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# DISCIPLINARY BOARD

# BEFORE THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD OF THE WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASSOCIATION

In re

RICHARD W. SWANSON,

Lawyer (Bar No. 4777).

Proceeding No. 14#<u>000</u>25

ODC File No. 12-02348

STIPULATION TO SIX-MONTH SUSPENSION

Under Rule 9.1 of the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct (ELC), the following Stipulation to Suspension is entered into by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) of the Washington State Bar Association (Association) through disciplinary counsel Linda B. Eide and Respondent lawyer Richard W. Swanson.

Respondent understands that he is entitled under the ELC to a hearing, to present exhibits and witnesses on his behalf, and to have a hearing officer determine the facts, misconduct and sanction in this case. Respondent further understands that he is entitled under the ELC to appeal the outcome of a hearing to the Disciplinary Board, and, in certain cases, the Supreme Court. Respondent further understands that a hearing and appeal could result in an outcome more favorable or less favorable to him. Respondent chooses to resolve this

Stipulation to Discipline Page 1

OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL
OF THE WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
1325 4<sup>th</sup> Avenue, Suite 600
Seattle, WA 98101-2539
(206) 727-8207

proceeding now by entering into the following stipulation to facts, misconduct and sanction to avoid the risk, time, and expense attendant to further proceedings.

# I. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE

1. Respondent was admitted to practice law in the State of Washington on December 12, 1972.

#### II. STIPULATED FACTS

- 2. Since 2008, following her divorce in Texas, Melissa Craft lived in Washington State with her two children. In January 2011 when her ex-husband, Christofer Craft, failed to return the children following a winter break visit to Texas, Melissa filed a proposed parenting plan under Snohomish County Superior Court Cause No. 11-3-00297-9. Christofer hired Respondent.
- 3. Respondent answered Melissa's petition for Christofer. He also prepared and filed Christofer's declaration and financial documents. At a February 24, 2011 hearing, the court issued temporary orders, and it appointed a Guardian Ad Litem (GAL). A year later, on March 28, 2012, the GAL filed a report. Respondent did not comment on the GAL report.
- 4. In March 2012, Respondent closed his Everett office. He intended to complete a few remaining matters from his home. He failed to tell Christofer what, if anything, he would do to conclude his case.
- 5. In June 2013, the court issued an order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed given that a year had passed with no activity. Melissa's lawyer then set the case for trial in December 2013. In August 2013, Respondent filed his notice of intent to withdraw. Christofer proceeded pro se. In December 2013, the court entered a final parenting plan.
  - 6. Christofer's grandmother had wired \$1,500 to Respondent to begin the

representation. Christofer forwarded additional payments, and Respondent issued invoices showing fees earned and funds withdrawn from trust to cover his fees.

- 7. Between March 1, 2012 and August 1, 2012, Christofer forwarded five more money orders for \$400 each. After Christofer filed a grievance against Respondent, in April 2013, Respondent returned those uncashed money orders and issued a check for the \$1,184.20, which Respondent told Christofer was "the money left in my trust account for your case."
- 8. Respondent admits that a letter he sent to Christofer in March 2012, could have been clearer regarding their future relationship in view of his impending retirement, and he should have simply withdrawn from the representation and refunded unearned fees at that time.

#### III. STIPULATION TO MISCONDUCT

9. By failing to withdraw from the representation when he closed his office in March 2012, by taking no further action for Christofer, by failing to adequately communicate with Christofer after March 2012, and by failing to promptly refund unearned fees, Respondent violated RPC 1.3 (diligence), RPC 1.4 (communication), RPC 1.16(d) (duties on termination), and RPC 1.15A(f) (promptly pay client funds due).

# IV. PRIOR DISCIPLINE

10. In 2007, Respondent stipulated to a three-month suspension for RPC 1.3 and RPC 1.4 violations by failing to communicate adequately and act diligently in two lawsuits for the same client.

#### V. APPLICATION OF ABA STANDARDS

11. The following American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991 ed. & Feb. 1992 Supp.) apply to this case: ABA Standard 4.4 is most applicable to the duty to communicate and to act diligently. The failure to promptly refund unearned fees or

otherw	ise protect the client's interest at termination of the representation falls under ABA
Standa	<u>rd</u> 7.0.
	<ul> <li>4.4 Lack of Diligence</li> <li>4.41 Disbarment is generally appropriate when: <ul> <li>(a) a lawyer abandons the practice and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client; or</li> <li>(b) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client; or</li> <li>(c) a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect with respect to client matters and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client.</li> </ul> </li> <li>4.42 Suspension is generally appropriate when: <ul> <li>(a) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes injury or potential injury to a client, or</li> <li>(b) a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect and causes injury or potential injury to a client.</li> <li>4.43 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent and does not act with reasonable diligence in representing a client, and causes injury or potential injury to a client.</li> <li>4.44 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent and does not act with reasonable diligence in representing a client, and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	7.0 Violations of Duties Owed as a Professional 7.1 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client, the public, or the legal system. 7.2 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system. 7.3 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system. 7.4 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an isolated instance of negligence that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional, and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.
	12. Respondent acted knowingly.
	13. Respondent caused injury or potential injury because Christofer's matter was
11	on to Discipline  OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 1325 4 <sup>th</sup> Avenue, Suite 600 Seattle, WA 98101-2539 (206) 727-8207

1	14. The presu	mptive sanction is suspension.	
2	15. The following aggravating factors apply under ABA Standard 9.22:		
3	(a)	prior disciplinary offenses [as described above, Respondent received a	
4	short suspension in 2007 for lack of diligence and failure to communicate];		
5	(d)	multiple offenses; and	
6	(i)	substantial experience in the practice of law [Respondent has practiced	
7	for 40 years].		
8	16. The following mitigating factors apply under ABA <u>Standard</u> 9.32:		
9	(b)	absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; and	
10	(1)	remorse.	
11	17. It is an additional mitigating factor that Respondent has agreed to resolve this matter		
12	at an early stage of the proceedings.		
13	18. On balance, the aggravating and mitigating factors do not require a departure from		
14	the presumptive sanction, which is suspension, or from the presumptive minimum suspension		
15	which is six months.		
16	VI. STIPULATED DISCIPLINE		
17	19. The p	arties stipulate that Respondent shall receive a six-month suspension for his	
18	conduct.		
19	VII. RESTITUTION		
20	20. No restitu	ation is required, as Respondent has refunded unearned fees.	
21	VIII. COSTS AND EXPENSES		
22	21. In light of Respondent's willingness to resolve this matter by stipulation at an early		
23	stage of the proceed	stage of the proceedings, Respondent shall pay attorney fees and administrative costs of \$1,000	
24	Stipulation to Discipline Page 5	OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASSOCIATION	

in accordance with ELC 13.9(i). The Association will seek a money judgment under ELC 13.9(l) if these costs are not paid within 30 days of approval of this stipulation. Reinstatement from suspension is conditioned on payment of costs.

# IX. VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT

22. Respondent states that prior to entering into this Stipulation he had an opportunity to consult independent legal counsel regarding this Stipulation, that Respondent is entering into this Stipulation voluntarily, and that no promises or threats have been made by ODC, the Association, nor by any representative thereof, to induce the Respondent to enter into this Stipulation except as provided herein.

# X. LIMITATIONS

- 23. This Stipulation is a compromise agreement intended to resolve this matter in accordance with the purposes of lawyer discipline while avoiding further proceedings and the expenditure of additional resources by the Respondent and ODC. Both the Respondent lawyer and ODC acknowledge that the result after further proceedings in this matter might differ from the result agreed to herein.
- 24. This Stipulation is not binding upon ODC or the respondent as a statement of all existing facts relating to the professional conduct of the respondent lawyer, and any additional existing facts may be proven in any subsequent disciplinary proceedings.
- 25. This Stipulation results from the consideration of various factors by both parties, including the benefits to both by promptly resolving this matter without the time and expense of hearings, Disciplinary Board appeals, and Supreme Court appeals or petitions for review. As such, approval of this Stipulation will not constitute precedent in determining the appropriate sanction to be imposed in other cases; but, if approved, this Stipulation will be admissible in

26. Under Disciplinary Board policy, in addition to the Stipulation, the Disciplinary Board shall have available to it for consideration all documents that the parties agree to submit to the Disciplinary Board, and all public documents. Under ELC 3.1(b), all documents that form the record before the Board for its review become public information on approval of the Stipulation by the Board, unless disclosure is restricted by order or rule of law. 27. If this Stipulation is approved by the Disciplinary Board and Supreme Court, it will be followed by the disciplinary action agreed to in this Stipulation. All notices required in the 28. If this Stipulation is not approved by the Disciplinary Board and Supreme Court, this Stipulation will have no force or effect, and neither it nor the fact of its execution will be admissible as evidence in the pending disciplinary proceeding, in any subsequent disciplinary WHEREFORE the undersigned being fully advised, adopt and agree to this Stipulation Dated: 1/3/14

Dated: 2/4/14

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