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Mark Stansfield (WSBA No. 11356, admitted 1980), of Quincy, was ordered to receive two reprimands on July 17, 2008, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following an appeal. This discipline was based on conduct involving purporting to represent a person’s estate without authorization and conflicts of interest. For more information, see In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Stansfield, 164 Wn.2d 108, 187 P.3d 254 (2008).
In May 2003, a two-car accident in Quincy resulted in the death of three people. The police report stated that there was probable cause to believe that the collision was due to the driver of one of the vehicles (Mr. V) operating his Lexus “while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug.” Mr. V was uninsured. In May 2003, the widow of the driver of the other vehicle (Mrs. U) and her daughter hired Mr. Stansfield to file an insurance claim on her husband’s behalf and to probate his estate. Mrs. U also asked Mr. Stansfield about suing Mr. V for wrongful death of her husband, which Mr. Stansfield counseled her against because Mr. V lacked assets.
Around the same time, Mrs. U informed Mr. Stansfield that the widow of the passenger in her husband’s car (Mrs. C) lived in Guatemala and had given her authority to act as personal representative for Mr. C’s estate. Mr. Stansfield had Mrs. U sign a retainer agreement and other documents as personal representative of Mr. C’s estate. He then notified Mr. U’s insurance company that he represented the estates of both Mr. U and Mr. C and requested that they communicate directly with him. Mr. Stansfield wrote two letters to Mrs. C, translated into Spanish, asking whether she wanted him to handle her husband’s estate. He received no response. In fact, Mrs. C had authorized a relative who lived in Washington to hire another lawyer (Lawyer B) to represent their family. When Lawyer B contacted the insurance company, he was told that Mr. Stansfield claimed to represent Mr. C’s family. He wrote to Mr. Stansfield and requested that he cease his representation. Mr. Stansfield promptly filed an attorney’s lien for $2,299.32 against Mr. C’s estate, which delayed the family’s receipt of the insurance funds. Mr. Stansfield sent a formal notice of vacation of his lien in November 2005.
In September 2003, approximately two weeks after Mr. Stansfield concluded matters regarding the insurance claim and estate probate for Mrs. U, Mr. Stansfield agreed to represent Mr. V, who was charged with three counts of vehicular homicide and two counts of vehicular assault from the motor vehicle collision. Although the two representations were substantially related and the two clients had materially adverse interests, Mr. Stansfield neither informed Mrs. U of his representation of Mr. V nor obtained her consent thereto. On September 22, 2003, before the arraignment, Mr. Stansfield had Mr. V sign a fee agreement and received a $10,000 nonrefundable flat fee. Mr. Stansfield represented Mr. V at his arraignment, where Mr. V pleaded not guilty. On the same day, Mr. Stansfield filed a notice of appearance, a notice of demand for discovery, a demand for preservation of evidence, a demand for jury trial, and a demand for a bill of particulars on behalf of Mr. V. Mrs. U attended the arraignment and was shocked and extremely upset to see Mr. Stansfield representing Mr. V. After the arraignment, Mrs. U expressed her concerns to the prosecutor. Mr. Stansfield decided to withdraw from the case and transferred all but $250 of the $10,000 to substitute counsel.
Mr. Stansfield’s conduct violated former RPC 1.2(f), prohibiting a lawyer from willfully purporting to act as a lawyer for any person without the authority of that person; and former RPC 1.9(a), prohibiting a lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter from representing another client in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client consents after consultation and a full disclosure of the material facts.
Natalea Skvir represented the Bar Association. Leland G. Ripley represented Mr. Stansfield. Paul M. Larson was the hearing officer. |