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David A. Ambrose (WSBA No. 21764, admitted 1992), of Edgewood, was suspended for two years, effective May 16, 2005, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board. This discipline was based on his conduct in multiple matters involving lack of diligence, failure to apprise a client of a settlement offer, failure to abide by client decisions regarding the objectives of representation, failure to communicate with clients, failure to refund unearned fees upon termination, failure to appear for depositions and comply with discovery requests, failure to comply with court orders, unauthorized communication with a person represented by counsel, conflicts of interest, and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. David A. Ambrose is to be distinguished from David R. Ambrose of Portland, OR.
Matter 1: In August 2003, client A hired Mr. Ambrose to prepare a parenting plan/visitation agreement because his daughter’s mother had stopped allowing visitation. The client paid Mr. Ambrose $1,800. Shortly thereafter, the client met with Mr. Ambrose, who agreed to have the initial paperwork completed in two weeks. At the end of two weeks, Client A telephoned Mr. Ambrose, who requested an additional week to prepare the paperwork. A week later, when they met to review the papers, Client A found the documents incomplete and inaccurate in many respects. In October 2003, Client A’s daughter made some comments at school that caused the school to report the mother to Child Protective Services. When Client A told Mr. Ambrose about this, Mr. Ambrose suggested that Client A seek full custody. Client A, however, told Mr. Ambrose that he discounted the allegations and believed that the mother remained the best custodial parent; Client A reiterated his desire that Ambrose complete the parenting plan as initially requested. Between November 2003 and January 2004, Client A repeatedly telephoned Mr. Ambrose, who failed to respond. In December 2003, Client A wrote to Mr. Ambrose demanding that he finish the work or refund the $1,800. Mr. Ambrose never finished the paperwork, nor did he refund the fee.
Matter 2: Client B hired Mr. Ambrose in January 2003 to recover records allegedly taken by his business partner, M.R., following the dissolution of the partnership. In February 2003, Mr. Ambrose wrote to M.R. demanding that he return the records. Subsequently, Mr. Ambrose commenced an action against M.R. in superior court. Mr. Ambrose failed to comply with the court’s initial scheduling order. In April 2003, Mr. Ambrose failed to appear for the client’s deposition and the deposition of another witness in the case. Mr. Ambrose failed to comply with a second scheduling order entered by the court in April 2003. In mid-2003, thinking Mr. Ambrose was diligently working on his case, the client gave Mr. Ambrose an automobile valued at $2,500 for legal fees. After Mr. Ambrose demanded further payment, Client B gave him another automobile valued at $3,000.
In October 2003, in ruling on a defense motion to dismiss for failure to make discovery, the court noted that Mr. Ambrose had appeared late for the hearing, ordered Mr. Ambrose to deliver documents he said were in his car to defendant’s counsel by 10:30 a.m., and imposed a $1,500 sanction against Mr. Ambrose. Mr. Ambrose did not deliver the documents as ordered by 10:30 a.m. and did not pay the sanctions within five days as ordered. In January 2004, after finding the refusal to comply with the October 2003 order was willful or deliberate, the court dismissed Client B’s complaint without prejudice. In January 2004, a commissioner found Mr. Ambrose in contempt of court for failure to comply with the October 2003 order and fined him $150 per day until the documents in his possession were produced.
Client B hired a new lawyer. Upon review of the file, the new lawyer learned that the defendant’s lawyer had offered to settle the matter in May 2003 if both parties agreed to dismissal of all claims and to pay their own attorney fees. Mr. Ambrose had never communicated this settlement proposal to Client B. This ultimately cost Client B more than $12,000 in attorney fees assessed against him.
In March 2004, a superior court judge found that Mr. Ambrose had intentionally failed to comply with the court’s January 2004 order. The court accordingly awarded a judgment to the defendant’s attorney for $10,500 in sanctions.
Although Client B paid Mr. Ambrose more than $8,000 in cash and/or cars, Mr. Ambrose never provided Client B with any billing statements and did not provide Client B with an accounting when requested. Mr. Ambrose provided Client B with his file only after repeated requests.
Matter 3: In early 2003, Client C hired Mr. Ambrose to commence foreclosure proceedings arising from a $17,000 loan made to J.S., which Client C had originally expected would be repaid following the listing and sale of J.S.’s home. Mr. Ambrose did not file a foreclosure action, but instead, in March 2003, obtained from J.S. a durable power of attorney and a trust that named Mr. Ambrose as J.S.’s attorney-in-fact and trustee over all of J.S.’s property. J.S.’s only significant asset was his house; the trust made Mr. Ambrose a potential trust beneficiary. J.S. believed that if Mr. Ambrose located a buyer for the home, he could approve the offer. He did not understand that the trust documents would be recorded.
In April 2003, a potential buyer, P.L., signed a purchase and sale agreement through the listing agent for J.S.’s property, agreeing to pay $255,000 in cash at closing.
In May 2003, Mr. Ambrose recorded the trust documents as well as an option to purchase the property given by Mr. Ambrose to individuals who were his former and/or current clients. Under the terms of the option, Mr. Ambrose received $1,000 in legal fees.
During a title search in connection with P.L.’s closing, the title company discovered the recorded trust, the quit claim deed from J.S. to the trust, and the option. As a result, J.S. first learned that Mr. Ambrose had recorded the deed and that, as trustee, Mr. Ambrose had sold an option to purchase J.S.’s property. J.S.’s lawyer informed Mr. Ambrose of the P.L. offer and asked him to revoke the trust. Mr. Ambrose refused to respond. Client C instructed Mr. Ambrose to conclude the P.L. sale. Mr. Ambrose refused, and the closing date was postponed.
In July 2003, Mr. Ambrose, as trustee, filed a declaratory judgment action against J.S., P.L., and the holders of the option. Although Mr. Ambrose knew that J.S. was represented by a lawyer in the matter, he contacted J.S. directly by telephone in an effort to convince J.S. that the transaction with the option holders would be better than the P.L. offer. P.L. subsequently abandoned the offer and was dismissed from the lawsuit.
In February 2004, Client C fired Mr. Ambrose. J.S. subsequently obtained Mr. Ambrose’s removal as trustee. In September 2004, the pending declaratory action was dismissed. Once the title company received the order dismissing the case, it closed a new sale of J.S.’s property.
Matter 4: In August 2002, a husband and wife hired Mr. Ambrose to resolve a family real estate dispute. Between August 2002 and December 2003, they paid Mr. Ambrose $2,900 in fees and costs. After filing a lawsuit in March 2003, Mr. Ambrose did little or no further work. He did not respond to defendant’s discovery requests until they moved for sanctions. He canceled scheduled depositions. In April 2004, he appeared on the trial date and moved for a new judge, asserting bias. Although the motion was untimely, the judge decided not to proceed. Mr. Ambrose agreed to arbitrate the claim, but he did not take steps to do so. Mr. Ambrose did not keep his clients adequately informed about the status of the matter, and did not work on the matter after December 1, 2003. However, between December 13, 2003, and September 17, 2004, Mr. Ambrose collected an additional $2,200 in fees. Following his termination, Mr. Ambrose refused to refund any of the $2,200.
Mr. Ambrose’s conduct violated RPC 1.2(a), requiring a lawyer to abide by a client’s decisions about the objectives of representation and to consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued, and requiring a lawyer to abide by a client’s decision about whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter; RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions; RPC 1.5, requiring that a lawyer’s fee be reasonable; RPC 1.7(b), prohibiting a lawyer from representing a client if the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer’s own interests, unless the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected and the client consents in writing after a full disclosure; RPC 1.8(a), prohibiting a lawyer from entering into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquiring an ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless the transaction and its terms are fair and reasonable and fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client, the client is given opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel, and the client consents; RPC 1.8(j), prohibiting a lawyer from acquiring a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for the client; RPC 1.15(d), requiring that a lawyer take reasonably practicable steps to protect a client’s interests upon termination of representation, including refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned; RPC 3.2, requiring that a lawyer make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client; RPC 3.4(a), prohibiting a lawyer from unlawfully obstructing another party’s access to evidence; RPC 3.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists; RPC 3.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from failing to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party; RPC 4.2(a), prohibiting a lawyer from communicating about the subject of a representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter; RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; and RPC 8.4(j) prohibiting a lawyer from willfully disobeying or violating a court order directing him or her to do or cease doing an act which he or she ought in good faith to do or forbear.
Linda B. Eide represented the Bar Association. Mr. Ambrose represented himself. |