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Hollis Wayne Duncan (WSBA No.27937, admitted 1998), of Edmonds, was suspended for 12 months, effective October 11, 2002, by order of the Supreme Court following a hearing. This discipline is based on his failure to avoid conflicts of interest from 1999 through 2000 and charging an unreasonable fee. In October 1998, Mr. Duncan began representing Mr. P. and Mr. K. Mr. P. supervised Mr. K. in a city shop. In early 1999, Mr. Duncan also began representing Mr. S., another shop employee supervised by Mr. P. In May 1999, Mr. Duncan agreed to assist Mr. S. with job-related issues involving his supervisor Mr. P. Although the parties appear to have known about the conflict of interest, Mr. Duncan did not discuss the matter or obtain a written conflict waiver. In May, 1999, Mr. S. sent a letter to the city mayor complaining about Mr. P. Mr. Duncan helped Mr. S. draft this letter. In June 1999, Mr. S. paid his bill in full. In June 1999, the city notified Mr. P. he was subject to disciplinary action, and Mr. Duncan represented him in this proceeding. Mr. S. was interviewed as a witness in the disciplinary action. In July 1999, the city terminated Mr. P’s employment, and Mr. Duncan filed a whistleblower action on Mr. P’s behalf. During discovery in this action, Mr. Duncan requested Mr. S.’s employment records. A city attorney wrote Mr. Duncan about the conflict between Mr. S. and Mr. P., but Mr. Duncan ignored the letter. In January 2000, a judge disqualified Mr. Duncan from further representation in the whistleblower case. After this decision, Mr. Duncan sent Mr. S. a letter demanding a $3,990 retainer in retaliation for the disqualification. In February 2000, Mr. Duncan assisted Mr. K. in filing a union complaint against Mr. S. Mr. Duncan participated in this complaint to further retaliate against Mr. S. In April and May 2000, Mr. Duncan made reports to animal control about Mr. S. Mr. Duncan’s conduct violated RPC 1.7(a), prohibiting lawyers from representing clients whose interests are directly adverse, unless the clients consent in writing after full disclosure and the lawyer reasonable believes that the representation will not adversely affect the other client; 1.9, prohibiting a lawyer from representing a client in the same or a substantially related matter whose interest are materially adverse to a former client’s interests, unless the former client consents in writing after a full disclosure; and 1.5, requiring lawyers fees to be reasonable. Michael Patterson and Christine Gray represented the Bar Association. Mr. Duncan represented himself. Paul M. Larson was the Hearing Officer.
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