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Mark A. Panitch (WSBA No. 12393, admitted 1982), of Seattle, was suspended for 135 days, effective December 21, 2004, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2001 and 2002 involving lack of diligence, lack of communication with clients, failure to expedite litigation, failure to return client paperwork and to refund unearned fees at the conclusion of a representation, and failure to deposit client funds into a trust account.
Matter 1: In 2002, a client hired Mr. Panitch to represent him in a pending federal action. The client paid Mr. Panitch $2,500 as an advance fee deposit for hourly work to be performed during the representation. Mr. Panitch deposited the check into his business checking account. In April 2002, the client flew to Seattle from Arizona for a scheduled meeting with Mr. Panitch. Mr. Panitch did not keep the appointment.
In June 2002, the court entered an order granting the client’s motion to vacate an earlier default. Accordingly, the client was obliged to file an answer. In June 2002, the plaintiff notified Mr. Panitch by letter that, owing to the absence of an answer, it intended to move for a default order. Mr. Panitch did not respond to the letter. On July, 9, 2002, the plaintiff moved for a default order. Shortly thereafter, by e-mail, the client’s former lawyer advised Mr. Panitch to file an answer. The client’s lawyer also sent the message to Mr. Panitch via fax, in which he advised Mr. Panitch to contact the client. Mr. Panitch did not respond.
On July 12, 2002, the client hired another lawyer, who filed the answer. Commencing on July 13, 2002, the client and his new lawyer made repeated efforts to contact Mr. Panitch to obtain the client’s file. Mr. Panitch did not respond to these overtures. In late August 2002, the client’s new lawyer warned Mr. Panitch that if the file was not delivered, he would file a grievance with the Bar Association. On August 28, 2002, Mr. Panitch replied that the file was available for retrieval. The new lawyer picked up the file on September 9, 2002. Although Mr. Panitch had performed only $1,000 worth of services, he never refunded any part of the $2,500 advance fee.
Matter 2: In March 2001, Mr. Panitch entered an appearance on behalf of a client in a pending personal-injury lawsuit. After filing a notice of appearance in March 2001 and a confirmation of joinder in April 2001, Mr. Panitch filed no other documents in the case. The client informed her former lawyer that Mr. Panitch was not involved in the case, and asked him to fire Mr. Panitch. In November 2001, the former lawyer met with Mr. Panitch, informed him that the client was dissatisfied, and notified him that the client wanted Mr. Panitch to return the file. Mr. Panitch told the former lawyer that he would discuss the situation with the client and address her concerns. He did not, however, communicate with her promptly.
In January 2002, opposing counsel noted the client’s deposition for January 22, the date of the discovery cutoff. By letter, Mr. Panitch notified opposing counsel that he voluntarily waived the discovery cutoff, thereby allowing opposing counsel to reset the deposition for January 24. Mr. Panitch did not communicate with the client about this course of action; he waived the discovery cutoff because of a personal scheduling conflict. On January 22, 2002, Mr. Panitch telephoned the client and asked her to appear for the January 24 deposition. During the conversation, the client informed Mr. Panitch that he was fired. Although the client had not authorized Mr. Panitch to communicate further with opposing counsel, Mr. Panitch assured opposing counsel by letter that there was an agreement waiving the discovery cutoff, and that if the client’s new lawyer attempted to resist a deposition and assert the discovery cutoff, Mr. Panitch would support the opposing lawyer’s right to take the deposition.
Mr. Panitch’s conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in representing a client; RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions; RPC 1.5(a), requiring that a lawyer’s fee be reasonable; RPC 1.14(a), requiring all funds of clients paid to a lawyer to be deposited in an interest-bearing trust account; RPC 1.15(d), requiring that a lawyer take reasonably practicable steps to protect a client’s interests upon termination of representation (including refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned and surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled); and RPC 3.2, requiring a lawyer to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interest of the client.
Anthony L. Butler represented the Bar Association. Leland G. Ripley represented Mr. Panitch. Robert C. Bibb was the hearing officer. |