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James E. Keech (WSBA No. 29972, admitted 2000), of Omak, was suspended for one year, effective August 17, 2005, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a default hearing. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2001, 2002, and 2003 involving failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness, failure to keep a client reasonably informed, failure to protect a client’s interests upon termination of the representation, failure to return client property, and failure to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation.
Matter 1: In January 2003, Mr. Keech was hired to represent a client in a worker’s compensation matter. On two occasions Mr. Keech informed the client he would forward information to the Department of Labor and Industries but failed to do so. In April and/or May 2003, the client tried unsuccessfully to reach Mr. Keech by telephone. Mr. Keech did not answer the telephone and his messaging system was typically full and unable to take messages. In June 2003, Mr. Keech moved from Olympia to Okanogan to work for another law office and did not inform his client of the move. The client tried unsuccessfully to reach Mr. Keech by telephone. On one occasion, the client was connected to Mr. Keech’s new law office, but was unaware that the office was located in Okanogan. The client left a message for Mr. Keech but did not receive a return call. In July 2003, the client went to Mr. Keech’s former office in Olympia and learned that he had moved. The client telephoned Mr. Keech, who informed the client that he was withdrawing from the case and would deliver the client file the following weekend. Mr. Keech did not deliver the client file until three months later.
Matter 2: In August 2001, Mr. Keech was hired to represent a client in a worker’s compensation matter. Prior to the hearing, Mr. Keech and the opposing counsel agreed that medical testimony would be taken by perpetuation deposition. Mr. Keech did not interview or communicate directly with his client’s medical expert before the deposition. Prior to the deposition of the opposing side’s medical expert, Mr. Keech read the medical expert’s report and identified specific areas for cross-examination, but he failed to examine the medical expert on these areas during the deposition.
In November 2001, a hearing was held before an industrial appeals judge. Mr. Keech intended to offer exhibits to support his client’s claim for time loss compensation, but did not do so. At the conclusion of the hearing, Mr. Keech offered to file a post-hearing brief, but did not do so. In March 2002, the industrial appeals judge issued a decision denying the claim, which was affirmed by the Board of Industrial Appeals (BIA) in May 2002. Mr. Keech filed an appeal of the BIA’s decision in the wrong county, and, consequently, the appeal was dismissed. In November 2002, Mr. Keech filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals, but did little or no work on his client’s case thereafter. In February 2003, owing to Mr. Keech’s failure to file a timely statement of arrangements or designation of clerk’s papers, the Court of Appeals commissioner notified Mr. Keech that the appeal would be dismissed without further notice unless the documents were promptly filed. Mr. Keech did not respond, nor did he inform his client of the ruling. In April 2003, the appeal was dismissed. Mr. Keech did not inform his client that his appeal was dismissed. In June 2003, Mr. Keech moved from Olympia to Okanogan to work for another law office and did not inform his client of the move.
Mr. Keech’s conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring that a lawyer act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.4(a), requiring that a lawyer keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; RPC 1.4(b), requiring that a lawyer explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; RPC 1.15(d), requiring that a lawyer take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled, and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned; RPC 1.14(b)(4), requiring that a lawyer promptly pay or deliver to the client as requested by a client the funds, securities, or other properties in the possession of the lawyer which the client is entitled to receive; and RPC 3.2, requiring that a lawyer make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.
Marsha A. Matsumoto represented the Bar Association. Mr. Keech did not appear in the proceeding either personally or through counsel. Erik S. Bakke Sr. was the hearing officer. |