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Clayton E. Longacre (WSBA No. 21821, admitted 1992), of Port Orchard, was suspended for 60 days, effective November 10, 2005, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a hearing. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2000 involving failure to provide competent representation to a client, failure to communicate, failure to act with reasonable diligence, and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. For additional information, see In re Discipline of Longacre, 155 Wn.2d 723, 122 P.3d 710 (2005).
In May 2000, Mr. Longacre was hired to represent a client charged with drive-by shooting. Because the client planned to pursue a military career, he wanted to avoid a felony conviction. During their first meeting, Mr. Longacre did not go over the contents of the information or advise the client of the sentencing range for the pending charges. The prosecuting attorney subsequently amended the information to include charges of drive-by shooting, assault in the second degree, and a firearm enhancement. The prosecuting attorney faxed Mr. Longacre the amended information and a plea agreement, which specified a sentencing range of 74-84 months and included a 36-month enhancement for the firearm allegation. In exchange for a guilty plea, the prosecuting attorney offered a sentencing recommendation of 62 months and an agreement not to file additional charges. Mr. Longacre did not discuss the proffered plea agreement with the client. By letter dated May 26, 2000, the prosecuting attorney reiterated the standard range sentence for the pending charges, warned Mr. Longacre that he would amend the information to include four counts of assault in the first or second degree (all to include firearm enhancements), along with the drive-by shooting, and urged Mr. Longacre to thoroughly consider the 62-month offer. According to the prosecuting attorney, if the information were to be amended as described, the low-end standard-range sentence for the crimes charged would be nearly 51 years. Mr. Longacre did not convey this information to the client.
In June 2000, the prosecuting attorney advised Mr. Longacre by letter that he would be making a 57-month plea offer to a co-defendant, and would extend the same offer to Mr. Longacre’s client. Mr. -Longacre never communicated this offer to the client. During a psychological evaluation in June 2000, the client told an evaluator that he believed he could be facing up to 46 months. In July 2000, the prosecuting attorney advised Mr. Longacre by letter that based on the client’s apparent choice to go to trial he would arraign the client on a second amended information as described in the May 26 letter. Mr. Longacre did not share this information with the client.
The client was arraigned on the second amended information, which charged four counts each of assault in the first degree and assault in the second degree, all with firearm enhancements, and one count of drive-by shooting. The client was tried in August 2000 and convicted of four counts of assault in the second degree with a firearm finding and drive-by shooting. The pre-sentence report included a standard range of 221-246 months based on the convictions.
Before sentencing, Mr. Longacre approached the client’s former lawyer and discussed the trial. The lawyer suggested that Mr. Longacre withdraw from the representation, indicating that Mr. Longacre’s conduct could rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Longacre moved to withdraw in September 2000. After the motion was granted, the former lawyer took over as counsel and filed a motion for new trial. A new trial was granted on grounds that Mr. Longacre had provided incorrect sentencing information to the client regarding the proper sentencing range and the effect of firearm enhancements. The client ultimately pleaded guilty to a third amended information and was sentenced to 57 months pursuant to a plea agreement.
Mr. Longacre’s conduct violated RPC 1.1, requiring a lawyer to provide competent representation to a client; RPC 1.2(a), requiring a lawyer to abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued; RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; and RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
Sachia Stonefeld Powell represented the Bar Association. Mr. Longacre represented himself. David B. Condon was the hearing officer. |