In re
CHARLES WILLIAM REHM,
Lawyer (Bar No. 10708).

Proceeding No. 13\#00107
STIPULATION TO A THREE-YEAR SUSPENSION

Under Rule 9.1 of the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct (ELC), and following a settlement conference conducted under ELC 10.12(h), the following Stipulation to a threeyear suspension, is entered into by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) of the Washington State Bar Association (Association) through disciplinary counsel Francesca D'Angelo, Respondent's Counsel Brian Keith Fresonke and Respondent lawyer Charles William Rehm.

Respondent understands that he is entitled under the ELC to a hearing, to present exhibits and witnesses on his behalf, and to have a hearing officer determine the facts, misconduct and sanction in this case. Respondent further understands that he is entitled under the ELC to appeal the outcome of a hearing to the Disciplinary Board, and, in certain cases, the Supreme Court. Respondent further understands that a hearing and appeal could result in an outcome more favorable or less favorable to him. Respondent chooses to resolve this Stipulation to Discipline Page 1

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proceeding now by entering into the following stipulation to facts, misconduct and sanction to avoid the risk, time, and expense attendant to further proceedings.

## I. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE

1. Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in the State of Washington on May 12, 1980.

## II. STIPULATED FACTS

2. In 2010 , Respondent began taking personal injury cases in addition to his general law practice. Respondent had not previously handled personal injury cases subsequent to the Supreme Court case of Mahler v. Sucz, 135 Wn.2d 398, 957 P.2d 632 (1998) (Mahler). Respondent did not inform himself of the import of the Mahler decision.
3. In 2010 and 2011, Respondent employed a non-lawyer legal assistant who translated for non-English speaking clients and assisted with the accountings on the cases. Respondent did not review the settlement statements sufficiently to determine compliance with the Mahler decision or otherwise ensure that the settlement statements and accountings were accurate. Client TA ${ }^{1}$
4. Respondent represented Client TA in a personal injury matter.
5. Respondent's fee agreement with TA stated that Respondent would be entitled to a contingent fee of $33.3 \%$ of the gross settlement.
6. TA's personal injury matter settled in or around December 2010 for $\$ 12,400$.
7. Respondent placed the settlement funds in his trust account.
8. In December 2010, TA signed a settlement statement prepared by Respondent.

[^0]9. The settlement statement stated that Respondent had discounted his fee to $\$ 3,133.33$.
10. The settlement statement stated that $\$ 5,905$ would be disbursed as "medical reimbursement."
11. TA's personal injury protection (PIP) provider was Farmers Insurance (Farmers).
12. In a letter to Farmers, Respondent calculated Farmers' pro rata share of attorney's fees under Mahler to be $\$ 1,968.27$.
13. Farmers agreed to reduce its subrogation from $\$ 5,905$ to $\$ 3,936.73$.
14. Respondent disbursed $\$ 3,936.73$ to Farmers.
15. Without notice to anyone, Respondent disbursed the difference of $\$ 1,968.27$ to himself.
16. Respondent was not entitled to the $\$ 1,968.27$ that he disbursed to himself.
17. Respondent should have known, but did not in fact know, that he was not entitled to these funds.
18. Respondent took the $\$ 1,968.27$ for his own use.
19. Respondent took the $\$ 1,968.27$ without TA's authorization, knowledge or consent.
20. In total, Respondent collected a fee of $\$ 5,101.60$, which was $41 \%$ of TA's net recovery, rather than the $33.3 \%$ of the net recovery as permitted under the fee agreement.

## Client KEK

21. Respondent represented Client KEK in a personal injury matter.
22. Respondent's fee agreement with KEK stated that Respondent would be entitled to a contingent fee of $33.3 \%$ of the gross settlement.
23. KEK's matter settled in December 2010 for $\$ 13,000$.
24. Respondent placed the settlement funds in his trust account.
25. In December 2010, KEK signed a settlement statement prepared by Respondent.
26. The settlement statement stated that Respondent would discount his fee to $\$ 3,133$.
27. The settlement statement stated that $\$ 6,485$ would be disbursed as "medical
reimbursement."
28. KEK's personal injury protection (PIP) provider was Farmers Insurance (Farmers).
29. In a letter to Farmers, Respondent calculated Farmers' pro rata share of attorney's
fees under Mahler to be $\$ 2,161.30$.
30. Farmers agreed to reduce its subrogation from $\$ 6,485$ to $\$ 4,323.70$.
31. Without notice to anyone, Respondent disbursed the difference of $\$ 2,161.30$ to himself.
32. Respondent was not entitled the $\$ 2,161.30$ that he disbursed to himself.
33. Respondent should have known, but did not in fact know, that he was not entitled to these funds.
34. Respondent took the $\$ 2,161.30$ for his own use.
35. Respondent took the $\$ 2,161.30$ without KEK's authorization, knowledge or consent.
36. In total, Respondent collected a fee of $\$ 5,294.63$, which was $40 \%$ of KEK's net recovery, rather than the $33.3 \%$ of the net recovery as permitted under the fee agreement.

## Client SC

37. Respondent represented Client SC in a personal injury matter.
38. Respondent's fee agreement with SC stated that Respondent would be entitled to a contingent fee of $33.3 \%$ of the gross recovery.
39. SC's matter settled for $\$ 10,300$.
40. Respondent placed the settlement funds in his trust account.
41. In June 2011, SC signed a settlement statement prepared by Respondent.
42. The settlement statement stated that the total medical reimbursement to be paid was
$\$ 5,466.24$.
43. SC's PIP provider was Hartford Insurance Company.

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\$ 3,644.16
$$


44. Hartford reduced its subrogation from $\$ 5,466.24$ to $\$ 3,624: 99$.
45. Without notice to anyone, Respondent disbursed the difference of $\$ 1,822.08$ to
himself.
46. Respondent was not entitled to the $\$ 1,822.08$ that he disbursed to himself.
47. Respondent should have known, but did not in fact know, that he was not entitled to these funds.
48. Respondent took the $\$ 1,822.08$ for his own use.
49. Respondent took $\$ 1,822.08$ without SC's authorization, knowledge or consent.
50. In total, Respondent collected a fee of $\$ 4,222.08$, which was approximately $41 \%$ of SC's net recovery, rather than the $33.3 \%$ of the net recovery as permitted under the fee agreement.

## Client KWK

51. Respondent represented Client KWK in a personal injury matter.
52. Respondent's fee agreement with KWK stated Respondent would be entitled to a contingent fee of $33.3 \%$ of the gross recovery.
53. In February 2011, KWK's personal injury matter settled for $\$ 8,000$.
54. Respondent placed the settlement funds into his trust account.
55. In February 2011, KWK signed a settlement statement prepared by Respondent.
56. The settlement statement stated that Respondent's fee would be $\$ 2,664.00$.

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58. KWK's PIP provider was GIECO Insurance (GIECO).
59. GEICO reduced its subrogation from $\$ 2,750$ to $\$ 1,834.25$.
60. In or around April 2011, without notice to anyone, Respondent disbursed the difference of $\$ 915.75$ to himself.
61. Respondent was not entitled to the $\$ 915.75$ that he disbursed to himself.
62. Respondent should have known, but did not in fact know, that he was not entitled to these funds.
63. Respondent took the $\$ 915.75$ for his own use.
64. Respondent took the $\$ 915.75$ without KWK's authorization, knowledge or consent.
65. In total, Respondent collected a fee of $\$ 3,579.75$, which was $44.75 \%$ of KWK's net recovery, rather than the $33.3 \%$ of the net recovery as permitted under the fee agreement.

## Client JHP

66. Respondent represented Client JHP in a personal injury matter.
67. Respondent's fee agreement with JHP stated that Respondent would be entitled to a contingent fee of $33.3 \%$ of gross recovery.
68. In August 2011, JHP's personal injury matter settled for $\$ 9,850$.
69. Respondent placed the settlement funds in his trust account.
70. In or around August 11, 2011, JHP signed a settlement statement prepared by Respondent.
71. The settlement statement stated that the total medical bills were $\$ 6,243.15$.
72. However, Respondent only paid $\$ 4,209$.to JHP's medical provider, Esurance.
73. Without notice to anyone, Respondent took the difference of $\$ 2,034.15$ for himself.
74. Respondent was not entitled to the $\$ 2,034.15$ that he took for himself.
75. Respondent should have known, but did not in fact know, that he was not entitled to these funds.
76. Respondent took the $\$ 2,034.15$ for his own use.
77. Respondent took the $\$ 2,034.15$ without JHP's authorization, knowledge or consent.
78. In total, Respondent collected a fee of $\$ 3,675.82$, which was $37 \%$ of JHP's net recovery, rather than the $33.3 \%$ of the net recovery as permitted under the fee agreement.

## Client KZ

79. Respondent represented Client KZ in a personal injury matter.
80. Respondent's fee agreement with KZ stated that Respondent would be entitled to a contingent fee of $33.3 \%$ of gross recovery.
81. In March 2011, KZ's case settled for $\$ 11,000$.
82. In March 2011, Respondent prepared a settlement statement for KZ.
83. Respondent's settlement statement indicated that $\$ 3,875$ would be reimbursed for medical reimbursement.
84. The medical reimbursement was owed to East/West Acupuncture.
85. Respondent paid East/West Acupuncture only $\$ 1,937.50$ of the $\$ 3,875$.
86. Without notice to anyone, Respondent took the remaining $\$ 1,937.50$ for himself.
87. Respondent was not entitled to the $\$ 1,937.50$ that he disbursed to himself.
88. Respondent should have known, but did not in fact know, that he was not entitled to these funds.
89. Respondent took the $\$ 1,937.50$ for his own use.
90. Respondent took the $\$ 1,937.50$ without KZ's authorization, knowledge or consent.
91. In total, Respondent collected a fee of $\$ 5,604.16$, which was approximately $51 \%$ of KZ's net recovery, rather than the $33.3 \%$ of the net recovery as permitted under the fee agreement.

## Client MC

92. Respondent represented Client MC in a personal injury matter.
93. Respondent's fee agreement with MC stated that Respondent would be entitled to a contingent fee of $33.3 \%$ of the gross settlement.
94. In June 2011, MC's matter settled for $\$ 10,000$.
95. Respondent placed the settlement funds into his trust account.
96. In June 2011, MC signed a settlement statement prepared by Respondent.
97. The settlement statement stated that $\$ 2,381.64$ would be disbursed as "medical reimbursement."
98. The medical reimbursement was owed to MC's PIP provider, Allstate Insurance (Allstate).
99. Respondent disbursed only $\$ 1,587.75$ of the $\$ 2,381.64$ to Allstate.
100. Without notice to anyone, Respondent took the difference of $\$ 793.89$ for himself.
101. Respondent was not entitled to the $\$ 793.89$ that he disbursed to himself.
102. Respondent should have known, but did not in fact know, that he was not entitled to these funds.
103. Respondent took the $\$ 793.89$ for his own use.
104. Respondent took the $\$ 793.89$ without MC's authorization, knowledge or consent.
105. In total, Respondent collected a fee of $\$ 4,828.92$, which was $48 \%$ of MC's net recovery, rather than the $33.3 \%$ of the net recovery as permitted under the fee agreement.

## B Estate

106. Respondent served as personal representative and attorney for the B Estate.
107. On or about May 3, 2002, Respondent deposited $\$ 2,910.17$ into his trust account for the B Estate.
108. On or about May 24, 2002, Respondent disbursed $\$ 900$ on behalf of the B Estate, leaving a balance of $\$ 2,010.17$ in his trust account.
109. Respondent did not disburse the remaining funds to the heirs until May 2013, after ODC had performed an audit of his trust account.

## SClosing

110. In 1994, Respondent performed a real estate closing in the S Closing matter.
111. After the S Closing, $\$ 1,000.67$ remained in Respondent's trust account.
112. Respondent did not disburse the $\$ 1,000.67$ to the buyers until May 2013, after ODC had performed an audit of his trust account.

## Trust Account

113. From January 1, 2010 through August 31, 2011, Respondent failed to keep contemporaneous check registers.
114. From January 1, 2010 through August 31, 2011, Respondent failed to keep individual client ledgers.
115. From January 1, 2010 through August 31, 2011, Respondent failed to perform trust account reconciliations.

## III. STIPULATION TO MISCONDUCT

116. By taking a higher percentage of his clients' settlement funds in the TA, KEK, SC, KWK, JHP, KZ, and MC matters than what was provided for in his fee agreement, Respondent violated RPC 1.5(a).
117. By converting portions of his clients' settlement funds to his own use in the TA, KEK, SC, KWK, JHP, KZ, and/or MC matters without client authorization, and by failing to promptly deliver his clients' funds to them, Respondent violated RPC 1.15A(b), and RPC 1.15A(f).
118. By providing settlement statements to his clients in the TA, KEK, SC, KWK, JHP, KZ, and/or MC matters that misstated the amount to be paid to third party medical providers and insurers and the amount to be retained by himself, Respondent violated RPC 1.4(a)(3) and RPC 1.4(b).
119. By failing to maintain complete trust account records as required by RPC 1.15B, Respondent violated RPC 1.15A(h)(2).
120. By failing to reconcile his trust account records with his bank account records, Respondent violated RPC 1.15A(h)(6).
121. By keeping client funds in his trust account for over 10 years in the B estate and S closing matters without disbursing the funds, Respondent violated RPC 1.14(b)(4) ${ }^{2}$ and/or RPC 1.15A(f).

## IV. OTHER DISCIPLINE

122. In 2012, Respondent was admonished for failing to communicate with a client,

[^1]failing to promptly conclude a probate, and failing to promptly distribute funds in his client trust account in violation of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4, and RPC 1.15A.
123. In 2013, Respondent was reprimanded for taking an advanced fee, failing to do any work on the case and failing to refund client's money in violation of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4, RPC 1.15A, and RPC1.16.

## V. APPLICATION OF ABA STANDARDS

124. The following American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer

Sanctions (1991 ed. \& Feb. 1992 Supp.) apply to this case:

### 4.1 Failure to Preserve the Client's Property

Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in 3.0 , the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving the failure to preserve client property:
4.11 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly converts client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client.
4.12 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows or should know that he is dealing improperly with client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client.
4.13 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in dealing with client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client.
4.14 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in dealing with client property and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client.

### 4.6 Lack of Candor

Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases where the lawyer engages in fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation directed toward a client:
4.61 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly deceives a client with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious injury or potential serious injury to a client.
4.62 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly deceives a client, and causes injury or potential injury to the client.
4.63 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently fails to provide a client with accurate or complete information, and causes injury or potential injury to the client.
4.64 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an isolated instance of negligence in failing to provide a client with accurate
or complete information, and causes little or no actual or potential injury to the client.

### 7.0 Violations of Duties Owed as a Professional

Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's services, improper communication of fields of practice, improper solicitation of professional employment from a prospective client, unreasonable or improper fees, unauthorized practice of law, improper withdrawal from representation, or failure to report professional misconduct.
7.1 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.
7.2 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.
7.3 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.
7.4 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an isolated instance of negligence that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional, and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.
125. Respondent acted knowingly in charging unreasonable fees. Under the ABA

Standards, " $[\mathrm{k}]$ nowledge' is the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances
of the conduct but without the conscious objective of purpose to accomplish a particular result."
The clients were injured in that they were overcharged for fees. The presumptive sanction is suspension.
126. Respondent should have known that he was taking funds to which he was not entitled. Respondent's clients were injured in that they did not timely receive the funds to which they were entitled. The presumptive sanction is suspension.
127. Respondent acted negligently in failing to provide his clients with accurate
information on their settlement statements. The clients were injured in that they did not receive
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correct, timely information. The presumptive sanction is reprimand.
128. Respondent acted knowingly in failing to properly handle the funds in his trust account and in failing to keep the required records. Under the ABA Standards, "' $[\mathrm{k}]$ nowledge' is the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective of purpose to accomplish a particular result." There was injury to the parties involved in the $S$ closing and $B$ estate who did not receive their funds in a timely manner. The presumptive sanction is suspension.
129. The following aggravating factors apply under ABA Standard 9.22:
(c) a pattern of misconduct [In 2012, Mr. Rehm was admonished for failing to communicate with a client and failing to promptly distribute funds in his client trust account; In 2013, Mr. Rehm was reprimanded for taking an advanced fee, failing to do any work on the case, and failing to refund the client's money].
(d) multiple offenses;
(i) substantial experience in the practice of law [Mr. Rehm was admitted to practice in 1980]
130. The following mitigating factors apply under ABA Standard 9.32:
(c) personal or emotional problems [During the relevant time periods, Respondent suffered from depression which was exacerbated by various family difficulties];
(d) payment of restitution;
(l) remorse.
131. It is an additional mitigating factor that Respondent has agreed to resolve this matter at an early stage of the proceedings.

## VI. STIPULATED DISCIPLINE

132. The parties stipulate that Respondent shall receive a three-year suspension for his conduct.

## VII. PROBATION

133. Respondent will be subject to probation for a period of two years commencing Stipulation to Discipline OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL OF THE Page 13
upon Respondent's reinstatement to the practice of law, with periodic reviews under ELC 13.8 of his trust account practices, and shall comply with the specific probation terms set forth below:
a) Respondent shall carefully review and fully comply with RPC 1.15A and RPC 1.15B, and shall carefully review the current version of the publication, Managing Client Trust Accounts: Rules, Regulations, and Common Sense.
b) For all client matters, Respondent shall have a written fee agreement signed by the client, which agreements are to be maintained for least seven years (see RPC 1.15B(a)(3)).
c) On a half-yearly basis, Respondent shall provide ODC's audit staff with all trustaccount records for the time period to be reviewed by ODC's audit staff and disciplinary counsel for compliance with the RPC:
d) Months $1-6$. By no later than the 30 th day of the seventh month after the commencement of probation, Respondent shall provide the trust account records from the date of his reinstatement to the end of the sixth full month.
e) Months $7-12$. By no later than the 30th day of the thirteenth month after the commencement of probation, Respondent shall provide the trust account records from the end of the previously provided time period through the end of month twelve.
f) Months $13-18$. By no later than the 30th day of the nineteenth month after the commencement of probation, Respondent shall provide the trust account records from the end of the previously provided time period through the end of month eighteen.

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g) Months $19-24$. By no later than the 30th day of the twenty-fifth month after the commencement of probation, Respondent shall provide the trust account records from the end of the previously provided time period through the end of month twenty-four.
h) The trust account records Respondent provides to ODC for each six-month review of his trust account will include: (a) a complete checkbook register for his/her trust account covering the period being reviewed, (b) complete individual client ledger records for any client with funds in Respondent's trust account during all or part of the period being reviewed, as well as for Respondent's own funds in the account (if any), (c) copies of all trust-account bank statements, deposit slips, and cancelled checks covering the period being reviewed, (d) copies of all trust account client ledger reconciliations for the period being reviewed, and (e) copies of reconciliations of Respondent's trust account check register covering the period being reviewed. The ODC's Audit Manager or designee will review Respondent's trust account records for each period.
i) On the same time schedule set forth in the preceding paragraph, Respondent will provide ODC's Audit Manager or designee with copies of any and all fee agreements entered into within the time period at issue.
j) On the same time schedule set forth in the preceding paragraph, Respondent will provide ODC's Audit Manager or designee with copies of any and all settlement statements for each personal injury matter settled within the time period at issue.
k) The ODC's Audit Manager or designee may request additional financial or client records if needed to verify Respondent's compliance with RPC 1.15A and/or 1.15B.

Within twenty days of a request from ODC's Audit Manager or designee for additional records needed to verify Respondent's compliance with RPC 1.15A and/or RPC 1.15B, Respondent will provide ODC's Audit Manager or designee the additional records requested.

1) Respondent will reimburse the Association for time spent by ODC's Audit Manager or designee in reviewing and reporting on Respondent's records to determine his/her compliance with RPC 1.15A and RPC 1.15B, at the rate of $\$ 85$ per hour. Respondent will make payment within thirty days of each written invoice setting forth the auditor's time and payment due.

## VIII. RESTITUTION

134. Respondent has paid restitution as follows:

- $\$ 1,968.27$ to TA with interest at $12 \%$ per annum from December 2010 to May 1,2014 ;
- $\$ 2,161.30$ to KEK with interest at $12 \%$ per annum from December 2010 to May 1, 2014;
- $\$ 1,822.08$ to SC with interest at $12 \%$ per annum from June 2011 to May 1, 2014;
- $\$ 915.75$ to KWK with interest at $12 \%$ per annum from February 2011 to May 1, 2014;
- $\$ 2,034.15$ to JHP with interest at $12 \%$ per annum from August 2011 to May 1, 2014;
- $\$ 1,937.50$ to KZ with interest at $12 \%$ per annum from March 2011 to May 1, 2014;

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- $\$ 793.89$ to MC with interest at $12 \%$ per annum from June 2011 to May 1 , 2014.


## IX. COSTS AND EXPENSES

135. In light of Respondent's willingness to resolve this matter by stipulation at an early stage of the proceedings, Respondent shall pay attorney fees and administrative costs of \$1,572.22 in accordance with ELC 13.9(i). The Association will seek a money judgment under ELC 13.9(l) if these costs are not paid within 30 days of approval of this stipulation.
136. Reinstatement from suspension is conditioned on payment of costs.

## X. VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT

137. Respondent states that prior to entering into this Stipulation he has consulted independent legal counsel regarding this Stipulation, that Respondent is entering into this Stipulation voluntarily, and that no promises or threats have been made by ODC, the Association, nor by any representative thereof, to induce the Respondent to enter into this Stipulation except as provided herein.

## XI. LIMITATIONS

138. This Stipulation is a compromise agreement intended to resolve this matter in accordance with the purposes of lawyer discipline while avoiding further proceedings and the expenditure of additional resources by the Respondent and ODC. Both the Respondent lawyer and ODC acknowledge that the result after further proceedings in this matter might differ from the result agreed to herein.
139. This Stipulation is not binding upon ODC or the respondent as a statement of all existing facts relating to the professional conduct of the respondent lawyer, and any additional existing facts may be proven in any subsequent disciplinary proceedings.
140. This Stipulation results from the consideration of various factors by both parties, including the benefits to both by promptly resolving this matter without the time and expense of hearings, Disciplinary Board appeals, and Supreme Court appeals or petitions for review. As such, approval of this Stipulation will not constitute precedent in determining the appropriate sanction to be imposed in other cases; but, if approved, this Stipulation will be admissible in subsequent proceedings against Respondent to the same extent as any other approved Stipulation.
141. Under Disciplinary Board policy, in addition to the Stipulation, the Disciplinary Board shall have available to it for consideration all documents that the parties agree to submit to the Disciplinary Board, and all public documents. Under ELC 3.1(b), all documents that form the record before the Board for its review become public information on approval of the Stipulation by the Board, unless disclosure is restricted by order or rule of law.
142. If this Stipulation is approved by the Disciplinary Board and Supreme Court, it will be followed by the disciplinary action agreed to in this Stipulation. All notices required in the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct will be made.
143. If this Stipulation is not approved by the Disciplinary Board and Supreme Court, this Stipulation will have no force or effect, and neither it nor the fact of its execution will be admissible as evidence in the pending disciplinary proceeding, in any subsequent disciplinary proceeding, or in any civil or criminal action.

WHEREFORE the undersigned being fully advised, adopt and agree to this Stipulation to Discipline as set forth above.


Charles William Rehm, Bar No. 10708


Brian Keith Fresonke, Bar No. 17655 Counsel for Respondent


Francesca ßAngeld,Bar No. 22979
Disciplinary Counsel

Dated: 4/30/2014

Dated: BO APRKC 2014 Dated: $5 / 21 / 20 / 4$


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ Client names are identified by initials in order to protect their privacy.

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[^1]:    ${ }^{2}$ The RPC's were amended in 2006 . All references to the RPC refer to those in effect at the time of the misconduct.

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