonson.

9 195. During all or part of Respondent's representation of the Levenhagens, the Laings  
10 and/or the Lanings, it was not reasonable for Respondent to believe that he would be able to  
11 provide competent and diligent representation to the Levenhagens, the Laings, and/or the  
12 Lanings.

13 196. During Respondent's representation of the Levenhagens, the Laings, and/or the  
14 Lanings, Respondent did not obtain the informed consent in writing from the Levenhagens, the  
15 Laings, and/or the Lanings to any actual or potential conflict of interest regarding his  
16 representation of them in the second adversary proceeding.

17 197. After Respondent's firm entered a notice of appearance for the Levenhagens, the  
18 Laings and the Lanings, Attorney Stephen Araki's name appeared as the attorney of record. In  
19 fact, Respondent did the majority of the work associated with this representation. Respondent  
20 made decisions regarding the course of the defenses to be raised on behalf of the Levenhagens,  
21 Laings and Lanings based primarily on his own self-interest and those of his other client,  
22 Douglas Simonson.

23 198. During the approximately 10 months Respondent represented the Levenhagens,  
24



1 Laings and Lanings, Respondent's conduct of the defense created substantial damage to the  
2 Levenhagens, the Laings and the Lanings and interfered with their ability to obtain a cost  
3 effective and timely resolution of their individual disputes with the bankruptcy trustee. The  
4 following findings discuss some of the specific instances wherein the Respondent made choices  
5 regarding the representation of these clients that placed his interests and/or the interests of  
6 Douglas Simonson before that of these clients.

7 199. The complaint naming the Levenhagens/Laings/Lanings sought an order  
8 vacating the order of abandonment. Key to the issue of whether the abandonment order would  
9 be vacated was the question of whether or not the debtor, Douglas Simonson, had perpetrated a  
10 fraud on the court in order to obtain the abandonment.

11 200. On July 21, 2006, Araki filed a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6).  
12 [Exhibit A-118] on behalf of the Levenhagens, Laings and Lanings. In that motion, Araki  
13 argued that the case could not proceed because the 11609 property was not property of the  
14 estate since it had been abandoned by the trustee in 2004.

15 201. In September 2006, the bankruptcy court denied the 12(b) (6) motion and  
16 informed the parties that the first issue that needed to be addressed was whether the order of  
17 abandonment would be vacated based on the alleged fraud.

18 202. On September 6, 2006, Moewes filed a second amended complaint adding  
19 Simonson to the second adversarial proceeding. Despite the formal addition of Simonson to the  
20 proceeding, Respondent continued to representing the Levenhagens, Laings and Lanings as well  
21 as providing legal advice and drafting pleadings for Simonson.

22 203. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-2, p. 18].

23 204. On October 3, 2006, Michael Levenhagen sent Respondent an email describing  
24 the facts associated with his ownership of the 11609 property. [Ex. A-143]. This document

1 was intended to be used in his defense. That summary included the information that Doug  
2 Simonson was one of Levenhagen's initial contacts and that the Levenhagens worked with  
3 Simonson as a representative of GFS during the acquisition. Levenhagen informed Respondent  
4 that at the time they purchased the property, they "had no knowledge of the history or prior  
5 ownership of the property." Levenhagen described how he learned about Simonson's  
6 bankruptcy after the purchase in late December 2004.

7 205. Levenhagen's email contained a summary of the transfers in June of 2005 and  
8 detailed how the Levenhagens had made all the loan payments from August 2005 to November  
9 2005. It is obvious from this email, that Levenhagen had no knowledge of the third mortgage  
10 Simonson had placed on the property in June of 2005 with Respondent's assistance.

11 206. On October 5, 2006, Cavagnaro filed Simonson's answer to the second amended  
12 complaint. That Answer included cross claims against GFS, David Langford and Hodges and  
13 Associates. [Ex. A-146]. The Answer alleged facts suggesting that Simonson was simply a  
14 victim of an equity skimming scheme developed by the GFS, Langford and Hodges and asserted  
15 that Simonson had not perpetrated any fraud upon the court.

16 207. Respondent worked on the answer and affirmative defenses for the Levenhagens,  
17 Laings and Lanings on October 6, 2006. At this time, Respondent had in his possession  
18 information that could, and should, have been used to protect the interests of these clients.

19 208. On October 16, 2006, Mr. Araki filed a document entitled Answer, Affirmative  
20 Defenses, Cross claims and Counter Claim. Like the Simonson Answer, this document  
21 contained allegations that GFS/Langford engaged in an equity skimming scheme and asserted  
22 that Simonson was an innocent victim. The factual statements supporting these assertions were  
23 untrue and inconsistent with the factual claims that should have been asserted in order to protect  
24 the rights of the Levenhagens, the Laings and the Lanings.

1           209. Respondent knew that the facts asserted in the Levenhagen/Laing/Laning  
2 Answer regarding Simonson's status as a victim were untrue. The Answer also did not contain  
3 the pertinent facts regarding Simonson's involvement with GFS outlined in Levenhagen's  
4 October 3, 2006 email to Respondent.

5           210. Respondent knowingly coordinated the facts in both Answers in order to protect  
6 Simonson. In doing so, Respondent concealed the real facts from the bankruptcy court,  
7 prolonged the litigation against the Levenhagens/Laings/Lanings and caused them harm.

8           211. At the time that this document was filed, valid claims existed against both  
9 Simonson and Robert Jackson. None of the clients were advised of the existence of these  
10 claims. No claims were brought against Simonson or Robert Jackson.

11           212. On October 13, 2006 the Herman Racor firm filed Defendants' Motion for  
12 Summary Judgment on behalf of the Levenhagens/Laings/Lanings. This motion was supported,  
13 in part, by the declarations of Michael Levenhagen, David Laning and Mark Laing.

14           213. [Subject to Protective Order [Ex. A-147].

15           214. Levenhagen neither knew of, nor consented to, the act described above. [RP 144-  
16 45].

17           215. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-149].

18           216. Laing neither knew of, nor consented to, the act described above.

19           217. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-150].

20           218. Laning neither knew of, nor consented to, the act described above.

21           219. [Subject to Protective Order].

22           220. On September 26, 2006, the trustee's attorney sent Requests for Production to  
23 the Herman Racor firm requesting documents from Levenhagen, Laing and Laning. The  
24

1 requests specifically demanded documents that mentioned Douglas or Karen Simonson and  
2 Network Builders. By its terms, the request included emails. [Exhibits A-139; 140; 141 (at  
3 page 5 on each)].

4 221. These requests were forwarded on to the clients.

5 222. On October 30, 2006, Michael Levenhagen sent Respondent, via Federal  
6 Express, a packet of materials. Contained in that packet were multiple emails responsive to the  
7 trustee's request. [Ex. A-163]. Levenhagen understood that these emails were to be delivered  
8 to the trustee in response to the request for production.

9 223. The emails Levenhagen sent to Respondent to be turned over to the trustee  
10 established, inter alia, that 1) Douglas Simonson was actively involved in the original sale of the  
11 11609 Holmes Point Drive property to Levenhagen in 2004; 2) Simonson was acting as an agent  
12 of GFS at the time; 3) Simonson portrayed himself as a victim of GFS and Levenhagen relied  
13 upon that representation; 4) Levenhagen did not know about the June 2005 loan Simonson  
14 obtained from Daniels Capital; and 5) Respondent was actively involved in many of the  
15 transactions.

16 224. Earlier in 2006, Respondent had requested that Levenhagen provide copies of  
17 materials that related to the subject of the lawsuit. [Ex. A-283; p. 2]. After receiving that  
18 request, Levenhagen went through his records and produced copies of the documents that  
19 related to the original purchase of the property. These documents were sent via Federal  
20 Express to Respondent. Included in these documents was a copy of the Global Financial  
21 Solutions Buying Partner General agreement upon that Levenhagen had written the name of  
22 Doug Simonson on the Global Financial Solutions signature line. Levenhagen placed  
23 Simonson's name on this document because Simonson was his contact at Global Financial  
24

1 Solutions. This document, with the name of Doug Simonson in that section, was provided to  
2 Herman Recor on June 23, 2006.

3 225. On November 7, 2006, Herman Recor produced documents it said was  
4 responsive to the requests for production. A clear preponderance of the evidence established  
5 that these responses were completed primarily by Respondent although they were electronically  
6 signed by Stephen Araki. The responses contained only a limited number of documents, most  
7 of that were available from public records.

8 226. The responses contained no emails.

9 227. The response did not include the General Partner Agreement Levenhagen that  
10 had provided to Herman Recor on June 23, 2006 that listed to Doug Simonson as the person  
11 representing GFS.

12 228. The emails contained in Exhibit A-163, had they been provided, would have  
13 helped to establish that Levenhagen was a victim, not a party to the bankruptcy fraud.  
14 Similarly, the General Buying Agreement with Simonson's name on it would have assisted the  
15 trustee and court in understanding that Simonson was an agent of GFS.

16 229. A number of other highly relevant documents that exculpated Levenhagen, but  
17 implicated Simonson and/or Respondent, were withheld from this and subsequent requests for  
18 production. These documents included the June 6, 2005 LLC Purchase and Sale agreement [Ex.  
19 A-9]; the Deed of Trust on the Daniels Capital loan showing that Herman Recor was the trustee  
20 in that transaction [Ex. A-14]; and the second LLC Purchase and Sale Agreement that  
21 transferred Network Builders back to the Simonsons [Ex. A-18].

22 230. Instead of providing these documents, Respondent intentionally withheld them in  
23 order to conceal his role in the transactions and the culpability of Douglas Simonson.

1           231. Respondent did not inform Levenhagen that he was withholding the documents.  
2 Levenhagen did not consent to the documents being withheld. Respondent did not indicate on  
3 the requests for production that other documents, responsive to the production requests were  
4 being withheld.

5           232. Respondent acted knowingly and intentionally in withholding these documents.

6           233. To a lesser extent, Respondent also failed to produce documents provided to him  
7 by the other clients. As with Levenhagen, the failure to produce these documents benefited  
8 Respondent and/or Simonson but impaired a proper defense of these clients.

9           234. On October 25, 2006, Respondent requested documents from Mark Laing. [Ex.  
10 A-158]. Laing sent 10 emails to Respondent on October 27, 2006. One of those emails was  
11 dated March 4, 2006. Laing commented on this specific email, telling Respondent that this was  
12 “the first knowledge I had of his (Simonson’s) bankruptcy. Had I known the details of all this I  
13 would never have gotten involved. I thought it was just another ‘buying partner program’ that  
14 Kenny North was offering to me.” [Ex. A-158].

15           235. The emails provided by attachment to exhibit A-158 were not provided at the  
16 time to the trustee. Had those emails been provided in a timely fashion they would have  
17 assisted in providing Laing with the defense that he too was a victim of Simonson.

18           236. Respondent did not inform Laing that he was withholding emails that Laing had  
19 provided to him. Laing did not consent to the withholding of the documents.

20           237. On December 1, 2006, the bankruptcy court denied summary judgment motions  
21 filed on behalf of Levenhagen, Laing and Laning and ruled that Levenhagen was an initial  
22 transferee as to the 2004 sale of the property at 11609 Holmes Point. The impact of that ruling  
23 was to impose strict liability on Levenhagen for the transfer.

24           238. Unaware that Levenhagen was in fact a victim of Simonson’s fraud, the court

1 referred the case to the U.S. Attorney's office for investigation. She noted: "The documents  
2 that have been submitted, and the testimony that's been submitted by way of declarations  
3 describes criminal activity; criminal fraud, bank fraud, securities fraud. And I am required to  
4 refer this matter to the U.S. Attorney's office, which I will do, for investigation. That's a  
5 separate matter. When I see that kind of thing in the pleadings, I am required to do that." [Ex.  
6 A-206, p. 9].<sup>14</sup>

7 239. Neither Respondent nor Mr. Araki informed Levenhagen of the court's statement  
8 that it was referring the matter to the U.S. Attorney's office for investigation.

9 240. Michael Levenhagen was then, and is now, a pilot for a commercial airline. A  
10 federal criminal investigation, had one been started,<sup>15</sup> would have jeopardized his ability to  
11 remain in this position. Had the documents Levenhagen provided to Respondent been provided  
12 in response to the Trustee's First Request for Production, it is extremely unlikely that the  
13 Levenhagens would have been included in the court's referral. In failing to provide the  
14 documents that exonerated Levenhagen and inculpated Simonson and Respondent, Respondent  
15 caused substantial potential harm to Levenhagen.

16 241. Neither Respondent nor Mr. Araki informed the Laings or the Lanings of the  
17 court's statements regarding the criminal referral. Both Laing and Laning are responsible  
18 businessmen whose reputations would be substantially damaged by a criminal investigation. In  
19 failing to produce documentation that would have made the referral unlikely, Respondent  
20 caused substantial potential harm to the Lanings and Laings.

21  
22 <sup>14</sup> The court also commented that Respondent's firm name appeared on "many, many of the documents."  
Exhibit A-206, p. 9].

23 <sup>15</sup> It does not appear that the U.S. Attorney's Office followed through with the referral. That fact does  
24 not change the analysis, however, as the Respondent bears responsible for potential as well as actual  
harm. ABA Standard 4.31.

1           242. On January 19, 2007, the bankruptcy court vacated Simonson's discharge, ruling  
2 that there had been a fraud in obtaining it. In its ruling, the court invited Araki to produce  
3 evidence that Levenhagens, Laings and/or Lanings had been also victimized by Simonson. The  
4 court informed Araki that "where your clients can demonstrate that they were also duped by the  
5 debtor, and that notwithstanding my abandonment—my vacating the order of abandonment, that  
6 I need to pay attention to what their rights are and what compensation they pay, what  
7 consideration they pay, etc." [Ex. A-220, p. 12, lines 6-11].

8           243. In subsequent discovery requests, Respondent continued to withhold relevant  
9 documents that would have benefited the defense of Levenhagen, Laning and Laing. [See  
10 exhibits A-237, 239; 241; 248; 254; 255]. A clear preponderance of the evidence established  
11 that Respondent was the person who prepared these responses.

12           244. Respondent knowingly and intentionally withheld relevant documents that would  
13 have assisted these clients in their defenses. Respondent was motivated by a desire to conceal  
14 his role in the fraud and the culpability of Douglas Simonson. Respondent thus placed his  
15 interest before those of these clients.

16           245. Respondent did not inform the Levenhagens, Laings and Lanings that actual or  
17 potential conflicts existed. The Levenhagens, Laings and Lanings did not agree to waive these  
18 conflicts.

19           246. Michael Levenhagen first learned of the criminal referral that had been made at  
20 his deposition on April 2, 2007 when the attorney for the bankruptcy trustee inquired as to  
21 whether he was going to exercise his 5<sup>th</sup> Amendment right to remain silent. The transcript of  
22 this proceeding, Ms. Moewes's testimony and the testimony of Mr. Levenhagen at this hearing  
23 established that the fact that his name had been referred to the U.S. Attorney's Office for a  
24



1 criminal investigation completely surprised Levenhagen. [*See, e.g.*, Ex. A-257].

2 247. Learning the information in this matter caused significant distress and other harm  
3 to Levenhagen. Ultimately he had to obtain the services of a criminal lawyer in order to advise  
4 him. He was substantially distressed by the information that a judge considered him to be a  
5 participant in fraudulent activity and was very concerned about the impact of an investigation  
6 on his career.

7 248. Had Respondent provided the documents and/or informed Levenhagen of the  
8 conflicts he had, Levenhagen would have been able to obtain legal counsel who protected  
9 Levenhagen's interests, not one who was acting on his own behalf and on behalf of a different  
10 client.

11 249. Respondent and Araki continued to represent the Levenhagens, Laings and  
12 Lanings in various hearings into May 2007. Throughout this time, Respondent conducted the  
13 defense of these individual clients in a manner consistent with his own self-interest and in a  
14 manner adverse to theirs. These actions included failure to file actions against Simonson when  
15 such actions were warranted, failure to raise defenses that would assist in their legal defense and  
16 the continued withholding of relevant documents. These clients neither knew of the conflicts  
17 nor consented to them.

18 250. By withholding the documents and not informing the clients of the conflicts of  
19 interests that he had that precluded Respondent from representing them, Respondent  
20 unnecessarily prolonged the litigation to the detriment of his clients and the legal system.

21 **H. Additional Facts Relating to Specific Discovery Violations**

22 Respondent's firm received three formal requests for production from the Levenhagens,  
23 the Laings and the Lanings. Pursuant to the federal rules governing the bankruptcy proceeding,  
24

1 Respondent had an obligation to respond to those requests honestly and accurately. The  
2 following findings discuss the Respondent's role in the deliberate withholding of relevant  
3 evidence properly requested by Attorney Denice Moewes in formal requests for production  
4 during the second adversarial proceeding.

5 251. On September 26, 2006, the trustee's attorney sent Requests for Production to  
6 the Herman Racor firm requesting documents from Levenhagen, Laing and Laning. The  
7 requests specifically demanded documents that mentioned Douglas or Karen Simonson or  
8 Network Builders. Specifically it requested: "any documents of any nature in your possession  
9 or under your control that relates to or mention Douglas or Karen Simonson or Network  
10 Builders or any other entity in that Douglas and Karen Simonson have any interest, including  
11 any and all emails, letters or other correspondence with said entities." [Exhibits A-139; 140;  
12 141 (at page 5 on each)].

13 252. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-2, pp. 21-23].

14 253. The clients also testified that they worked directly with Respondent regarding  
15 these discovery requests.

16 254. Respondent was aware that these requests required him to produce emails. Not  
17 only do the requests make that clear, but Respondent actually told his clients to forward emails  
18 to him. On October 25, 2006, Respondent corresponded with Mark Laing. His email states:  
19 "Finally, let me know if there were ever any letters or emails between you and Doug Simonson  
20 as they have requested copies of any correspondence." [Ex. A-158].

21 255. In response to this email, Laing forwarded 10 emails. [Ex. A-158. RP 300,  
22 lines 22-25; 301, lines 1-13]. Despite having these emails in his possession, Respondent did not  
23 provide a single email to the trustee in the initial production. [See Ex. A-177].

24 256. Exhibit A-163 is the packet of materials that Michael Levenhagen sent directly to  
Robert Jackson in an attempt to comply with the trustee's request for production. Despite

1 having these emails in his possession, Respondent did not produce a single email in response to  
2 the Trustee's First Request for Production. [See Ex. A-178].

3 257. On February 28, 2007, Moewes sent Plaintiff's Third Request for Production of  
4 Documents to the Levenhagens, the Laings and the Lanings. [Exhibits A-237; A-239; A-241].  
5 The request directed at the Levenhagens demanded production of "any and all correspondence,  
6 including emails, phone messages, letter or other communication documents between: 1) the  
7 Levenhagens and the debtors (Simonsons); 2) The Levenhagens and the debtors attorneys; 3)  
8 The Levenhagens and any other defendant to this proceeding; 4) The Levenhagens and any  
9 other defendant's legal counsel; 5) The Levenhagens or any entity acting on their behalf and any  
10 entity other than their counsel that relates to or mention this proceeding, the subject matter of  
11 this proceeding, any defendants named in this proceeding, the debtors, the debtors counsel, and  
12 the property which is referenced in the Complaint. [Ex. A-237 at page 5].

13 258. The request also required the Levenhagens to produce "any and all  
14 correspondence, including emails, phone messages, letter or other communication documents  
15 between the Levenhagens and Kenny North or other entity in which he has any interest, or any  
16 communication which references or mentions Kenny North or any entity in which he has any  
17 interest." [Ex. A-237, p. 6]. The requests to the Laings and Lanings contained similar  
18 language. [See Exhibits A-240; 241].

19 259. On February 26, 2007, Levenhagen received an email from a paralegal at  
20 Herman Racor attaching the requests for production. Levenhagen responded on February 26,  
21 2007 agreeing to gather everything. On March 2, 2007, Levenhagen sent an email to  
22 Respondent and to Steve Araki in which he stated that he had previously sent all the emails  
23 from or to Doug. He also attached emails from Greg Cavagnaro and Kenny North. [Ex. A-  
24

1 383, p. 127].

2 260. The answers to these requests were returned on March 28, 2007. [Exhibits A-  
3 254; A-255].

4 261. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-2, pp. 28-29].

5 262. On April 2, 2007, Levenhagen attended his deposition wherein the bankruptcy  
6 trustee attorney inquired about his intent to assert his 5<sup>th</sup> Amendment rights. After that  
7 deposition, Moewes asked Levenhagen if he had had any communications with Douglas  
8 Simonson after January 18, 2006 and asked if he could produce the additional emails to her.

9 263. On April 4, 2007, Levenhagen sent Respondent and Araki an email to which he  
10 attached the emails he received from Doug Simonson after the January 18, 2006 date. [Ex. A-  
11 259].

12 264. On April 6, 2007, Levenhagen had another email exchange with Respondent that  
13 specifically inquired about receipt of the emails. He wrote: "P.S. Did you get the emails and  
14 do we have to send them?" [Ex. A-260].

15 265. In April or May of 2007, Levenhagen met with a criminal attorney recommended  
16 by Respondent. Levenhagen paid this attorney \$10,000 in fees. Respondent accompanied  
17 Levenhagen to the attorney/client conference. [RP 180-81].

18 266. Shortly after this date, Respondent's firm withdrew from representing the  
19 Levenhagens, Laings and Lanings, citing conflicts brought on by the addition of an additional  
20 defendant. Levenhagen then hired attorney Marc Stern to represent him in the bankruptcy  
21 proceeding.

22 267. Levenhagen was deposed in October 2007. At that deposition he learned for the  
23 first time that a third mortgage had been placed on the 11609 property while he owned it. In  
24

1 addition, attorney Stern and Moewes discussed discovery issues. Stern indicated to Moewes  
2 that he had “a couple of boxes of stuff from Herman Recor.” [RP 694, lines 11-17]. Moewes  
3 requested, and was granted, access to the materials.

4 268. In reviewing the files in Stern’s possession, Moewes discovered a substantial  
5 number of emails and documents that were responsive to the requests for production that had  
6 not been provided to her. She also discovered documentation that the clients had provided those  
7 materials to Herman Recor in a timely fashion.

8 269. Further investigation revealed that some documents had been modified. Email  
9 strings that had multiple conversations had been redacted in such a way as to obscure the fact  
10 that there were more conversations taking place in the email string.

11 270. Ultimately, with the help of Stern and full access to the materials that had been  
12 sent to Herman Recor, Moewes was able to document numerous irregularities as part of a  
13 motion for sanctions she brought against the Herman Recor law firm. Exhibit A-284, consisting  
14 of over 1200 pages, contains the full description of the irregularities she discovered. Noted  
15 below is a partial list of her findings.

16 271. Moewes documented that on October 30, 2006, Levenhagen provided  
17 Respondent with an email dated 6/15/2005 at 7:22 p.m. [Ex. A-163, p. 41]. This email was  
18 not produced to the trustee. [Exhibits A-178; A-254]. An e-mail on the same day, at 3:44 pm  
19 was produced, however. [Ex. A-254, p. 63]. The omitted email that had been on the same page  
20 as the earlier email had two references to Respondent’s involvement in the 2005 real estate  
21 transaction. [Ex. A-163, p. 41].

22 272. On October 30, 2006, Levenhagen provided to Respondent an email dated  
23 6/17/2005 at 11:06 am. [Ex. A-163, p. 42]. That document was on the same page as an email  
24

1 dated June 15, 2005, at 3:44 pm. The document had the date of 10/28/2006 on the bottom. This  
2 is the date that Levenhagen printed the document in anticipation of sending it to Respondent.  
3 In response to the trustee's Third Request for Production, Respondent sent only that portion of  
4 the e-mail exchange dated 6/15/2005. [Ex. A-254, p. 63]. In the omitted portion, Simonson  
5 instructed Levenhagen to "Fed Ex back to Bob Jackson's office" the signed agreement  
6 associated with the 2005 sale of the property. [Ex. A-163, p. 42].

7 273. On October 30, 2006, Levenhagen provided Respondent with a copy of an email  
8 dated 11/1/2005 at 8:48 p.m. [Ex. 163, p. 64]. He provided that document on the same page as  
9 a document date 11/1/2005 at 11:59 p.m. Again the document contained a notation showing  
10 that it was printed on 10/28/2006. The email from earlier in the day was provided to the trustee.  
11 The 8:48 email was not provided to the trustee. [Ex. A-254, p. 79]. Again the omitted email  
12 referred to Respondent and the notation showing when it was printed had been eliminated.

13 274. On October 30, 2006, Levenhagen provided an email dated 11/4/2005 at 12:10  
14 p.m. to Respondent. Again the document shows that it was printed on October 28, 2006. [Ex.  
15 A-163, p. 67]. Respondent provided a copy of an email on the same page dated 11/7/2005 and  
16 11/6/2005. The email from 11/4/2005 referred to Simonson talking to Bob Jackson about the  
17 escrow. [Ex. A-163, p. 67]. Respondent provided a copy of this page of emails that omitted  
18 the printed date and omitted the 11/4/2005 email referring to Bob Jackson. [Ex. A-254, p.  
19 107].

20 275. On October 30, 2006, Levenhagen provided Respondent with an email dated  
21 11/18/2005 at 1:14 pm. This email also had the date 10/28/2006 printed on the bottom. [Ex.  
22 A-163, p. 74]. The email had three references to Simonson discussing an issue relating to the  
23 November 2005 sale with Bob Jackson. That email was never provided to the trustee. An email  
24

1 dated November 18, 2005 at 10:32 am, which had been on the same page, was provided. [Ex.  
2 A-254, p. 86].

3 276. On October 30, 2006, Levenhagen provided Respondent with an email dated  
4 12/1/2005 at 3:28. The print date 10/26/2006 appeared on the bottom. [Ex. A-163, p. 86].  
5 This document was not produced to the trustee. This page of Levenhagens' materials also  
6 contains an email of 12/1/2005 at 6:22 pm. The second email, (12/1/2005 at 6:22) was provided.  
7 The date stamp was removed from the document that was produced. [Ex. A-254, p. 98]. Again  
8 the omitted document referred to Bob Jackson.

9 277. In addition to the six redacted emails referred to above, Respondent withheld 31  
10 emails that Levenhagen had provided to Respondent on either October 30, 2006 as part of  
11 exhibit 163, or in the additional materials he sent on March 2, 2007.

12 278. These emails contained relevant information that implicated Doug Simonson  
13 and/or Respondent but exonerated Levenhagen.

14 279. A number of the earliest documents demonstrated that Simonson was acting as  
15 an agent GFS. [See Ex. A-163, pp. 7-8].

16 280. Emails and attachments at Ex. A- 163, pp. 22-28 described Simonson's dispute  
17 with GFS, Dave Langford and Tiffany Doty.

18 281. A number of these emails mention Respondent. An email dated 6/8/2005,  
19 referred to Respondent's advice regarding the structure of the LLC agreement, the fact that  
20 Respondent "can handle all this at closing" and the fact that documents involved in the  
21 transactions were to be faxed directly back to Respondent.

22 282. In another omitted email, Levenhagen referred back to the 6/8/2005 email and  
23  
24

1 Simonson's reference to Respondent handling the transaction.<sup>16</sup> An email omitted from page 65  
2 again referred to Bob Jackson, as does the omitted page 78.

3 283. The email of November 20, 2005 expressed Levenhagen's concern that the LLC  
4 (and therefore the property) was in Simonson's name while Levenhagen was still responsible  
5 for the mortgages. Levenhagen attached a quit claim deed to this email and asked that Simonson  
6 return the LLC to him. The entire content of the email established that Levenhagen was a  
7 victim. Nonetheless, the document that would have most dramatically assisted in his defense,  
8 was never provided to the trustee.

9 284. All of the above emails were provided to Respondent for the purpose of being  
10 forwarded to the trustee to aid in the Levenhagens' defense. All of the above were provided to  
11 Respondent a full month before the bankruptcy court decided to make the referral to the U.S.  
12 Attorney's office. All of the above emails were omitted from the response to the request for  
13 production prepared by the Respondent.

14 285. The additional emails Levenhagen sent to Respondent on March 2, 2007,  
15 established that Simonson directed Levenhagen to Respondent, by falsely representing that  
16 Jackson was not his "bankruptcy attorney." [Ex. A-284, p. 1225]. They also established that  
17 Respondent and Simonson directed the litigation and did so in a manner to protect Simonson.  
18 [See Ex. A-284, p. 1227].

19 286. In addition to the emails discussed above, Moewes located transactional  
20 documents in the Herman Recor boxes that had been delivered to Respondent, but had not been  
21 produced in any of the productions. Those documents included the LLC Purchase and Sale  
22 Agreements dated June 6, 2005 (wherein Network Builders is sold to the Levenhagens), the  
23

24 <sup>16</sup> The chances that both emails were accidentally omitted are slim to nonexistent.



1 Quit Claim Deed (wherein the Levenhagens transfer the 11609 property to Network Builders)  
2 and the LLC Purchase and Sale Agreement dated June 16, 2005 (wherein Network Builders is  
3 sold to the Simonsons). Respondent drafted these documents. Nonetheless, these documents  
4 were not produced. [Ex. A-284, pp. 10-11].

5 287. Also not produced was the Deed of Trust held by Herman Recor on the 11609  
6 property. Had this and the other documents been produced, Respondent's involvement in these  
7 transactions would have been discovered immediately.

8 288. The attorney for the trustee invested substantial time in tracking down the  
9 discovery issues in this case. In addition to simply withholding documents, many documents  
10 that were produced were only produced after repeated requests by Moewes. Productions, when  
11 they occurred, were timed so as to prevent Moewes from properly being able to prepare for  
12 various court proceedings and deposition. Because of the criminal referral, some of the  
13 depositions ended up being cancelled when the trustee learned that the parties had not been  
14 informed of the referral.

15 289. This matter came before the bankruptcy court for hearing on the Trustee's  
16 Motions for Sanctions against the Herman Recor firm on July 11, 2008.<sup>17</sup> The court allowed  
17 the parties to submit additional materials and allowed Herman Recor time to analyze and  
18 challenge the requested fees. In that proceeding, Herman Recor apparently acknowledged that  
19 at least \$88,602.50 of the requested fees was reasonably related to its failure to provide  
20 discovery.

21  
22 <sup>17</sup> The Court's ruling on the Motion for Sanctions was admitted for limited purposes. This Officer has  
23 independently resolved the issues relating to the discovery sanctions by comparing the documents that  
24 the Association established were in Respondent's possession to those actually produced in response to  
the formal requests for production. This task was assisted by demonstrative exhibits and summaries  
prepared by the Association. This Officer independently verified each of the entries on said exhibits  
before reaching the conclusions above.

1           290. On October 27, 2008, the bankruptcy court issued a 47 page decision finding that  
2 Respondent's firm had withheld relevant documents. Ultimately, the court awarded the Trustee  
3 a total of \$205,574.43 in fees against the firm of Herman Recor for the discovery abuses. This  
4 amount was subsequently compromised and Herman Recor paid a total of \$185,000 for the  
5 discovery abuses found by the bankruptcy court. [RP 1605]. These funds came from  
6 Respondent and Stephen Araki.

7           291. At hearing, Respondent was unable to explain why the omitted documents had  
8 not been produced. He claimed that he had been hampered in his ability to defend the motion  
9 because Levenhagen's subsequent attorney had not provided complete access to the full files  
10 that Herman Recor had provided to him.

11           292. Respondent claimed that anywhere from six to ten boxes had been given to  
12 attorney Marc Stern. He described an elaborate, detailed scene where he carried boxes up to the  
13 front reception area because he was a "gentleman." [RP 1600, lines 12-18]. He testified further  
14 that his firm requested copies of what had been produced to them, but claimed that he had been  
15 given materials that comprised only one or two boxes without any of the key documents in  
16 them.

17           293. Respondent was not credible. This officer concludes he provided false testimony  
18 to support his defense of this charge. His testimony concerning how the file was turned over to  
19 Marc Stern and the amount of materials turned over was directly contradicted by the attorney of  
20 record on the file, Stephen Araki.

21           294. Araki testified that he turned over either one big box or two to three boxes. More  
22 specifically, he testified that he delivered the file directly to Marc Stern. He recalled  
23 transferring the file from the trunk of his car to Stern while in the parking lot at the bankruptcy  
24

1 court. [RP 770; lines 5-13].

2 295. Respondent intentionally and willfully abused the discovery process. The  
3 exhibits and testimony of Levenhagen, Laing and Laning establish that all three of these  
4 defendants willingly turned over documents requested during the discovery process. These  
5 individuals provided the documents directly to Respondent and his firm in a timely fashion  
6 whenever they received such requests.

7 296. Respondent, acting in his own self-interest and on behalf of Douglas Simonson,  
8 intentionally and repeatedly withheld highly relevant information that would have exonerated  
9 these clients but implicated Respondent and Simonson.<sup>18</sup>

10 297. Respondent's conduct caused harm to his clients, to the bankruptcy court and  
11 trustee, and to the public respect for the legal system.

12 **I. Misrepresentations on Home Mortgage in the Dainard Matter**

13 298. In October 2005, Rob and Claire Dainard were friends and clients of  
14 Respondent. They socialized frequently with the Jacksons. Respondent had represented them  
15 in a number of legal matters. At the time of the events associated with this grievance,  
16 Respondent was representing Claire Dainard in a personal injury action.

17 299. The Dainards have a number of investment properties. The testimony  
18 established that the Dainards were conservative in their investments. Up until the fall of 2005,  
19 they purchased property in their own name, put 20% down, avoided speculation and held their  
20 properties for extended periods of time. They had not worked with property that was intended  
21 to be "flipped" to a developer.

22  
23 <sup>18</sup> This officer concurs with Judge Overstreet's conclusion that none of the missing documents were  
24 privileged and that had Respondent intended to withhold them on this basis, he had an obligation to  
inform the court and the parties that he was doing so and prepare the appropriate privilege log.

1           300. Respondent, on the other hand, was actively and aggressively involved in  
2 complicated real estate transactions, including many associated with Douglas Simonson and  
3 Kenny North's companies. At the time of these events, Respondent had been working with  
4 Douglas Simonson and Kenny North for a number of months. Kenny North was heavily  
5 involved in real estate investments and developments.

6           301. In October 2005, the Dainards located property located 115 Webster Court in  
7 Chelan, County ("115 Webster"). The Dainards were interested in this property as an  
8 investment. The Dainards had multiple real estate investments in the area and were well  
9 qualified to obtain appropriate financing for investment property. The Dainard were not  
10 speculators and typically rehabilitated their purchased properties and held them for long term  
11 investments. Testimony at trial established that they were successful investors with sufficient  
12 credit to purchase the property on acceptable terms without needing to rely on the credit of the  
13 Jacksons.<sup>19</sup>

14           302. The property was zoned multi-family and had the potential, with two adjoining  
15 properties, to be developed into condominiums or apartments. The adjoining properties  
16 consisted of a property with a duplex ("hereafter duplex") and a property located at 113 Webster  
17 Court, known as the Mack property ("hereafter Mack property").

18           303. The Dainards realized the property had development potential, but were unsure  
19 as how to structure its purchase so as to allow it to be sold to a developer. They brought their  
20 concern to Respondent, who then in turn became interested in being involved financially in the  
21 project. Prior to the Dainards bringing this property to his attention, Respondent had no  
22  
23  
24

1 knowledge of the property or its investment potential.

2 304. On or about October 26, 2005, the Dainards signed a purchase and sale  
3 agreement for the property at 115 Webster and provided \$25,000 in earnest money. On  
4 Respondent's advice, this contract also allowed for assignment of the purchase and sale  
5 agreement to another party. [RP 944, line 16].

6 305. Respondent also suggested that there be feasibility language in the agreement  
7 and gave the Dainards other advice regarding the transaction. Mr. Dainard incorporated this  
8 legal advice into his purchase agreement

9 306. About 10 days after the agreement was signed, Respondent suggested that he  
10 take a look at the property. Respondent then inquired as to whether the Dainards were  
11 interested in joining Respondent in on the property. Mr. Dainard informed Respondent that he  
12 had never had a partner and expressed concerns about not having control. Respondent assured  
13 Mr. Dainard that he would handle any legal issues that arose, and that Respondent's wife, Patti,  
14 could handle the accounting issues. [RP 951; 4-12].

15 307. Respondent convinced the Dainards to allow him and his wife to join in the  
16 investment. Respondent also advised them that the best format for the project was a limited  
17 liability company that Respondent, could create for the couples. The Dainards relied on the  
18 Respondent's legal expertise and advice in making decisions regarding the purchase of this  
19 property and in formation of the limited liability company.

20 308. In November 22, 2005, Respondent, Dainard, and their wives, Claire Dainard  
21 and Patricia Jackson, formed RPC Enterprises, LLC (RPC Enterprises). The purpose of RPC  
22

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23 <sup>19</sup> Respondent testified that the decision to allow the Jacksons to do the purchase was based on the fact  
24 the Dainards did not have a regular income. The Dainards testified that they had substantial investments  
and assets that allowed them to finance their purchases on good terms. The Dainards apparently also

1 Enterprises was to acquire 115 Webster as an investment property.

2 309. Dainard was the president and Chief Executive Officer of RPC Enterprises.  
3 Respondent was the Vice President, the lawyer for RPC Enterprises, and its registered agent.  
4 Respondent and his wife owned 50 percent of RPC Enterprises. Rob Dainard and his wife  
5 Claire owned the other 50 percent. Respondent did the paperwork to form the LLC. The  
6 Dainards agreed to participate in the LLC after Respondent explained that if the property were  
7 in a LLC, the remainder of the Dainards assets would be protected if someone were injured or  
8 there was a lawsuit of some kind. [Ex. A-353].

9 310. The Dainards agreed to transfer the purchase and sale agreement for 115 Webster  
10 to Respondent and his wife. The Dainards agreed to this transfer because Respondent  
11 represented that he would be able to obtain better financing for the purchase of 115 Webster  
12 through his contacts with Bank of America. In turn, Respondent and his wife agreed to  
13 quitclaim 115 Webster to RPC Enterprises immediately after closing.

14 311. Neither party contemplated that the residence at 115 Webster would be used as a  
15 second or vacation home. [RP 955, lines 21-25; 956, lines 1-2]. Mr. Dainard would not have  
16 agreed to enter into the business relationship with Respondent had he stated an intention to use  
17 the house as a second home. [RP 956, lines 3-6]. Instead, the Dainards anticipated that they  
18 would rehabilitate the house and rent it until such time as an appropriate purchaser appeared.

19 312. On May 4, 2006, Respondent and his wife Patti Jackson signed a Uniform  
20 Residential Loan application for a loan to finance the purchase of the property at 115 Webster.  
21 [Ex. R-542]. The application stated on three separate pages, all of them signed by Respondent  
22 that the intended use of the property was residential. [See R-542, pp. 1, 4 and "Certifications,

23 had the ability to buy the property outright. The Dainards presented the more credible testimony on this  
24 issue.

1 Disclosures and Notices” pages].

2 313. Mr. Dainard believed, based on conversations with Respondent regarding the  
3 financing arrangements, that Respondent was financing the property through his own bank,  
4 Bank of America. On June 7, 2006, Mr. Dainard received a copy of correspondence between  
5 Respondent and Ancora Financial.<sup>20</sup> [Ex. A-358]. In that email, Respondent went through the  
6 good faith estimate for the loan, identified minor discrepancies apparently from a previous  
7 version and questioned why the discrepancies existed.

8 314. The Dainards had been working with a local title company and expected that  
9 escrow for the closing of the house would take place in Chelan. Without discussing that  
10 decision, Respondent had the escrow moved to Araki Escrow, an entity in which he shared  
11 certain profits. [Ex. A-359].

12 315. The actual transfer of the purchase and sale agreement from the Dainards to the  
13 Jacksons occurred on June 12, 2006, 39 days after Respondent signed the initial residential loan  
14 application that specified the property was to be used as a second residence. [Ex. A-361].

15 316. This transaction occurred at the LLC’s organizational meeting held on June 12,  
16 2006. [Ex. A-362]. There is no indication of any discussion during this meeting either of an  
17 issue with financing the property or the fact that the Respondent was seeking a residential loan  
18 for the property. Exhibit A-361 stated that the assignment was being done so that better  
19 financing could be obtained for the property. That document also stated that the parties would  
20 share equally in the repair or improvement of the property “as well as all loan costs associated  
21 with the acquisition of the property as well as the monthly loan obligation.” [Ex. A-361].

22 317. Exhibit A-361 also documented the parties’ intent regarding the power to sell or

23 \_\_\_\_\_  
24 <sup>20</sup> Dainard questioned Respondent about the change from Bank of America. Respondent informed him  
that Bank of America had not “worked out.”

1 transfer the property. It stated: "The parties further agree that any decision to sell or transfer  
2 the property shall be made by all four owners/members of the Company. . . ." A similar  
3 restriction is contained in the LLC's organizational minutes of June 12, 2006. [Ex. A-362].  
4 Exhibit A-362 contains a resolution that "the signatures of all members are required to execute  
5 all agreements and transfer documents on behalf of the company." Testimony established that  
6 this restriction was included at the specific request of the Dainards.

7 318. On or about June 15, 2006, Respondent signed and submitted a mortgage  
8 application representing that 115 Webster would be used as his "secondary residence." This  
9 representation was false.

10 319. At the same time as the mortgage application was signed, Respondent signed a  
11 "Second Home Rider." [Ex. A-367]. The Second Home Rider, a two page document, stated in  
12 pertinent part: "**Occupancy.** Borrower shall occupy, and shall only use, the Property as  
13 Borrower's second home. Borrower shall keep the Property available for Borrower's exclusive  
14 use and enjoyment at all times, and shall not subject the property to any timesharing, or other  
15 shared ownership arrangement or to any rental pool or agreement that requires the Borrow  
16 either to rent the Property or give a management firm or any other person any control over the  
17 use of the Property." The rider informed the borrower that the borrower would be in default if  
18 any person gave "false, misleading or inaccurate information. . . . Material representations  
19 include, but are not limited to, representations concerning Borrower's occupancy as Borrower's  
20 second home." [Ex. A-367, p.1].

21 320. As part of the closing paperwork, an insurance binder was provided. Like the  
22 loan documents, the insurance binder provided that the property was to be used as a seasonal,  
23 owner occupied, dwelling.



1           321. The Jacksons initialed this page and signed the following page with full  
2 knowledge that the information they were providing was false. Respondent intentionally made  
3 the misrepresentation in the mortgage application for the purpose of obtaining a mortgage loan  
4 on the more favorable residential home loan terms. This misrepresentation was made to  
5 American Mortgage Network, Inc. At the time, American Mortgage Network, Inc. was owned  
6 by Wachovia Bank, an institution insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. [Ex.  
7 A-478].

8           322. Both Jacksons asserted that the financing was arranged by the Dainards, that they  
9 saw the second home rider language only at closing, and that they signed it only because they  
10 were concerned that if they did not the Dainards would lose their earnest money deposit. This  
11 testimony was false.

12           323. Respondent's testimony was directly contradicted by the loan officer who  
13 testified that he dealt only with Mr. Jackson. He testified that after he started working with Mr.  
14 Jackson, "I had no communication other than emails where I saw that Mr. Dainard was involved  
15 in the email." [RP 1219, lines 3-4].

16           324. The Jacksons' version of events is also directly contradicted by Exhibit R-542,  
17 the original loan application signed a full six weeks before the loan closed. That document, like  
18 the final mortgage application signed at closing, contained multiple references to the property  
19 being used as a second home

20           325. It is not credible that Respondent missed the references in the original  
21 application and did not see the second home rider on the final documents until the last minute.  
22 The evidence demonstrated that Respondent paid great attention to detail. His correspondence  
23 with the loan officer regarding the discrepancies in the good faith estimate demonstrated this  
24

1 attention to detail. In addition, his paralegal stated unequivocally that “it would be standard  
2 practice for Mr. Jackson to review any document he’s putting his name on.” [RP 1405, lines  
3 15-16]. Finally, the Association produced evidence that the seller of the property had  
4 voluntarily agreed to extend the closing date. [Ex. A-441].

5 326. At the time Respondent signed the mortgage application and the rider, he  
6 remained the lawyer for RPC Enterprises. The Dainards were not informed of these false  
7 representations. They did not consent to the Jacksons falsely signing loan papers for property  
8 that was intended to be held jointly as an investment.

9 327. In signing the second home rider and falsely claiming the property as a second  
10 home, Respondent intentionally violated Title 18, United States Code, Section 1344.  
11 Respondent’s purpose in signing this document was not to protect the Dainards’ earnest money  
12 agreement, but rather to obtain a residential interest rate that otherwise would not have been  
13 available. Respondent and his wife had no intention of ever occupying this home. Rather, from  
14 the outset, Respondent was attempting to leverage this property into a successful real estate deal  
15 with Kenny North.

16 328. Respondent and his wife received the mortgage for 115 Webster from American  
17 Mortgage, Inc. On or about June 16, 2006, Respondent and his wife purchased 115 Webster.  
18 Robert Dainard did substantial work repairing the property. Unaware of the second home rider,  
19 the Dainards arranged for a tenant upon the completion of the remodel.

20 329. The false statements caused the Dainards substantial harm. The Dainards relied  
21 upon Respondent’s representation that he could obtain better financing for the project from his  
22 bank. When they learned of the second home rider, the Dainards determined that they could no  
23 longer risk renting the property. As a result, the property remained empty for a period of time.  
24

1                   **J. Findings Regarding Additional Conflict of Interests with Dainards**

2                   330. Just before the property closed, the members of RPC Enterprises LLC met for its  
3 first organizational meeting. The minutes of that meeting refer to Jackson as the “company  
4 attorney” and “corporate counsel.” [Ex. A-362]. At no time during the events described  
5 below, did Respondent ever inform the Dainards individually or RPC Enterprises LLC, that he  
6 was no longer the RPC’s attorney. At no time did Respondent formally withdraw from  
7 representation.

8                   331. At the request of the Dainards, the members discussed the issue of what  
9 signatures were required for transfer of any asset, including real property, belonging to the  
10 company. A resolution was passed that stated “the signatures of all members are required to  
11 execute all agreements and transfer documents on behalf of the company.” [Ex. A-362]. The  
12 members also resolved that any member “may execute a contract for the benefit of the  
13 company.”

14                   332. Respondent did not immediately quitclaim 115 Webster to RPC Enterprises.  
15 However, the members of RPC continued to conduct business as if RPC Enterprises was the  
16 owner of the property. Rob Dainard immediately started the process of remodeling the home  
17 and Claire Dainard started looking for a tenant.

18                   333. A banking account was set up for RPC Enterprises. Both couples deposited funds  
19 into this account to pay the mortgage and expenses associated with the property’s rehabilitation.  
20 One of the initial transactions from this account was a deposit of \$30,000 in April 2006 made by  
21 the Jacksons. Just after the closing, the Jacksons transferred \$20,000 back to their personal  
22 accounts.

23                   334. An additional \$10,000 check was written to Manna Funding. [Ex. A-442]. The  
24

1 memo line stated that this was for a loan for Tiffany Doty, the same individual involved with  
2 Kenny North and Doug Simonson. RPC Enterprises did no business with Manna Funding or  
3 Tiffany Doty.

4 335. [Subject to Protective Order

5 336. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-153].

6 337. In the last quarter of 2006, Respondent told the Dainards that a developer named  
7 Kenny North was interested in developing 115 Webster along with the adjoining properties.  
8 Mr. Dainard specifically asked Respondent if he represented North. Respondent replied "No."  
9 [RP 990, lines 12-14].

10 338. These representations were false. Respondent knew they were false.

11 In fact, North had been a client of Respondent's since 2005. Respondent was representing one  
12 of North's companies at that time. Respondent did not disclose this information to the  
13 Dainards.

14 339. [Subject to Protective Order [Ex. A-375].

15 340. The email contained in Exhibit A-375 was not copied to the Dainards.

16 Respondent did not tell the Dainards anything about these negotiations. [RP 994, lines 21-22].

17 341. On January 24, 2007, Respondent corresponded with the seller of the Mack  
18 property, Steven Brown. Brown indicated that he would give Respondent and his partners first  
19 shot. [Ex. A-377]. The partners referred to in this email were most probably Kenny North as  
20 there is no credible evidence that Respondent informed the Dainards of these negotiations.

21 342. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-376].

22 343. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-378].

23 344. On February 9, 2007, Respondent discussed making an offer on the duplex  
24

1 property with Skip Boyd. [Ex. A-379]. Respondent instructed Boyd to write the deal under  
2 "Jackson-Field Enterprises or assigns." Respondent had a 50% ownership interest in this entity.  
3 The Dainards had none. RPC Enterprises LLC had no interest in this company.

4 345. The Dainards did not receive a copy of this email. Respondent did not inform  
5 the Dainards that he was making an offer on the property adjoining 115 Webster.

6 346. On March 1, 2007, Respondent acted to lock up the Mack property, the other  
7 property in adjoining that owned by RPC Enterprises LLC. To accomplish that, Respondent  
8 signed a purchase and sale agreement binding RPC Enterprises to purchase the Mack property  
9 for \$1.2 million. Respondent did not inform the Dainards that he was making an offer on the  
10 Mack property in the name of RPC Enterprises. [RP 995, lines 8-9]. He did not have the  
11 authority to make this offer. [Ex. A-361].

12 347. On March 1, 2007, Respondent signed a promissory note, promising that RPC  
13 Enterprises LLC would pay \$50,000 as part of the Purchase and Sale agreement. [Ex. A-381].  
14 The note indicated that it would become due within 10 days of the removal of the contingencies.

15 348. The purpose of the purchase and sale agreement drafted in this manner was to  
16 allow Respondent and Kenny North to explore the full investment potential of the three  
17 properties. Critical to this plan was the ultimate sale of the 115 Webster property to Kenny  
18 North.

19 349. Respondent did not inform the Dainards that the Mack property was for sale.  
20 [RP 994, lines 15-22]. Respondent did not inform the Dainards that he was signing a  
21 promissory note and Purchase and Sale Agreement for the Mack property on behalf of RPC  
22 Enterprises LLC. [RP 995, lines 8-17]. Respondent did not have the authority to enter into that  
23 transaction. [Ex. A-361]. The Dainards would not have consented to the transaction had they  
24

1 | been informed. [RP 995, lines 18-22].

2 |           350. On March 2, 2007, Respondent transmitted the Purchase and Sale agreement and  
3 | the promissory note to the owners of the Mack property. [Ex. A-382]. The Dainards did not  
4 | receive a copy of this email. [RP 997, lines 12-17]. The Dainards were unaware of the  
5 | transaction, had not authorized it, and would not have authorized it had Respondent informed  
6 | them of it. [RP 995-96]

7 |           351. [Subject to Protective Order]. [RP 998, lines 3-13]. [Ex. A-383].

8 |           352. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-384].

9 |           353. Respondent did discuss selling 115 Webster to Kenny North with the Dainards  
10 | during the first quarter of 2007. The Dainards were concerned that North was attempting to tie  
11 | up property at the height of the market without any guarantee that he would actually close on  
12 | the property. The Dainards decided to allow Respondent to convey a firm offer of \$795,000 to  
13 | North with the proviso that the sale had to close by the end of April. [Ex. A-385].

14 |           354. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-386]. [RP 1009; lines 8-25; 1010, lines 1-  
15 | 2].

16 |           355. Respondent continued his efforts to secure the three properties for North. On  
17 | April 11, 2007, Respondent formed Chelan Landing LLC. [Ex. A-390]. Respondent was the  
18 | registered agent for this LLC. Jackson-Field Enterprises LLC was a 50% owner in the new  
19 | LLC. KC North Family Trust, LLC was the other member. Respondent was the organizer of  
20 | the LLC. Respondent, his wife and another couple owned Jackson-Field LLC, an entity whose  
21 | stated purpose was to engage in the business of real property acquisition.

22 |           356. Respondent testified falsely that Jackson-Field had no ownership interest in  
23 | Chelan Landing. [RP 1487, lines 6-8]. This testimony was contradicted by the contents of A-  
24 |

1 390 and by the testimony Jeffrey Soehren, an architect and owner of the Mack property.<sup>21</sup>

2 357. Respondent's purpose in forming Chelan Landing was to acquire the three  
3 properties: 115 Webster, the duplex, and the Mack property. Respondent and North then  
4 intended to develop the property into a single project. During the transactions relating to  
5 Chelan Landing, LLC, both North and Respondent acted on behalf of the company. [RP 1204,  
6 line 25; p. 1205, lines 1-7].

7 358. Respondent did not inform the Dainards of his involvement with North in Chelan  
8 Landing. In late March and April 2007, there was a significant risk that Respondent's  
9 representation of RPC Enterprises and/or the Dainards would be materially limited by his  
10 personal interest and his responsibilities to Chelan Landing and North.

11 359. Jackson-Field Enterprises, acting by and through Respondent, signed an offer to  
12 purchase the duplex on May 1, 2007. [Ex. A-389]. The Dainards did not know that  
13 Respondent, acting through another company, was purchasing the duplex. [RP 1003]. He did  
14 not provide the Dainards with a copy of the purchase and sale agreement. [RP 1003, lines 5-7].  
15 Respondent did not obtain the informed consent of RPC Enterprises and/or the Dainards,  
16 confirmed in writing, to the duplex transaction.

17 360. In entering into the purchase and sale agreement for the duplex, Respondent used  
18 client information relating to his representation of the Dainards and/or RPC Enterprises.  
19 Respondent's purpose in entering into a purchase and sale agreement of the duplex on behalf of  
20 Jackson-Field was to acquire and develop that property, along with 115 Webster and the Mack  
21 property, in conjunction with North using Chelan Landing LLC as the nominal owner of the  
22 project.

23  
24 <sup>21</sup> RP 1199, lines 20-25; RP 1200, lines 10-19; RP 1204-1205; 1206, lines 21-25, 1207, lines 1-2.

1           361. Respondent did not tell the Dainards that he had represented North and that he  
2 had represented a North company, Cedar Hollow. [RP 1008, lines 13-19]. He did not tell the  
3 Dainards of that he had represented people in a bankruptcy proceeding that involved property in  
4 which North had an interest. [RP 1008, lines 20-23.]

5           362. The terms of the duplex transaction were not fair and reasonable to RPC  
6 Enterprises in that the transaction usurped the opportunity for RPC Enterprises to determine  
7 whether it wanted to purchase the property and/or it undermined any opportunity for RPC  
8 Enterprises to make an offer at a more advantageous price.

9           363. As of the end of April 2007, neither North nor Respondent had responded to the  
10 Dainards' proposal for the sale of 115 Webster. By the end of April 2007, the Dainards's offer  
11 to sell 115 Webster for \$795,000 expired.

12           364. On May 7, 2007, Respondent wrote to the seller of the Mack property, stating  
13 that North would be depositing \$50,000 into escrow to go forward with the deal. [A-398].  
14 As of May 7, 2007, Respondent did not intend for RPC Enterprises to acquire and/or develop  
15 the Mack property.

16           365. [Subject to Protective Order]. [A-400].

17           366. On or about July 20, 2007, Respondent assigned the purchase and sale agreement  
18 for the Mack property to Chelan Landing. [Ex. A-411]. With this transaction, two of the three  
19 properties necessary Respondent and North's project, were under contract.

20           367. Respondent's actions were not authorized by the Dainards and/or RPC  
21 Enterprises. Respondent did not inform RPC Enterprises and/or the Dainards that he assigned  
22 the Mack property purchase and sale agreement to Chelan Landing or North. [RP 1018-19].

23           368. Respondent did not obtain the informed consent of RPC Enterprises and/or the  
24



1 Dainards, confirmed in writing, to the assignment of the purchase and sale agreement for the  
2 Mack property.

3 369. In assigning the purchase and sale agreement for the Mack property, Respondent  
4 used information relating to his representation of the Dainards and/or RPC Enterprises.  
5 Respondent's purpose in assigning the purchase and sale agreement for the Mack property was  
6 to acquire and develop that property, along with 115 Webster and the duplex, in conjunction  
7 with North.

8 370. The terms of assignment of the purchase and sale agreement for the Mack  
9 property were not fair and reasonable to RPC Enterprises in that RPC Enterprises received no  
10 compensation, received no concessions regarding the use of the Mack property and received no  
11 opportunity to negotiate regarding compensation and/or concessions.

12 371. Respondent did not advise RPC Enterprises and/or the Dainards in writing of the  
13 desirability of seeking independent counsel regarding RPC Enterprises' position regarding the  
14 assignment of the Mack property. At the time of the transaction, the Dainards believed  
15 Respondent was representing them. [RP 1019, lines 5-9].

16 372. On or about July 20, 2007, Chelan Landing purchased the Mack property. The  
17 sellers of the property dealt with Respondent on this transaction. [RP 1204, line 25; p. 1205,  
18 lines 1-7]. They did so because they understood from Respondent that he too had an interest in  
19 the project. [RP 1206, lines 21-25; p. 1207, lines 1-2].

20 373. On September 5, 2007, the Dainards offered to release the Jacksons from their  
21 obligations relating to the Webster property by in themselves on contract. [Ex. A-413].

22 374. In September 2007, Mr. Dainard had a major medical emergency. Respondent  
23 was aware of this medical emergency. [RP 1021;1023].

1           375. On September 19, 2007, Respondent, through his wife, forwarded a written offer  
2 for 115 Webster to the Dainards. The written offer, made in the name of Chelan Landing, was  
3 to purchase 115 Webster for \$950,000. [Ex. A-416]. Concerned about potential conflict of  
4 interests, Rob Dainard asked Respondent if he represented North. [RP 1025, lines 21-23].  
5 Respondent denied to Dainard that he was representing North. [RP 1025; 1040]. Respondent  
6 did not disclose to the Dainards his involvement with Chelan Landing and/or North. [RP 1019-  
7 20].

8           376. Respondent did not disclose to the Dainards his actions with regard to the  
9 purchase or sale of the Mack property and/or the duplex. In forwarding an offer for the  
10 purchase of 115 Webster, Respondent used client information relating to his representation of  
11 the Dainards and/or RPC Enterprises.

12           377. On September 20, 2007, Kenny North made a presentation in Chelan at a winery.  
13 The focus of the presentation was the development that North planned for the 3 properties: the  
14 Mack property, the duplex and the property owned by the Dainards/Jacksons at 115 Webster.<sup>22</sup>

15           378. On the date of the presentation, the property at 115 Webster was in the name of  
16 the Jacksons although both couples had invested time and money in the property and although  
17 the intent had been to own it jointly through RPC Enterprises LLC.

18           379. The Dainards were not informed that 115 Webster was being included in a  
19 marketing presentation as a part of the Chelan Landing development. They did not consent to  
20 that representation.

21           380. The Dainards learned of the presentation on September 21, 2007. [Ex. A-418].  
22 They informed the Jacksons at that time that they were not interested in doing business with

23 \_\_\_\_\_  
24 <sup>22</sup> There was testimony that Respondent attended this presentation although the Jacksons denied  
knowledge of it. [RP 1205, lines 21-25].

1 Kenny North.

2 381. The Dainards told Respondent that they would not entertain any offers until  
3 Respondent quitclaimed 115 Webster to RPC Enterprises. On September 26, 2007, Respondent  
4 signed a quit claim deed drafted by a title company in Chelan. The quit claim deed incorrectly  
5 listed the grantee as RPC LLC rather than RPC Enterprises LLC.

6 382. On October 2, 2007, the Dainards informed Respondent of the terms under that  
7 they would sell their one half interest in the property. [Ex. A-424]. In that email, the Dainards  
8 indicated that they did not trust North.

9 383. [Subject to Protective Order

10 384. The Dainards decided not to accept the offer regarding 115 Webster.

11 The Dainards' decision not to sell 115 Webster made it impossible for Respondent and North to  
12 proceed with their plan to develop 115 Webster along with the Mack property and the duplex.  
13 Even if they had accepted the offer, however, it is not likely that the project would have come to  
14 fruition. Mr. North was apparently a speculator who moved from property to property, tying up  
15 real estate while he determined whether or not a project was feasible to complete. The various  
16 transactions associated with Chelan Landing indicated that North's offers were largely illusory  
17 and constructed in such a way as to minimize risk to his companies and maximize his leverage.  
18 Chelan Landing subsequently lost the Mack property in a foreclosure action. [RP 1204, lines  
19 20-24].

20 385. Respondent was aware that the offers made by North for the property at 115  
21 Webster were constructed in such a manner as to maximize North's flexibility to walk away  
22 from the project without serious financial penalty. Respondent assisted in constructing the  
23 offers so that they served North's interest in maintaining that flexibility.

1           386.     Respondent acted intentionally in concealing the transactions associated with  
2 the proposed Chelan Landing LLC and his role in them, in order to benefit himself and Kenny  
3 North.

4           387.     In structuring the purchase and sale agreements in such a way as to protect North  
5 and increase the risk to the seller, Respondent acted intentionally to benefit himself and to  
6 benefit Kenny North

7           388.     Respondent intentionally attempted to conceal the nature of his relationship to  
8 Kenny North by resisting the Association's ELC 10.13 Demand for Documents. In resisting  
9 these legitimate demands for materials, Respondent intentionally provided false statements  
10 during the hearing regarding the location of the documents, the ability to retrieve the documents  
11 and the status of electronic files. When Respondent finally produced the materials, the  
12 Association was able to document the presence of Kenny North's funds in Respondent's trust  
13 account, a fact that substantially undercut his contention that Mr. North was not his client.

14           389.     Respondent provided false testimony concerning his relationship with the  
15 Dainards. He testified that he acted with the knowledge of the Dainards and for their benefit.<sup>23</sup>  
16 None of the numerous emails concerning the three properties that were exchanged between  
17 sellers, Respondent and Kenny North were copied to the Dainards. There are no emails  
18 advising the Dainards that Respondent was engaged in these negotiations. The Dainards  
19 provided credible evidence that they did not have knowledge of Respondent's actions.  
20 Respondent's statements to the contrary were not credible given the totality of the evidence.

21           390.     Respondent acted intentionally in providing false testimony concerning his  
22 relationship to Kenny North during the hearing.

23  
24 <sup>23</sup> See e.g., RP 1484, lines 22-25, p. 1485, lines 1-19; RP 1486, lines 5-25; p. 1487, lines 1-19.

1           391. Respondent's actions concerning the attempted purchase of 115 Webster caused  
2 the Dainards substantial harm. RPC Enterprises LLC is currently the subject of a lawsuit  
3 seeking dissolution of the company and division of the asset. The Dainards invested substantial  
4 funds and sweat equity in the property at 115 Webster in order to further protect their  
5 investment, yet for large portions of the time the property could not be rented as the status of the  
6 second home rider was uncertain. Finally, the property's investment value has dropped  
7 dramatically since it was not sold during the peak of the real estate market. The property is  
8 currently for sale at a fraction of the prices available in the 2006-2007 timeframe.

## 9 10           **VI. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING CHARGED VIOLATIONS**

11           Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Hearing Officer makes the following  
12 conclusions of law:

13           **Count 1:** RPC 8.4(c) states that it is professional misconduct to "engage in conduct  
14 involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." This officer concludes that  
15 Respondent violated this rule by signing a real estate excise tax affidavit that falsely represented  
16 that he was an agent of Michael Levenhagen.<sup>24</sup>

17           **Count 2:** Count 2 involves the Respondent's misconduct in participating in the fraud on  
18 the bankruptcy court. This conduct violated Title 18, United States Code, Section 152 and/or  
19 Title 18, United States Code, Section 2. As recognized by Respondent, §152 prohibits  
20 concealment of the debtor's assets. **Respondent's Post Hearing Brief at 15.** Respondent  
21 acknowledged that this section can be violated by persons other than the bankrupt. *Id.*  
22 Respondent argued, however, that there was no evidence that he "made payments in knowing

23  
24           <sup>24</sup> The RPC were amended effective September 1, 2006. The Formal Complaint charges Respondent  
with violating the RPC in effect as of the date of the alleged conduct.

1 violation of any court order.” **Respondent’s Brief at 15, lines 2-3.** Respondent also “denied  
2 that he was aware his actions would violate any court order.” *Id* at lines 8-9.

3 Respondent’s testimony was not credible. As noted in the findings, the documents, the  
4 timing of events, and the substance of his communications with Simonson all rebut  
5 Respondent’s claim that he acted without knowledge. By transferring funds into and out of his  
6 trust account in February and March 2006 to benefit Simonson, in contravention of the January  
7 2006 bankruptcy restraining order, Respondent violated 18 U.S.C. §152 and thereby violated  
8 RPC 8.4(b).

9 Because the conduct involved dishonesty, Respondent violated RPC 8.4(c). This  
10 conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice in contravention of RPC 8.4(d). Finally,  
11 Respondent willfully violated the court’s restraining order in contravention of RPC 8.4(j).

12 **Count 3:** The Association charged that Respondent’s failure to account for the \$55,000  
13 paid to his wife, violated former RPC 3.3(a) and current RPC 8.4(c), RPC 8.4(d), and/or RPC  
14 8.4(j).

15 Former RPC 3.3 (a) provided that a lawyer shall not knowingly

16 (1) Make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal.

17 (2) Fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid  
18 assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client unless such disclosure is  
prohibited by rule 1.6;

19 (3) Fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known  
20 to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by  
opposing counsel;

21 (4) Offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.

22 The application of RPC 3.3(a) to Respondent’s failure to disclose the \$55,000 payment  
23 raises several issues. At first glance, former RPC 3.3(a) (1) appeared to require an affirmative  
24

1 false statement that arguably did not exist here. In interpreting a similar provision contained in  
2 RPC 4.1, our Supreme court declined to resolve the issue of whether a false statement could be  
3 made by omission. *In re Disciplinary Proceeding of Carmick*, 146 Wn. 2d 582, 600, 48 P.3<sup>rd</sup>  
4 311 (2002). Nonetheless, in the context of this case, this officer concludes Respondent's failure  
5 to include the \$55,000 payment in a report which he intended the court to rely upon, should be  
6 considered either an affirmative statement under former RPC 3.3(a), or false evidence under  
7 former 3.3(a) (4).

8 Here, the bankruptcy court issued an order that was unequivocal about Respondent's  
9 duty to disclose every payment. It stated in pertinent part:

10 ORDERED that Robert Jackson, attorney for the debtors, is (1) required to  
11 file with the court no later than June 2, 2006 a report setting forth the date  
12 and amount of each and every payment he has received from the debtors,  
13 their entities, or from any other party on behalf of the debtors, since January  
14 20, 2006, the date of the entry of the Temporary Restraining Order; (2)  
15 required to turnover to the Trustee all funds he has in his possession that  
16 belong to the debtors, that are within the control of the debtors or any entity  
17 which the debtors have an interest.

18 [Ex. A-95]. The language of this order must be read in conjunction with the court's letter ruling  
19 of May 10, 2006. [Ex. A-88]. The Letter Ruling discussed and rejected Simonson's arguments  
20 that "borrowed funds" were not subject to the initial restraining order. [Ex. A-88, p. 5]. The  
21 court noted correctly that if Mr. Simonson truly believed this, he would have deposited the  
22 monies directly into his own accounts rather than into his attorney's trust account. [Ex. A-88,  
23 pp. 5-6]. [Subject to Protective Order]. [Ex. A-89].

24 Respondent sent an accounting to the Trustee that appeared to comply with this court  
order. [Ex. A-97]. However, Respondent limited the accounting to his trust account. He did  
not include the \$55,000 payment to Patti Jackson for the loan Respondent made to Simonson.

This officer concludes that where a court affirmatively orders a complete accounting, omission

1 of an item can and should be considered a false statement to the court. Respondent therefore  
2 violated former RPC 3.3(a).

3 The Association also charged violations of 8.4 (c); (d) and (j). Each of these sections  
4 applies to this misconduct. As noted previously, RPC 8.4(c) prohibits conduct involving  
5 dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. In failing to disclose the \$55,000 payment,  
6 Respondent violated this provision because his failure to disclose was meant to conceal his own  
7 involvement in the fraud. By omitting this payment, Respondent misrepresented the total  
8 amount of the payments that he made on Simonson's behalf. Moreover, he cannot hide behind  
9 the attorney/client privilege because he had an affirmative duty to disclose pursuant to the  
10 court's order. Respondent knew this and complied with the order as to other payments. He  
11 simply omitted the one that led most directly back to him.

12 The order directed Respondent to create a report "setting forth the date and amount of  
13 each and every payment he has received from the debtors, their entities, or from any other party  
14 on behalf of the debtors or for the benefit of the debtors, since January 20, 2006. It directed  
15 Jackson to turn over to the trustee all funds he had in his possession or control that "belong to  
16 the debtors, that are within the control of the debtors, or any entity in which the debtors have an  
17 interest." [Ex. A-95]. This order did not limit the disclosure to funds in Respondent's trust  
18 account. Despite the broad language contained in this order, Respondent failed to reveal the  
19 payment in violation of RPC 8.4(j).

20 Respondent's conduct was extremely prejudicial to the administration of justice. Here,  
21 the bankruptcy judge and the trustee and the debtors' creditors had the right to rely on the  
22 proposition that an attorney will act honestly and will not file incomplete reports in direct  
23 contravention of the court's order. Respondent's conduct violated RPC 8.4(j).



1           **Count 4:** Count 4 involved discovery abuses previously sanctioned by the bankruptcy  
2 court. This officer independently concludes that the conduct also violated the Rules of  
3 Professional Responsibility.

4           RPC 3.4(a) prohibits a party from “unlawfully obstructing another party’s access to  
5 evidence” and prohibits alteration and destruction of documents. Respondent withheld  
6 numerous relevant documents and did so in an attempt to conceal his own involvement in the  
7 bankruptcy fraud.

8           This conduct is extremely prejudicial to the integrity of the judicial system. As noted by  
9 Judge Overstreet: “This case presents the most serious allegations of discovery misconduct the  
10 Court has encountered. When parties or their attorneys determine, independently of the rules of  
11 civil procedure, what should or should not be produced to their opponent, the adversary system  
12 breaks down.” [Ex. A-287, p. 25].

13           By withholding documents responsive to the Requests for Production and by  
14 misrepresenting the scope of the documents being produced in response to the First Requests  
15 and/or the Third Requests from an attorney representing the bankruptcy trustee, and/or by  
16 providing redacted documents produced in response to the Requests, Respondent violated  
17 current RPC 3.4(a), RPC 8.4(c) and/or RPC 8.4(d).

18           **Count 5:** Count 5 charged violation of the Respondent’s duty to avoid conflicts of  
19 interests under current and former versions of RPC 1.7.<sup>25</sup> The findings set out the numerous  
20 conflicts presented by Respondent’s representation of Doug Simonson at the same time he  
21 participated in the representation of the Levenhagens, Laings and/or Lanings in the second  
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23 <sup>25</sup> Respondent represented these three couples beginning in June 2006. That representation continued  
24 until his firm’s withdrawal in the early summer of 2007. This particular count is thus governed by both  
the current and former versions of RPC 1.7.

1 adversary proceeding. As noted above, the actual conflicts were so numerous and so serious  
2 that Respondent could not accept representation. Nonetheless, Respondent accepted these three  
3 couples as clients and purported to act on their behalf. At every step in the proceedings,  
4 however, Respondent acted for his own benefit and for the benefit of Douglas Simonson thus  
5 violating both former RPC 1.7(b) and current RPC 1.7(a).

6           RPC 1.7 contains limited exceptions for those situations where the lawyer reasonably  
7 believes the representation will not be adversely affected and the clients consent in writing after  
8 full disclosure of the facts. There was evidence in this record [Exhibit A-108] that suggested  
9 that Respondent attempted to follow the procedure for obtaining informed consent to the  
10 conflicts. However, the disclosure contained in Exhibit A-108, while citing the applicable rule,  
11 does not comply with RPC 1.7.

12           Exhibit A-108, the conflicts letter, omitted material facts that were necessary for the  
13 clients to make informed decisions. Respondent failed to inform the clients that he was the  
14 attorney who drafted many of the documents that were involved in the underlying transactions.  
15 The letter did not inform the clients that Respondent provided legal advice to Douglas  
16 Simonson in the bankruptcy proceeding. The conflicts letter did not inform the Levenhagens of  
17 the fact that Respondent had falsely certified that he was the Levenhagen's agent on the real  
18 estate excise tax affidavit. These and other material facts discussed in Findings of Fact 162  
19 through 250 needed to be disclosed in order for the clients to consent regarding representation.

20           Moreover, exhibit A-108 contains a number of false statements concerning the existence  
21 of conflicts. The letter claimed there were no real conflicts, despite their obvious existence. The  
22 letter stated: "it appears as though there are no claims that are likely to develop between any of  
23 you to any other client or that have potential to result in a dispute." Repeatedly the letter  
24

1 emphasizes the alleged lack of conflicts, stating in another paragraph, that “there are only  
2 potential conflicts at this time, even though unlikely.” [Ex. A-108, p. 2].

3 By accepting this representation at a time when there was a significant risk that the  
4 representation would be materially limited by his personal interest and/or his responsibilities to  
5 Simonson, without reasonably believing that he would be able to provide competent and  
6 diligent representation to the Levenhagens, the Laings and/or the Lanings, and/or without  
7 obtaining the informed consent in writing of the Levenhagens, the Laings and/or the Lanings,  
8 Respondent violated former RPC 1.7(b), and current RPC 1.7(a).

9 **COUNT 6:** Count 6 involved Respondent’s actions regarding the loan application he  
10 signed for the property intended to be owned jointly by Rob and Claire Dainard. As established  
11 above, Respondent intentionally signed a sworn statement that he and his wife intended to use  
12 the property as a second home. Respondent had no such intent and signed the document for the  
13 sole purpose of obtaining a lower interest rate available only to residential property, rather than  
14 paying the higher rate associated with investment property.

15 Respondent argued that the Dainards, not the Respondent, obtained the financing. This  
16 argument is rejected. Respondent’s testimony and that of Patricia Jackson, was contradicted by  
17 the testimony of other, credible, witnesses and by the exhibits. A clear preponderance of the  
18 evidence established instead that Respondent obtained the financing.

19 Respondent also argued that they signed the documents without the requisite intent to  
20 defraud because they were concerned the Dainards would lose their earnest money deposit.

21 **Respondent’s Post Hearing Brief at 8.** This argument is also rejected. Again, Respondent  
22 provided no credible testimony to support his version of the facts. The documents establish  
23 that Respondent signed the original loan application more than six weeks prior to the closing.

1 The representation that 115 Webster was to be used as a second residence was present on this  
2 document as well as the documents signed at closing. There was also evidence that the closing  
3 could have been postponed if needed.

4 Respondent also argued that the Jacksons did not sign a lease on the property, that they  
5 obtained the approval of the lender, and that they had no intent to defraud the lender.

6 **Respondent's Brief at 8.** These arguments are rejected. The evidence clearly established that  
7 the property was to be rented upon the completion of the remodel/rehab and that Respondent  
8 was aware of that fact. The only admissible evidence pertaining to the lender's consent to the  
9 arrangement placed that consent substantially after the disputes arose between the Dainards and  
10 the Jacksons and after the Dainards filed their grievance. This post grievance remedial act does  
11 not negate Respondent's original intent to defraud.

12 This officer concludes that by making false statements on a mortgage application  
13 regarding 115 Webster and/or on a second home rider regarding 115 Webster, Respondent  
14 violated Title 18, United States Code, Section 1344. Respondent knowingly executed the  
15 documents as part of his scheme to obtain a loan from a financial institution. In order to obtain  
16 the loan under the more favorable terms of a residential loan, Respondent fraudulently and  
17 falsely represented that he and his wife were going to occupy the house as a second home.  
18 Respondent's argument that he never intended to provide false information is rejected. As  
19 noted in the findings, Respondent's testimony on this issue was not credible. In committing this  
20 criminal act, Respondent violated RPC 8.4(b). Respondent's conduct also involved dishonesty,  
21 deceit and misrepresentations. Therefore, Respondent violated RPC 8.4(c) as well.

22 **COUNT 7:** As a joint investment with the Dainards, to be held by RPC Enterprises  
23 LLC, Respondent had a duty to advise the other members of the LLC of conduct that affected  
24

1 the value of its only asset. Because he was also the LLC's attorney, he had a duty to keep his  
2 client, the LLC and its management, informed of matters reasonably necessary to permit it to  
3 make informed business decisions regarding future courses of action. Had Respondent  
4 informed the Dainards of his intention to sign the second home rider before signing the  
5 documents, the Dainards could have chosen to either finance the property themselves and/or  
6 declined to enter into the joint venture with Respondent and his wife. Had Respondent  
7 informed them after the loan was obtained, the Dainards could have pursued other options.<sup>26</sup>

8 By failing to inform the Dainards and RPC Enterprises of the false statement contained  
9 on his mortgage application and that he had signed a second home rider regarding the subject  
10 property, Respondent violated former RPC 1.4(b).

11 **COUNT 8:** Count 8 involved Respondent making an offer to purchase the Mack  
12 property in the name of RPC Enterprises LLC and his subsequent assignment of that purchase  
13 and sale agreement to another entity, unrelated to the RPC. Respondent assigned this agreement  
14 to another client, Kenny North, for no consideration to RPC Enterprises, LLC. Indeed, the co-  
15 owners of RPC Enterprises, Inc., the Dainards, did not even know that their company had made  
16 such an offer. This transaction breached Respondent's duties under RPC 1.8. The Dainards  
17 were not informed of the transaction as required by RPC 1.8 (a) (1) either orally or in writing.  
18 The Dainards were not informed of the desirability of seeking independent counsel as required  
19 by RPC 1.8(a) (2). Neither the Dainards nor RPC Enterprises, LLC, gave their written  
20 consent.<sup>27</sup> By assigning a purchase and sale agreement for what is referred to as the "Mack

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22 <sup>26</sup> Respondent's failure to inform the Dainards of the second home rider undercuts his argument that the  
23 intent to defraud the bank element was not substantiated because he and his wife actually contemplated  
24 using the home as a second residence. **Respondent's Post Hearing Brief at 6.** To do so, they would  
have had to obtain the consent of the Dainards, the party whose earnest money they claimed they were  
protecting by signing the agreement. There was no evidence that the Jacksons had that discussion with  
the Dainards.

1 property” to an entity known as Chelan Landing on terms that were neither fair and reasonable  
2 to RPC Enterprises LLC nor fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to RPC Enterprises and  
3 the Dainards, Respondent violated RPC 1.8(a).

4 **COUNT 9:** The same analysis applies to the transaction regarding the duplex property.  
5 In this case, Respondent was acting on his own behalf through another LLC, Jackson-Field, an  
6 entity that was unknown to his co-owners in RPC Enterprises LLC. This transaction raises the  
7 same issues of conflicts with current clients prohibited by RPC 1.8(a). Again, Respondent  
8 failed to inform the Dainards and RPC Enterprises, LLC and again he failed to obtain consent to  
9 the transaction. This Officer concludes Respondent violated RPC 1.8(a). He acquired an  
10 interest, through Jackson-Field, in an a duplex property adjoining the property owned by RPC  
11 Enterprises on terms that were not fair and reasonable to RPC Enterprises, and/or on terms that  
12 were not fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to RPC Enterprises and the Dainards. He did  
13 not advise RPC Enterprises and the Dainards in writing of the desirability of seeking  
14 independent counsel, and without obtaining the informed consent in writing of RPC Enterprises  
15 and the Dainards,

16 **COUNT 10:** RPC 1.8(a) precludes a lawyer from using information relating to a  
17 client’s representation to the disadvantage of that client. Respondent’s conduct in assisting  
18 Kenny North in the purchase of the neighboring properties and in discussing the potential sale  
19 of 115 Webster with North as part of the larger project involved disclosure of information that  
20 the Dainards and RPC Enterprises, LLC did not authorize to be disclosed. Consequently, by  
21 using information learned during his representation of RPC Enterprises and the Dainards to the  
22 disadvantage of RPC Enterprises and the Dainards, Respondent violated RPC 1.8(b).

23 <sup>27</sup> Respondent was not authorized to enter into this transaction on behalf of RPC Enterprises LLC, so his  
24 knowledge cannot be imputed to the LLC.

1           **Count 11 & 12:** In addition to breaching his duty to refrain from use of information  
2 obtained during representation, Respondent breached his duty to avoid the conflicts of interests  
3 raised by these transactions.

4           As to Count 11, this Officer concludes that Respondent was the attorney for RPC  
5 Enterprises at the time he made an offer for the sale of 115 Webster in March and April 2007 to  
6 North. He was also its attorney when he considered the offer from Chelan Landing for the sale  
7 of 115 Webster in September 2007. During these transactions, there was a significant risk that  
8 his representation of RPC Enterprises would be materially limited by his personal interest and  
9 his responsibilities to Chelan Landing and/or Kenny North. He could not reasonably believe  
10 that he would be able to provide competent and diligent representation to RPC Enterprises while  
11 dealing on both sides of these transactions. He did not obtain the informed consent in writing  
12 of RPC Enterprises and the Dainards. This conduct violated current RPC 1.7(a).

13           Likewise, as to Count 12, this Officer concludes Respondent violated RPC 1.7(a). He  
14 represented RPC Enterprises regarding the purchase and sale agreement for the Mack property  
15 and the transfer of the purchase and sale agreement for the Mack property. At this time, there  
16 was a significant risk that the representation would be materially limited by his personal interest  
17 and his responsibilities to Chelan Landing and North, Respondent could not reasonably believe  
18 that he would be able to provide competent and diligent representation to RPC Enterprises when  
19 he was taking a potential asset from one company he represented and transferring it to a  
20 company in which he had a financial interest. Moreover, he did not obtain the informed consent  
21 in writing of RPC Enterprises and the Dainards. Respondent violated RPC 1.7(a).

22           **Count 13:** Count 13 raised issues regarding the Respondent's duty to inform his  
23 clients of information needed for them to make appropriate decisions. Because Respondent  
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1 concealed the information regarding the Mack property and his involvement with Kenny North  
2 and Chelan Landing, Respondent violated RPC 1.4 and RPC 8.4(c).

3 **COUNT 14:** An attorney must first and foremost be honest with his clients. During the  
4 course of his relationship with the Dainards and RPC Enterprises, LLC, Respondent  
5 misrepresented his relationship to North, the status of various transactions and his involvement  
6 in the September 2007 presentation by Chelan Landing LLC. He made other false statements  
7 regarding these transactions to the Dainards. Respondent therefore violated RPC 8.4(c).

## 8 VII. PRESUMPTIVE SANCTIONS

9 Determination of the appropriate sanction involves a two-step process applying ABA  
10 Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. *In re Anshell*, 149 Wn. 2d 484, 69 P.3<sup>rd</sup> 844  
11 (2003). The first step is to determine the presumptive sanction, considering the ethical duty  
12 violated, the lawyer's mental state, and the extent of the harm caused by the misconduct. ABA  
13 Std. 3; *In re Whitt*, 149 Wn. 2d 707, 717, 72 P.3<sup>rd</sup> 173 (2003). The second step in the process is  
14 to consider whether aggravating or mitigating factors should alter the presumptive sanction. *In*  
15 *re Johnson*, 118 Wn. 2d 693, 701, 826 P.2d 186 (1992).

16 **COUNT 1:** Count 1 involved dishonest conduct in violation of RPC 8.4(c). In falsely  
17 swearing under oath that he was Michael Levenhagen's agent, Respondent violated his duty to  
18 maintain his personal integrity as required members of the legal profession. ABA Standard 5.1  
19 applies to this finding of misconduct.

20 ABA Standard 5.1 provides:

21 Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors  
22 set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases  
23 involving commission of a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's  
24 honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, or in cases with  
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation:

5.11 Disbarment is generally appropriate when:



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- a. a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct a necessary element of which includes intentional interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, distribution, or importation of controlled substances, or the intentional killing of another; or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of these offenses; or
  - b. a lawyer engages in any other intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice.

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5.12 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in criminal conduct which does not contain the elements listed in Standard 5.11 and that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice.

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5.13 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in any other conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.

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5.14 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.

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This officer concludes that ABA Standards 5.11 (b) applies to the facts of this case. Respondent acted intentionally in signing this affidavit in order to facilitate a loan for Douglas Simonson. The signing of this affidavit, without Levenhagen's knowledge, was critical to Simonson's obtaining funds from property he did not own at the time. Respondent signed this declaration, knowing at the time he signed it, that he was facilitating a loan on behalf of a borrower who did not have legal title to the property being used to secure the loan. Respondent falsely swore that he was Levenhagen's agent to facilitate a fraudulent transaction. ABA Std. 5.11 (b) applies to conduct which is not "serious criminal conduct" but is intentional conduct involving "dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to

1 practice.”<sup>28</sup>

2 The Washington Supreme court applied Standard 5.11 in *In re Disciplinary*  
3 *Proceeding of Kuvara*,<sup>29</sup> 149 Wn. 2d 237, 66 P. 3<sup>rd</sup> 1057 (2003) to facts similar to these.  
4 In *Kuvara*, the attorney prepared a quit claim deed to allow a surviving wife to transfer  
5 property long after her husband’s death. *Kuvera* prepared the quit claim deed, had the  
6 wife sign her husband’s name to it, notarized the signature and then recorded the deed.  
7 Applying ABA Standard 5.11, the court concluded disbarment was the presumptive  
8 sanction.

9 Here Respondent’s intentional act seriously adversely reflects on his fitness to  
10 practice law. Moreover, the conduct caused significant potential and actual harm to the  
11 Levenhagens. Respondent’s act allowed Simonson to seize \$150,000 in equity from  
12 property that legally belonged to Levenhagen, thereby diminishing its net value.  
13 Disbarment is the presumptive sanction.

14 **COUNT 2:** Respondent violated 18 U.S.C. §152 by intentionally concealing  
15 Simonson’s funds in his accounts.<sup>30</sup> This conduct violated Respondent’ duty to maintain his  
16 personal integrity. It also implicated Respondent’s duty to the court and the justice system.

17 As noted above, ABA Standard 5.11 applies to a lawyer’s duty to maintain his personal

18 <sup>28</sup> Had the Association charged this as criminal misconduct, sufficient evidence exists to conclude that  
19 ABA Standard 5.11 (a) would apply as well. While it might be argued that the false signature on a real  
20 estate excise affidavit is not the type of serious criminal conduct 5.11(a) contemplates, that rationale  
21 does not apply where the act furthers a larger criminal scheme. Here the signing of the affidavit cannot  
22 be viewed in isolation. Respondent’s signature facilitated a greater scheme that allowed his client to  
23 remove \$150,000 in equity from property legally owned by another.

24 <sup>29</sup> Actually, the facts in *Kuvara* are less egregious, because the intent of the transaction was simply to  
document formally a transaction that all parties agreed had taken place. Here, Respondent’s action  
allowed his client to obtain something to which he had no legal right.

<sup>30</sup> The record supports additional transactions than those listed in the formal complaint. These uncharged  
acts do not form the basis for this hearing officer’s conclusions or recommendations, however, but have  
been considered pursuant to **ER 404(b)** in evaluating issues of knowledge, plan, scheme, and credibility.

1 integrity. Respondent's violation of 18 U.S.C. §152 is the type of "serious criminal conduct"  
2 contemplated by ABA Standard 5.11 (a). By definition, violation of this statute constitutes  
3 fraud. This activity occurred over an extended period of time, represented multiple incidents of  
4 misconduct and as established in the various emails discussed above, was done knowingly and  
5 intentionally. Respondent's conduct caused substantial injury to the integrity of the judicial  
6 process.

7 It is hard to imagine conduct more prejudicial to the administration of justice than an  
8 attorney who, using his trust account and attorney/client privilege, conspires with his client to  
9 conceal funds from a court in violation of a direct order. Here, in addition, Respondent stood to  
10 gain financially from the scheme. By allowing his client to conceal funds in Respondent's  
11 accounts, Respondent allowed the client to continue operating his businesses in a manner that  
12 could not be traced by the court or the bankruptcy trustee. Respondent received fees from those  
13 businesses, including 27 \$1,000 payments from the same closing accounts that were being used  
14 to funnel the funds to Simonson. To the extent that monies were available to Simonson, those  
15 funds should have been retained for benefit of Simonson's creditors.

16 Pursuant to §5.11(a), disbarment is the presumptive sanction. *See In re Discipline of*  
17 *Marshall*, 160 Wn. 2d 317, 343, n. 11, 157 P.3<sup>rd</sup> 859 (2007)[“Standard 5.11(a) includes list of  
18 specific criminal conduct to which that standard applies.]

19 **COUNT 3:** Count 3 involves the Respondent's concealment of a \$55,000 payment from  
20 his escrow account to his wife, Patti Jackson. As noted in the findings, Respondent and his wife  
21 lent Simonson \$50,000 at the beginning of February 2006. Within a matter of days, this money  
22 was returned to the Jacksons with a \$5,000 premium. Respondent transferred this money with  
23 full knowledge of the restraining order and with the intent of assisting Simonson. In return for  
24

1 this short term "loan" concealed from the bankruptcy trustee, Respondent's client rewarded him  
2 with a \$5,000 bonus. This omission of a substantial payment that directly implicated  
3 Respondent cannot credibly be deemed accidental. The clear preponderance of the evidence  
4 establishes that this omission was made knowingly and intentionally.

5 Count 3 implicates the Respondent's duty to the refrain from conduct that is prejudicial  
6 to the administration of justice and his duty to comply with lawful orders of a court. ABA  
7 Standard 6.11 applies to these duties where the attorney acts with intent:

8 Absent mitigating or aggravating factors, upon application of the factors set out in  
9 Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate for cases involving  
10 conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice or that involves dishonesty,  
11 fraud, deceit or misrepresentation to a court:

12 6.11 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, with intent to  
13 deceive the court, makes a false statement, submits a false document, or  
14 improperly withholds material information, and causes serious or  
15 potentially serious injury to a party, or causes a significant or potentially  
16 significant adverse effect on the legal proceeding.

17 Respondent's intentional act caused serious injury and/or potentially serious injury to  
18 the trustee and a significant or potentially significant adverse effect on the bankruptcy  
19 proceeding. Because Respondent failed to disclose funds, the trustee was unaware that  
20 Simonson had even more funds available to him that rightfully belonged to his creditors. This  
21 in turn required the trustee's lawyer to expend additional time and resources in attempts to  
22 locate all the funds the debtor had concealed with Respondent's assistance. ABA Standard  
23 6.11 applies to this count. Disbarment is the presumptive sanction.

24 **COUNT 4:** Count 4 involves Respondent's conduct during the discovery process in the  
second adversarial proceeding. This violation implicates Respondent's duty to maintain the  
integrity of the legal process. ABA Standard 6.2 applies to this count. Standard 6.2 provides:

1                   **6.2    ABUSE OF LEGAL PROCESS**

2                   Absent aggravating or mitigating factors, upon application of the factors  
3                   set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases  
4                   involving failure to expedite litigation or bring a meritorious claim, or failure to  
                  obey any obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based  
                  on an assertion that no valid obligation exists:

5                   6.21    Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly violates a  
6                   court order or rule with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or  
                  another, and causes serious injury or potentially serious injury to a party or  
                  cause serious or potentially serious interference with a legal proceeding.

7                   6.22    Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows that he or she is  
8                   violating a court order or rule, and causes injury or potential injury to a  
9                   client or a party, or cause interference or potential interference with a legal  
                  proceeding.

10                  6.23    Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently fails to  
11                  comply with a court order or rule, and causes injury of potential injury to a  
                  client or other party, or causes interference or potential interference with a  
                  legal proceeding.

12                  6.24    Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an  
13                  isolated instance of negligence in complying with a court order or rule,  
14                  and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a party or cause little or  
                  no actual or potential interference with a legal proceeding.

15                                   As established in FOF 251-297, Respondent intentionally abused the discovery process  
16                                   by withholding relevant documents and/or redacting those portions of certain documents that  
17                                   referred to Respondent. Respondent acted with knowledge and with the intent to conceal  
18                                   relevant information from the court and from the bankruptcy trustee in order to hide his role in  
19                                   the bankruptcy fraud and in order to protect Simonson's interests.

20                                   Respondent's conduct caused serious injury, and/or potentially serious injury to a party  
21                                   and a significant or potentially significant adverse effect on the legal proceeding.

1 The most serious injury and/or potential injury, was to the Levenhagens.<sup>31</sup> As  
2 established by the testimony of the attorney for the bankruptcy trustee, the withheld documents  
3 tended to exculpate the Levenhagens and to a lesser extent, the Laings and Lanings. If  
4 Respondent had provided the documents, it is unlikely that the Levenhagens and the other two  
5 couples would have been the subject of a criminal referral by the bankruptcy judge. A criminal  
6 investigation, if one were initiated, could have significant consequences for Michael  
7 Levenhagen, a commercial airline pilot.

8 The referral itself caused serious injury to the three couples. Successful businessmen  
9 and respected members of the community, these individuals were implicated in a systematic  
10 fraud on a federal court. Learning that a referral had been made caused each couple  
11 significant emotional distress.<sup>32</sup> Levenhagen was forced to retain a criminal defense lawyer to  
12 provide him with advice and to defend his rights. Had Respondent provided the materials  
13 demanded in discovery, the trustee and the court would have known that Levenhagen was a  
14 victim, not an active participant in the fraud. There would have been no need for Levenhagen  
15 to hire a criminal lawyer. Finally, had the material been provided, the Levenhagens and  
16 Respondent's other clients, the Laings and the Lanings, would have resolved their cases with  
17 the court much earlier.

18 Substantial evidence also established that Respondent's conduct caused serious  
19 interference with the bankruptcy proceedings. The trustee's lawyer expended time and

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20 <sup>31</sup> ABA Standard 6.21 refers to injuries to "a party." This language raises the issue of whether the intent  
21 of the section is to apply only to an opposing party. Because there is no such express limitation, and  
22 because there exists a need to protect clients from the misconduct of their own lawyers, this officer  
concludes that "party" as used in this section should include the attorney's own clients as well as the  
opposing party.

23 <sup>32</sup> Michael Levenhagen first learned of the referral at the beginning of his first deposition, when the  
24 attorney for the bankruptcy trustee inquired as to whether or not he was going to assert his 5<sup>th</sup>  
Amendment right to remain silent.

1 resources to track down the documents, and expended funds that rightfully should have been  
2 available to creditors. The failure to provide the material in a timely fashion impaired her  
3 ability to prepare for various motions and proceedings. The omitted materials caused the  
4 bankruptcy judge to draw false conclusions regarding the status of various parties and potential  
5 parties to the litigation. Most, if not all of this work would have been avoided had the  
6 Respondent provided the materials at the time they were initially requested.<sup>33</sup>

7 Standard 6.21 therefore applies to this count. Disbarment is the presumptive sanction.

8 **COUNT 5:** Count 5 involved conflicts of interest created by Respondent's  
9 simultaneous representation of Simonson, the Levenhagens, the Laings and the Lanings. ABA  
10 Standard 4.3 applies to Respondent's failure to avoid conflicts of interest.

11 **Standard 4.3 FAILURE TO AVOID CONFLICTS OF INTEREST**

12 Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors  
13 set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases  
involving conflicts of interest.

14 4.31 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, without the  
15 informed consent of client(s):

- 16 a. Engages in representation of a client knowing that the  
17 lawyer's interests are adverse to the client's with the  
intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious  
or potentially serious injury to the client; or
- 18 b. Simultaneously represents clients that the lawyer knows  
19 have adverse interests with the intent to benefit the  
lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially  
20 serious injury to a client; or
- 21 c. Represents a client in a matter substantially related to a  
22 matter in which the interests of a present or former client  
are materially adverse, and knowingly uses information

23 <sup>33</sup> As established in FOF 251-297, a number of emails and documents were never provided by  
24 Respondent. The court and the trustee learned of their existence only after Respondent's firm had been  
replaced by attorney Marc Stern who provided access to the complete files.

1 relating to the representation of a client with the intent to  
2 benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious or  
potentially serious injury to a client.

3 Here, Respondent's conduct breached his duties under all three of these standards. He  
4 represented the Levenhagens, Laings and Lanings knowing that their interests were adverse to  
5 his interest in concealing his involvement in the bankruptcy fraud. Moreover, he  
6 simultaneously represented Simonson and the Levenhagens, Laings and Lanings, knowing that  
7 the interests of the three couples were adverse to that of Simonson. His firm remained attorneys  
8 of record, even after Simonson was added as a party to the litigation.

9 [Subject to Protective Order].

10 Thereafter, Respondent drafted answers to the complaints on behalf of his clients which  
11 omitted essential counterclaims and defenses available to them because assertion of those  
12 claims would have impaired Simonson's position.

13 These acts were done without informing the Levenhagens, Laings and Lanings of his  
14 conduct and without obtaining their consent. Respondent's conduct benefited the Respondent  
15 by allowing him to continue to hide his role in the transactions. The conduct benefited Simonson  
16 by coordinating the defenses in such a way as to allow Simonson to continue his claim that he  
17 too was a "victim" of GFS, when in fact he was an active and willing participant in its equity  
18 skimming schemes. Simonson rewarded Respondent by additional fees and promises of future  
19 investment opportunities that would provide substantial financial rewards to both of them.

20 Finally, Respondent used the information he obtained through his representation of the  
21 Levenhagens, Laings and Lanings to benefit Simonson and to conceal his role in the  
22 proceedings.

23 [Subject to Protective Order].



1 This conduct was done without the knowledge or consent of the Levenhagens, Laings  
2 and Lanings.

3 Respondent's breach of his duty under ABA Std. 4.31 resulted in serious injury to these  
4 couples. Those injuries include extending the litigation, referral to the U.S. Attorney's Office  
5 for criminal investigation, and other adverse consequences associated with the proceedings in  
6 the second adversarial action. Disbarment is the presumptive sanction for Count 5.

7 **Count 6:** Count 6 involves dishonest conduct in violation of RPC 8.4 (b) and (c). In  
8 making false statements on his residential loan applications and in signing the second home  
9 rider, Respondent violated the law and violated his duty to maintain his personal integrity as  
10 required of members of the legal profession. ABA Standard 5.1 applies to this finding of  
11 misconduct.

12 Respondent's conduct in fraudulently obtaining a residential loan on property that was  
13 intended to be an investment held jointly with the Dainards represents "serious criminal  
14 conduct" as contemplated in 5.1(a). Title 18 U.S.C. §1344, carries sanctions of up to  
15 \$1,000,000.00 in fines and up to 30 years imprisonment. Clearly, Congress considered this a  
16 serious criminal offense. In addition, by its terms this criminal offense involves fraud and  
17 misrepresentation. Finally, Respondent signed the second home rider under penalty of perjury,  
18 thus implicating the prohibition on false swearing.

19 Our Supreme court applied 5.1 in similar circumstances in *In re Disciplinary*  
20 *Proceedings of Miller*, 149 Wn.2d 262, 283, 66 P.3<sup>rd</sup> 1069 (2003). In *Miller*, the lawyer  
21 completed a personal loan application without revealing a substantial loan he had obtained from  
22 a client. The court noted that the "submission of a signed loan application to Cheney Federal  
23 Credit Union knowing it contained false information satisfies the elements of Standard 5.11.  
24

1 Miller executed the loan application with a signed certification subject to punishment under 18  
2 U.S.C. §1014, which makes it a federal crime, punishable by up to 30 years imprisonment, to  
3 knowingly make false statements in a document such as a loan application to a federally  
4 chartered and insured credit union.” *Miller*, 149 Wn.2d at 283.

5 Although the Association relied upon a different federal statute in the present case, the  
6 charged crime carries with it the same penalty as that involved in *Miller*. Standard 5.1(a)  
7 applies to this charge.

8 Alternatively and/or in addition, Standard 5.1 (b) applies to Respondent’s conduct. By  
9 falsely signing these loan documents, Respondent engaged in intentional conduct that involved  
10 dishonesty, fraud, deceit and misrepresentation. This conduct adversely reflects on his ability  
11 to practice law. Disbarment is the presumptive sanction for Count 6.

12 **Count 7:** As the attorney for RPC Enterprises, LLC, Respondent had a duty to inform his  
13 the CEO of RPC Enterprises (Rob Dainard) and/or his co-owners, the Dainards, of information  
14 that impaired the health of the LLC. RPC Enterprises was formed for the sole purpose of  
15 holding the real property at 115 Webster. Respondent knowingly deceived RPC Enterprises and  
16 the Dainards about the status of the loan used to purchase the property.

17 ABA Standard 4.6 is applicable to cases where a lawyer engages in “fraud, deceit,  
18 misrepresentation directed toward a client.”

19 ABA Standard 4.6 states in pertinent part:

20 Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out  
21 in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are appropriate in cases where the lawyer  
engages in fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation directed toward a client:

- 22 a. Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly deceives a client  
23 with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious injury or  
24 potential serious injury to a client.

- 1           b.     Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly deceives a client,  
2           and causes injury or potential injury to the client.
- 3           c.     Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently fails to provide a  
4           client with accurate or complete information and causes injury or potential injury  
5           to the client.
- 6           d.     Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an isolated  
7           instance of negligence in failing to provide a client with accurate or complete  
8           information and causes little or no actual or potential injury to the client.

9           Although no other ABA Standard deals with this type of conduct, the terms of ABA 4.6  
10          are not a perfect fit with the facts pertaining to count 7. Respondent did not affirmatively  
11          misrepresent or deceive the Dainards or RPC Enterprises. Instead, he failed to disclose that he  
12          had signed the second home rider. Respondent's misconduct was by omission, rather than  
13          commission. Because standards 4.61 and 4.62 appear to require acts of commission directed to  
14          the client, this Officer concludes that they do not apply even though Respondent's conduct does  
15          meet the mental state requirement and other factors contained in these standards.

16          Standard 4.63 differs from 4.64 in two ways. Standard 4.64 speaks to an "isolated"  
17          incident. Arguably, the second home rider information could be classified as "isolated."  
18          However, 4.64, unlike 4.63, applies where the omission causes "little or no actual or potential  
19          injury to the client." Standard 4.63 applies when the omission causes injury.

20          On balance, this Officer concludes that Standard 4.63 is a better fit for the facts  
21          associated with Count 7. There is sufficient evidence of repeat behavior to take the conduct out  
22          of the "isolated" incident language of 4.64. Moreover, Respondent's conduct caused actual  
23          injury to the LLC and its co-owners. The issue of the second home rider, until it was resolved,  
24          required that the home remain empty. That fact denied the LLC rental income while still  
25          obligating it to paying the mortgage. Had the Respondent informed the LLC and the Dainards

1 that he had signed the mortgage loan application with the rider language, the Dainards could  
2 have exercised their right to decline to go through with the assignment of their purchase rights  
3 to the LLC. Alternatively, they could have asked that Respondent repay them their \$25,000  
4 earnest money and assume ownership of the property.

5 Respondent's failure to provide the information thus caused injury. Absent aggravating  
6 or mitigating factors discussed below, Reprimand is the presumptive sanction.

7 **Counts 8-12**

8 Counts 8 through 12 raise issues relating to the Respondent's duty to avoid conflicts of  
9 interests. These five counts thus implicate ABA Standard 4.3.

10 **Standard 4.3 FAILURE TO AVOID CONFLICTS OF INTEREST**

11 Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors  
12 set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases  
involving conflicts of interest.

13 4.31 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, without the  
14 informed consent of client(s):

- 15 a. Engages in representation of a client knowing that the  
16 lawyer's interests are adverse to the client's with the  
intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious  
or potentially serious injury to the client; or
- 17 b. Simultaneously represents clients that the lawyer knows  
18 have adverse interests with the intent to benefit the  
lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially  
19 serious injury to a client; or
- 20 c. Represents a client in a matter substantially related to a  
21 matter in which the interests of a present or former client  
are materially adverse, and knowingly uses information  
22 relating to the representation of a client with the intent to  
benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious or  
potentially serious injury to a client.

23 4.32 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows of a  
24

1 conflict of interest and does not fully disclose to a client the possible  
2 effect of that conflict, and causes injury or potential injury to a  
client.

3 4.33 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in  
4 determining whether the representation of a client may be materially  
5 affected by the lawyer's own interests, or whether the representation  
will adversely affect another client, and causes injury or potential  
injury to a client.

6 4.34 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an  
7 isolated instance of negligence in determining whether the  
8 representation of a client may be materially affected by the lawyer's  
own interests, or whether the representation will adversely affect  
another client, and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a  
client.

9  
10 **Count 8:** The Association argues that 4.31 applies to Count 8 because there was injury  
11 to the Dainards when RPC Enterprises received no compensation for the assignment of the  
12 purchase and sale agreement from RPC Enterprises to Chelan Landing. This argument assumes  
13 that the right to purchase the Mack property had value. To reach that conclusion, this Officer  
14 would have to draw inferences from the meager evidence in the record concerning this issue.  
15 The Dainards did not know of the agreement. It appeared to be part of Respondent's larger plan  
16 with Kenny North for development of the three properties. The Dainards testified that they  
17 were not interested or able to participate in the type of project that Kenny North was  
18 contemplating. Thus it is unlikely that they would have been interested in the property for their  
19 own use. This officer concludes that ABA 4.31 does not apply.

20 For the same reason, the lack of an identifiable injury, this officer rejects application of  
21 4.32 and 4.33. Again these standards require the presence of an actual or potential injury to the  
22 client. The record does not support that conclusion. Absent aggravating factors, admonition is  
23 the presumptive sanction pursuant to Standard 4.34.

24 **Count 9:** Like Count 8, the record does not support a finding of injury to the Dainards

1 or RPC Enterprises. Standard 4.34 applies to this count. Absent aggravating factors,  
2 admonition is the presumptive sanction pursuant to Standard 4.34.

3 **Count 10:** The same analysis does not apply to Count 10. Count 10 involves the use of  
4 information Respondent learned from his representation of the Dainards and RPC Enterprises to  
5 further the development scheme he was working on with Kenny North. In this situation,  
6 Respondent acted with knowledge that his interests were adverse to that of the Dainards and  
7 RPC Enterprises. Respondent was motivated by his desire to gain financially through his  
8 participation in Kenny North's condominium project, Chelan Landing, LLC.

9 As to this count, Respondent's conduct caused serious and/or potentially serious injury  
10 to RPC Enterprises and the Dainards. Respondent and North attempted to tie up the property at  
11 115 Webster while they determined whether the condo project was viable. Using his knowledge  
12 of the property, the finances of RPC Enterprises, and Robert Dainards's temporary medical  
13 issues, Respondent attempted to push the Dainards into a sales agreement that would tie up the  
14 property for little or no money down and allow Chelan Landing to walk away from the deal if it  
15 didn't suit Kenny North. The fact that the Dainards ultimately rejected the proposal, does not  
16 negate the potential injury to RPC Enterprises and/or the Dainards. Pursuant to Standard  
17 4.31(a) disbarment is the presumptive sanction as to this count.

18 **Count 11:** This count involves concurrent conflict of interests pursuant to RPC 1.7(a).<sup>34</sup>  
19 As with count 10, this conduct is governed by Standard 4.31(a). Respondent was simply playing  
20 both sides in an attempt to obtain the financial benefits associated with working on Kenny  
21 North's condo project. As with Count 10, the Respondent acted with knowledge to benefit

22  
23 <sup>34</sup> Count 11 and Count 12 differ in the underlying conduct charged. In Count 11, the Association cites  
24 the conduct relating to the sale of 115 Webster. In Count 12, the charged conduct involves the use of  
RPC Enterprises as a vehicle for obtaining purchase rights to the neighboring Mack property.

1 himself and Kenny North. This Officer concludes that Respondent's conduct as to count 11  
2 caused the same type of injury or potential injury as identified in Count 10. In addition,  
3 Respondent's conduct caused the Dainards to lose faith in lawyers and the legal system.  
4 Disbarment is the presumptive sanction applicable to Count 11.

5 **Count 12:** Count 12 involves a similar charge for Respondent's actions regarding the  
6 Mack property. Like Count 11, Respondent acted with the same knowledge and intent. As to  
7 this count, Respondent caused an additional injury. By binding his client, RPC Enterprises, to  
8 the unauthorized purchase and sale agreement for the Mack property, Respondent exposed the  
9 RPC to significant potential liability.<sup>35</sup> Respondent created a contractual relationship with the  
10 seller of the property, promising on behalf of RPC Enterprises to purchase the property for \$1.2  
11 million dollars. This contractual liability caused serious or potentially serious injury to RPC  
12 Enterprises. Had North walked away from the deal and/or refused to accept the subsequent  
13 assignment, there was a real danger that RPC Enterprises would have been forced into the  
14 purchase. Using a client's company as a mechanism for purchasing property on behalf of  
15 another client is the type of transaction that seriously undercuts the public's faith in the legal  
16 system. Because of the actual/potential injury to RPC Enterprises, the Dainards and the public,  
17 disbarment is the presumptive sanction pursuant to 4.31.

18 **Count 13:** Count 13 involved the Respondent's failure to inform the Dainards of the  
19 Mack transactions. The failure to provide information to clients implicates the lawyer's duty of  
20 candor towards clients as set out in ABA Standard 4.6. Count 13 raises the same legal issues  
21 regarding application of the standards as were raised in Count 7. Both counts involve the  
22 failure to provide information, rather than actual deception. For the reasons set out in count 7,

23  
24 <sup>35</sup> Respondent testified that the promissory note and contingencies in the documents were standard and allowed the LLC to walk away from the deal if things didn't work out. RP 1483, lines 1-12.





1 Certain counts, however, have the element of dishonesty inextricably interwoven into  
2 the violation and the applicable ABA presumptive sanction. Counts 1, 2, 3, 6, and 14 therefore  
3 are not subject to the dishonesty portion of this aggravating factor. The second factor, selfish  
4 motive, is not included in the presumptive sanction and therefore may be applied to aggravate  
5 the presumptive sanction.

6 The two counts involving failure to inform, Counts 7 and 13, were downgraded from the  
7 presumptive sanctions recommended by the Association based on this Officer's conclusion that  
8 the Association has not proven an injury sufficient to apply the harsher sanctions. Both of these  
9 counts involved intentional, dishonest acts prompted by Respondent's desire for personal gain  
10 either directly (Count 14) or indirectly through benefits to a valuable client. (Count 7). Both the  
11 dishonesty and selfish prongs of Standard 9.22 (b) apply to these counts.

12 **ABA Std. 9.22(c) Pattern of Misconduct**

13 This aggravating factor applies to all counts. One of the most disturbing aspects of  
14 Respondent's conduct is his total failure to appreciate a lawyer's duties to his clients and to the  
15 legal system. Reading the numerous emails presented in this case leaves one with the distinct  
16 impression of a lawyer whose main goal is to keep wheeling and dealing with big time  
17 investors. To get and retain those clients, unfortunately, Respondent repeatedly demonstrated  
18 that he was willing to sacrifice the interests of other "lesser" clients. He repeatedly used  
19 confidential information obtained through his representation of the "lesser" clients to his own  
20 advantage and to the advantage of the preferred clientele. This pattern warrants application of  
21 the aggravator contained in 9.22 (c).

22 **ABA Std 9.22 (d) Multiple offenses**

1 Counts 2, 4, & 5 and involve multiple offenses. The most egregious examples involve  
2 the numerous transfers in violation of the bankruptcy orders (count 2),<sup>36</sup> the multiple examples  
3 of discovery abuse contained in count 4 and the multiple incidents of disregarding the interests  
4 of the Levenhagens, the Laings and the Lanings in an attempt to further his own interests and  
5 those of Douglas Simonson associated with count 5. Standard 9.22(d) applies to these three  
6 counts.

7 **ABA Stds 9.22(e) Bad Faith Obstruction of Disciplinary Proceeding by**  
8 **intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the**  
9 **disciplinary agency.**

10 Although the Association does not argue that this factor applies, this Officer concludes  
11 that it does. Of concern here is the Respondent's failure to comply with the Association's  
12 March 24, 2011 ELC 10.13 (c) demands for documents. That document, exhibit A-293,  
13 required that Respondent bring to court all original client ledgers for his IOLTA account for  
14 2006, his original check register for this year and other documents.

15 Early in the proceedings, the Association inquired as to the status of these requests.  
16 Respondent offered convoluted, incredible explanations for why he had not brought the check  
17 register and client ledgers for his trust account. Ultimately, to obtain the documents, this  
18 Officer had to intervene and fashion orders that were sufficiently specific enough to circumvent  
19 Respondent's evasive behavior. Once the documents were produced, they revealed that funds  
20 belonging to Kenny North had in fact gone through Respondent's trust account. That evidence,

21  
22  
23 <sup>36</sup> As noted in the findings, there were additional transfers that were not part of the formal charges  
24 brought by the Association. These charges are not the basis for application of the multiple offense  
aggravator. They have been used only to establish issues relating to the credibility of Respondent.

1 in turn, substantially undercut Respondent's claim that Kenny North was not his client.<sup>37</sup>

2 Respondent's conduct concerning this demand justifies application of this additional  
3 aggravating factor.

4 **ABA Std 9.22 (f) Submission of false evidence during**  
5 **the disciplinary process**

6 "In addition to their duties to their clients, lawyers owe an ethical duty to the legal  
7 system, to the legal profession, and to the general public." *In re Disciplinary Proceedings of*  
8 *Huddleston*, 137 Wn.2d 560, 573, 974 P.2d 325 (1999); ABA Standards at 5. The presentation  
9 of false testimony by the Respondent during the disciplinary process undercuts public  
10 confidence in the legal system in a way that no other misconduct can. As our courts have  
11 repeatedly recognized:

12 Misrepresentations and fabrications during the disciplinary process reflect  
13 adversely on the lawyer's ability to practice law, the public perception of the legal  
14 system, and the judicial process as a whole. The foundation of the judicial  
15 system is truth and honesty. An attorney is expected to cooperate fully with the  
16 discipline process and should not be rewarded for "coming clean" after lying in  
17 the disciplinary proceedings.

18 *In re Disciplinary Proceedings of Whitt*, 149 Wn.2d 707, 721, 72 P. 3<sup>rd</sup> 173 (2003).

19 The Association seeks to apply this rule to false statements in Respondent's Answer and  
20 in the Response to Request for Admissions. Although not condoning allegedly false  
21 statements in the earlier pre-hearing pleadings, in an excess of caution, this aggravator is not  
22 being applied to those matters. Misstatements and/or unwarranted denials contained in pre-  
23 hearing matters may be the result of factors other than intentional dishonesty, including lack of

24 <sup>37</sup> As noted in the findings, the Respondent spontaneously addressed this issue once it became clear that the Association was going to be able to access his records. This comment suggests strongly that Respondent was well aware of what the records would show at the time he was making excuses for why the records could not be produced as demanded.

1 preparation and/or poor communication with counsel. These rationales, however, do not apply  
2 when a lawyer takes an oath to tell the truth and then intentionally lies.

3 This Officer concludes that the aggravating factor should be applied because of the  
4 multiple false statements Respondent made during the actual hearing. Unfortunately, there are  
5 numerous examples of Respondent intentionally providing false testimony during the hearing,  
6 including his claims that he was unable to access records requested by the Association; his  
7 statements regarding when he learned of the restraining orders, his claim that provided the  
8 Levenhagens, Laings and Lanings of information needed to consent to the conflicts of interests,  
9 and his claim that he signed the second home rider only to prevent forfeiture of the Dainards'  
10 \$25,000 earnest money deposit.

11 More troubling than the individual false statements was the fact that that nothing this  
12 lawyer said could be trusted to be true and accurate. Admittedly Respondent had an innocent  
13 explanation for virtually everything that occurred. Frequently those explanations involved  
14 attacks on the integrity of other lawyers or suggestions of incompetence on the part of the  
15 bankruptcy court. Respondent's explanations were directly contradicted by the remaining  
16 evidence offered in the case. ABA Standard 9.22(f) applies to this case.

17 **ABA Std. 9.22 (g) Refusal to Acknowledge Wrongful**  
18 **Nature of Conduct**

19 Throughout these proceedings, Respondent has denied wrongdoing or attempted to  
20 justify his conduct. The Washington Supreme court has attempted to balance an attorney's right  
21 to defend himself against charges with the terms of this aggravator. *See In re Disciplinary*  
22 *Proceedings of Kronenberg*, 155 Wn. 2d 184, 196, n.8, 117 P.3<sup>rd</sup> 1134 (2005). In *Kronenberg*  
23 the court questioned use of this aggravator, noting: "We are not persuaded that a lawyer's  
24 continuing to assert on appeal that alleged acts did not occur should have that assertion used

1 against him or her.” The *Kronenberg* court went on to observe that Kronenberg had admitted  
2 the conduct occurred but denied that it was wrongful. The court apparently considered  
3 application of the aggravator to be justified in such cases.

4 Other cases have attempted to define this point where an attorney’s right to defend  
5 himself against charges crosses over the line to the type of intransigence that this aggravating  
6 factor was designed to sanction. In *In re the Disciplinary Proceedings of Anshell*, 149 Wn.  
7 2d 484, 513, 69 P.3<sup>rd</sup> 844 (2003), the court recited the lawyer’s response to the charges and  
8 noted that as to at least one, “Earlier in these proceedings, his consistent position was that he  
9 never represented Mr. Doty<sup>38</sup>, so there was no conflict. He plainly does not consider his  
10 conduct to be of any concern.”

11 The next case, *In re the Disciplinary Proceedings of Holcomb*, 162 Wn. 2d 563, 173  
12 P.3<sup>rd</sup> 898 (2007), held that it was inappropriate to apply the aggravator to a case where the  
13 lawyer claimed he did not engage in the transactions forming the basis of the discipline. The  
14 court then distinguished *Kronberg* and *In re Disciplinary Proceedings of Dyan*, 152 Wn. 2d  
15 601, 98 P. 3<sup>rd</sup> 444 (2204). *Holcomb*, the court reasoned, had denied the underlying conduct in  
16 contrast to *Dyan* and *Kronberg*, where the lawyers admitted to the conduct but either  
17 rationalized the acts or asserted that the conduct was not wrongful.

18 A more recent case, *In re Disciplinary Proceedings of Ferguson*, 170 Wn.2d 916, 246  
19 P.3<sup>rd</sup> 1236 (2011) suggests that the court will apply this factor in the appropriate situation, even  
20 where a lawyer challenges the underlying conduct. In *Ferguson*, the lawyer appeared ex parte  
21 before a superior court judge in a contested matter, failed to disclose all relevant facts and

22  
23 <sup>38</sup> Here, Respondent took a similar approach. He denied that he represented Kenny North, stating only that he did  
24 some legal work for some of his companies. He acknowledged that he did some work for RPC Enterprises, Inc.,  
but denied that that representation imposed any obligation on him regarding his dealings with Kenny North. In  
both cases, he refused to acknowledge the obligations that even the limited representation raised.

1 obtained relief through misrepresentation and deceit. The court looked to two cases cited in the  
2 comment to this ABA standard, *Greenbaum v. State Bar*, 15 Cal. 3<sup>rd</sup> 893, 544 P.2d 921, 126  
3 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1976) and *Stanley v. Board of Professional Responsibility*, 640 S.W. 2d 210  
4 (Tenn. 1982).

5 These cases, noted the court, applied the standard where (i) the attorney appeared  
6 unrepentant and continued to maintain he was justified in his conduct, (ii) his claim was  
7 contrary to his own testimony and controverted by abundant evidence, and (iii) the attorney  
8 excused the violation as merely “technical” or an “an unfortunate labeling.” *Ferguson*, 170  
9 Wn.2d at 945. The court concluded that the aggravator applied to Ferguson’s conduct because  
10 Ferguson expressed no remorse, consistently denied she had done anything wrong, and lashed  
11 out at another attorney involved in the process. Ferguson remained unrepentant “in the face of  
12 abundant documentary evidence. Finally, Ferguson characterized her violations as unfortunate  
13 “labeling.” *Ferguson*, 170 Wn.2d at 946.

14 This officer concludes that this aggravating factor is appropriately applied to count 5.<sup>39</sup>

15 Count 5, the conflicts of interest associated with the representation of the Levenhagens,  
16 Laings and Lanings, falls under both the *Kronberg* and *Ferguson* rules. Here, respondent does  
17 not contest that he represented these three couples. He contests only that there were conflicts  
18 that precluded the representation and/or that he acted in such a way as to impair their rights.  
19 He also rationalizes his representation, arguing in a post-hearing brief, that the bankruptcy court  
20 improperly resolved legal issues relating to the fraudulent transfers.

21  
22  
23 <sup>39</sup> Good arguments could be made that the aggravator applies to all the counts. As Mr. Jackson’s  
24 defenses differed with each count, this officer has erred on the side of leniency in determining which  
counts should be aggravated pursuant to ABA Std. 9.22 (g).

1 This Officer has not resolved the legal issue<sup>40</sup> raised by the Respondent as it fails  
2 entirely as a defense to the charged misconduct. The most serious conflicts associated with this  
3 count involved the Respondent's personal involvement in the real estate transactions, his  
4 falsification of the real estate excise tax affidavit, his intentional withholding of discovery that  
5 would have assisted the trustee in resolving the question of the culpability of these three couples  
6 and his total failure to provide information sufficient regarding his relationship with Simonson  
7 sufficient to allow the clients to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

8 Respondent remains "unrepentant in the face of abundant documentary evidence."  
9 Respondent minimizes and rationalizes the transfers and seeks to blame others, including the  
10 bankruptcy judge and other lawyers, for much of what occurred. This pattern is indicative of  
11 Respondent's defenses generally. Respondent's total failure to appreciate the wrongful nature  
12 of representing these individuals thus justifies application of this aggravator.

13 **ABA Std 9.22 (i) Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law.**

14 Respondent was first admitted to practice in November 1989. Consequently, at the time  
15 of the events in question, Respondent had been practicing law for almost sixteen years<sup>41</sup>. Our  
16 Supreme Court has applied this aggravator to lawyers with much less experience. *See In Re*  
17 *the Disciplinary Proceeding of Ferguson*, 170 Wn. 2d 246 P.3<sup>rd</sup> 1236 (2011). [Aggravator  
18 applied to attorney with 11 years general practice experience.]  
19  
20

21 <sup>40</sup> If resolution of the transferee status issue had been necessary, this Officer would rely upon the  
22 testimony on the trustee's attorney and that of Marc Stern, for the proposition that these legal defenses  
23 were without merit. To that is added, of course, the fact that a federal bankruptcy judge also rejected the  
24 argument.

<sup>41</sup> This assumes the first act of misconduct began with the June 2005 real estate transactions with  
Simonson and Michael Levenhagen.

1 **IX. MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES**

2 **ABA Std 9.32 (a) Absence of a prior discipline record.**

3 Respondent has no prior disciplinary record. This mitigating factor is clearly applicable.

4 **ABA Std 9.32 (g) Character or Reputation**

5 Respondent produced credible evidence regarding his reputation as a lawyer and for  
6 charitable activities within the community. The testimony of these witnesses established the  
7 existence of this mitigating factor.<sup>42</sup>

8 **ABA Std 9.32 (k) Imposition of Other Penalties or Sanctions**

9 This factor applies only to count 4. The bankruptcy judge imposed a sanction in excess  
10 of \$200,000 against Respondent's firm to compensate the trustee for the substantial time  
11 required to track down the information, cross check the different materials and bring the  
12 appropriate motions.<sup>43</sup> While these funds reimbursed the estate for the attorney's fees  
13 expended, the sanctions did nothing to restore trust in the legal system. While this mitigating  
14 factor technically applies, it does little to diminish the impact of the extreme discovery abuses  
15 that Respondent committed in an effort to hide his own involvement in the bankruptcy fraud.

16  
17 **X. RECOMMENDATION**

18 Of the fourteen counts before this Officer, 10<sup>44</sup> carry with them the presumptive  
19

20 <sup>42</sup> Ironically, Respondent's charitable activities involved wheeling and dealing with high rollers, this time  
21 to raise money for a local children's hospital. While this does not diminish the applicability of this  
22 mitigating factor, it does much to explain the appeal of this type of community involvement.

23 <sup>43</sup> Exhibit A-284 illustrates the effort required to track the discovery misconduct. This exhibit consists  
24 of a 12 page Declaration of Counsel, with 1244 pages of documentation appended. Exhibit 45 to that  
declaration contains the bulk of the emails that were either not produced or produced in part. That  
particular attachment consists of 145 pages that are the result of checking and cross checking materials  
actually produced to those made available after Attorney Marc Stern appeared in the case.


<sup>44</sup> The remaining four, counts 7, 8, 9 and 13, involve sanctions of reprimand or admonition.



1 sanction of disbarment. Ordinarily, the presumptive sanction should be imposed unless the  
2 aggravating or mitigating factors are sufficiently "compelling" to justify departure therefrom.<sup>45</sup>  
3 This Office also concludes that at least 7 aggravators apply to various counts. In contrast, three  
4 mitigating factors exist.


5 The purpose of lawyer discipline proceedings is to protect the public and the  
6 administration of justice from lawyers who have not discharged, will not discharge, or are  
7 unlikely to properly discharge their professional duties to clients, the public, the legal system  
8 and the legal profession. ABA Standards, §1.1. Respondent Robert Jackson is a lawyer who  
9 does not recognize his duties to his clients and to the legal system. Based on the ABA Standards  
10 and the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors, this Hearing Officer recommends that  
11 Respondent be disbarred.

12 DATED this 17<sup>th</sup> day of August 2011.

13   
14 \_\_\_\_\_  
15 Bertha Baranko Fitzler,  
16 Hearing Officer,

17  
18 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

19 I certify that I caused a copy of the Redacted Findings, Conclusion + Rec  
20 to be delivered to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and to be mailed  
21 to Leland Ripley, Respondent/Respondent's Counsel  
22 at PO Box 1716, Duwamish, WA 98019, by Certified/first class mail,  
23 postage prepaid on the 17<sup>th</sup> day of August, 2011

24   
25 \_\_\_\_\_  
26 Clerk/Counsel to the Disciplinary Board

<sup>45</sup> *In re Disciplinary Proceedings of Cohen*, 149 Wn. 2d 323, 339, 67 P.3<sup>rd</sup> 1086 (2003).