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Bruce Brunton (WSBA No. 1866, admitted 1965), of Bainbridge Island, has been suspended for five months, censured, and ordered to pay restitution following a stipulation approved by the Supreme Court on May 5, 2000. The discipline is based upon his entering a business transaction and conflict of interest with a client, and failure to adequately communicate with another client.
Matter 1: Mr. Brunton and his wife assisted Mrs. H, a personal friend, for several years. Mr. Brunton also assisted Mrs. H with legal matters. In the 1980s, Mr. Brunton drafted Mrs. H’s will. In 1984, she requested that Mr. Brunton act as executor of her estate, and that he draft a Durable Power of Attorney naming himself as her attorney-in-fact if she became disabled. Mr. Brunton drafted these documents and Mrs. H executed them.
In 1989, Mr. Brunton referred Mrs. H to another lawyer to change her will. Although Mr. Brunton shared office space with the other lawyer, they were not associated. The other lawyer discussed with Mr. Brunton potential conflicts that could exist because Mr. Brunton drafted Mrs. H’s earlier will and was named as executor. Additionally, the client now named Mr. Brunton as a residual beneficiary to one-third of her estate.
In June 1991, Mrs. H asked Mr. Brunton to draft a new will for her. She requested that Mr. Brunton remain a residual beneficiary, but he refused. At Mrs. H’s request, Mr. Brunton removed himself as a beneficiary, but included his wife as a residuary beneficiary of the same one-third of Mrs. H’s estate. In July 1991, a bank trust officer wrote to Mr. Brunton about the conflicts related to his participation in drafting a will that provided for a gift to his wife.
In 1991, Mr. Brunton again drafted a will for Mrs. H. He referred her to another lawyer to review the will because he was concerned about the conflict created by his wife being a beneficiary. The other lawyer read the will to Ms. H and she agreed that the will reflected her desire to give Mr. Brunton’s wife a substantial gift. In June 1993, after meeting with bank employees, Mrs. H requested that Mr. Brunton reduce the size of the general bequests in her will. Mr. Brunton assumed that these changes were made to reflect the size of the anticipated estate, but he did not know the exact size of her estate. Mrs. H died on January 4, 1997. Mr. Brunton administered her estate as the executor and as the attorney for the executor. He charged the $2,728.22 administrative expenses against the general bequests and the residuary pro rata. This provided a benefit of $909.40 to Mrs. Brunton.
In 1990, Mrs. H told Mr. Brunton that she would like to sell her home to him. Mr. Brunton paid for two appraisals. The first stated the property was worth $93,000; the second, $110,000. Mr. Brunton showed both appraisals to Mrs. H. Mr. Brunton then purchased the house for less than the appraised value. The purchase and sale documents indicated that Mr. Brunton was a beneficiary under Mrs. H’s will, and that the additional $40,000 that could have been added to the purchase price was agreed to be a reduction in his portion of her estate. Mr. Brunton also paid the closing costs in the sale, even though they are usually paid by the seller. Mr. Brunton fully paid the purchase price in March 1994, including a 10 percent interest rate. There is no indication that Mr. Brunton pressured Mrs. H to sell her house to him. He did not, however, advise her to seek independent advice about the documents he drafted or the conflicts of interest created by selling her house to him.
Matter 2: From 1981 through May 1997, Mr. Brunton leased office space to Mr. R. Mr. Brunton and Mr. and Mrs. R were long-time friends. In the 1980s, Mr. Brunton drafted a will and durable power of attorney for Mr. and Mrs. R. In late 1997 or early 1998, both Mr. and Mrs. R experienced health problems and asked Mr. Brunton to become more involved in their affairs. Mr. R asked Mr. Brunton to add his signature to the Rs’ bank account so that Mr. Brunton could pay the Rs’ bills. The form prepared by the bank teller made Mr. Brunton a co-signer and indicated the account was joint with right of survivorship. Neither Mr. Brunton nor the Rs realized that Mr. Brunton received an ownership interest in the account.
In April 1988, Mr. Brunton started to pay the Rs’ bills and pick up their bank statements. Mr. Brunton provided services to Mr. R regarding medical insurance, home refinancing, medical bills and home caregivers, and met with Mr. R’s accountant. Mr. Brunton did not explain his billing rate or procedure to Mr. R. He also did not keep track of all of his time. Between March 30 and July 10, 1998, Mr. Brunton billed Mr. R $4,330.50. None of the bills reflect a breakdown for the amount of time spent or for an hourly rate charged. On June 5, 1998, Mr. Brunton issued two checks to himself from Mr. and Mrs. R’s account totaling $1,972, significantly depleting the available funds in the account.
Mrs. R died on June 11, 1998. Mr. Brunton paid himself for his remaining bills after Mrs. R’s death. This left $174.59 in the Rs’ account. Mr. R’s caregiver told Mr. R about the checks Mr. Brunton had written to himself. Mr. R told the caregiver that Mr. Brunton did not have authority to pay himself from the checking account. On July 20, 1998, Mr. Brunton returned all of the money he had disbursed to himself to the Rs’ checking account.
Mr. Brunton’s conduct violated RPC 1.8(a), prohibiting entering a business transaction with a client, unless the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client, and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which can be reasonably understood by the client, the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel, and the client consents; RPC 1.8(c), prohibiting lawyers from preparing an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer, as a parent, child, sibling or spouse, any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, except where the client is related to the donee; RPC 1.7(b), prohibiting lawyers from representing a client if the representation will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer’s own interests, unless the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected and the client consents in writing after a full disclosure; RPC 1.3, requiring lawyers to diligently represent a client; RPC 1.4, requiring lawyers to keep clients reasonably informed about the status of their matters; and 1.5(b), requiring lawyers to explain fee agreements to new clients.
Jonathan Burke represented the Bar Association. David Swartling represented Mr. Brunton.
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