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Victoria N. Smith (WSBA No. 26569, admitted 1996), of Kirkland, was suspended for one year, effective March 16, 2006, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board. This discipline was based on her conduct between 2000 and 2004 in four matters involving, inter alia, lack of communication, lack of diligence, failure to communicate the basis or rate of her fee, trust-account irregularities, failure to comply with local court rules, and failure to cooperate with disciplinary investigations.
Matter 1: Ms. Smith represented a client in connection with the dissolution of his marriage, which was finalized in August 2000. At the conclusion of the case, Ms. Smith did not file a notice of intent to withdraw. After the dissolution was finalized, the client’s ex-wife was involved in an accident while driving an automobile awarded to her under the terms of the dissolution. As a result, an insurance company attempted to collect from Ms. Smith’s client. For approximately 16 months following the accident, the client tried to contact Ms. Smith to discuss the insurance problem, but Ms. Smith did not return his phone calls or respond to his efforts to contact her. Eventually, the client hired another lawyer to resolve the matter.
Matter 2: In June 2001, Ms. Smith began representing a client in a dissolution proceeding. She had not previously represented the client in other matters. The fee agreement between Ms. Smith and the client provided that Ms. Smith would represent the client until entry of temporary orders for a flat fee of $2,500, which the client paid in early June. It also provided that Ms. Smith and the client would discuss further action and additional fees after the temporary orders were entered. After the court entered temporary orders in March 2002, Ms. Smith never discussed with the client how her fees would be calculated, but she continued to represent the client until a decree of dissolution was entered in May 2003. Also, in March 2002, the court awarded Ms. Smith’s client $3,000 in legal fees, to be paid by the client’s husband. Without advising her client, Ms. Smith deposited the $3,000 into her trust account and disbursed $2,000 to herself as earned fees for the month of March, even though according to her own records she had earned less than $1,600 for her work during that month. During the nearly two years that she represented the client, Ms. Smith did not, prior to disbursing fees to herself from the trust account, provide the client with any accounting of time spent on the case or of fees earned.
Matter 3: Ms. Smith represented a client whose dissolution decree was entered in February 2002. As part of the decree, the client’s wife was awarded a monetary judgment, of which $30,000 was to be paid from the client’s pension account. The decree required that Ms. Smith prepare and have her client execute a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) for the pension portion of the judgment within 10 days after entry of the decree, which Ms. Smith failed to do until six months later. In October 2002, Ms. Smith sent the wife a Release of Lien for her to sign. The release stated that the wife had received the full monetary judgment due her under the terms of the dissolution decree, even though Ms. Smith knew that the QDRO had not yet been entered in court and that the wife had not received the $30,000 payment from her client’s pension account. Ms. Smith failed to understand that if the wife signed the release, it could have prejudiced her ability to collect the money that had been awarded under the terms of the dissolution decree. The QDRO was ultimately entered by the court in October 2002, though the delay cost the wife an estimated $2,000 in interest.
Matter 4: In 2002, Ms. Smith was hired to represent a client in a dissolution action that involved custody of the client’s seven-year-old son. In addition to paying Ms. Smith’s fee, the client also paid to Ms. Smith $2,000 to hire a second parenting evaluator in addition to the one the court had appointed. The second evaluator was never hired, and Ms. Smith never gave the client an accounting of the money the client paid for the costs of the second evaluator, or any accounting for the work done or fees earned in representing the client. After a continuance had been granted due to Ms. Smith’s discovery violations, a bench trial was conducted in August 2002, to decide the custody issues. At trial, Ms. Smith was precluded from calling any witnesses to testify on her client’s behalf because Ms. Smith had “willfully violated court rules by disregarding four previous deadlines to disclose her witnesses.” As a result, Ms. Smith’s client was the only witness allowed to testify on her behalf. At the conclusion of the trial, the court followed the recommendations of the court-appointed parenting evaluator, giving primary custody to the father and awarding Ms. Smith’s client visitation rights. After the trial, the client made an effort to retain primary custody of her son by hiring new counsel and filing a motion to reopen the judgment and take additional testimony, but her motion was denied.
Matter 5: Ms. Smith failed to cooperate in the investigation of the grievances filed in Matters 1, 2, and 3. Specifically, she failed to appear for her deposition on more than one occasion after being subpoenaed, failed to produce documents in a timely manner as she had agreed to do under oath, and failed to answer written questions propounded to her. Ms. Smith did not cooperate in the investigation of two of the grievances until a petition for interim suspension based upon her noncooperation was filed by disciplinary counsel.
Ms. Smith’s conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; RPC 1.5(b), requiring a lawyer who has not regularly represented a client to communicate to the client the basis or rate of the fee or factors involved in determining the charges for services and the lawyer’s billing practices; RPC 1.14(a), requiring all funds of clients be deposited in one or more identifiable interest-bearing trust accounts and no funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm be deposited therein; RPC 1.14(b)(3), requiring a lawyer to render appropriate accounts to his or her client regarding all client funds and other properties; RPC 3.2, requiring a lawyer to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; and 8.4(l), prohibiting a lawyer from violating a duty or sanction imposed by or under the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct (here, ELC 1.5 and 5.3(e)) in connection with a disciplinary matter.
Natalea Skvir represented the Bar Association. Leland G. Ripley represented Ms. Smith. James M. Danielson was the hearing officer. |