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Michael Holland (WSBA No. 8134, admitted 1978), of Seattle, has been suspended for 18 months following a default hearing, by Supreme Court order effective August 31, 1999. The discipline was based on multiple acts of neglect involving four separate client matters.
Matters 1 and 2. Mr. Holland represented clients in personal injury suits. The Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) filed third-party liens for medical services provided to the clients, and mailed Mr. Holland the recorded statements of lien. Mr. Holland had a statutory obligation to notify DSHS of any third-party claims, and to provide them 30 days’ notice of any settlement of the claims. Mr. Holland settled the third-party claims without notice or payment to DSHS and disbursed the funds subject to the lien to his clients and/or third parties. Over the next approximately two and one-half years, DSHS sent Mr. Holland several additional lien notices. As of the date of the January 1999 disciplinary hearing, the DSHS liens remained unpaid. Mr. Holland’s conduct in settling the claims and in failing to satisfy the statutory liens violated RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
Matter 3. Mr. Holland represented a husband in a wrongful death claim. Mr. Holland initiated a probate of the wife’s estate, had the husband appointed personal representative, and represented the husband in this capacity. The probate was opened primarily to pursue the wrongful death claim. Mr. Holland did not file or publish the required notice to the estate creditors, or arrange for an inventory or appraisal of estate assets. Mr. Holland negotiated a settlement in the wrongful death suit on behalf of the husband and the two minor children. Mr. Holland deposited the estate’s share of the settlement funds directly into his general account, instead of his trust account, to allow his client to receive the money sooner than waiting for the check to clear his trust account. This conduct violated RPC 1.14, requiring a lawyer to deposit a client’s funds in a trust account.
The insurance company sent separate checks to each child’s guardian ad litem (GAL). One GAL assured the child’s check was deposited into a blocked account, and the other GAL sent the check directly to the father, Mr. Holland’s client, with the notation, "For [child] — to be placed in blocked account." The client returned to his out-of-state home and spent the child’s money. The GAL filed a motion to remove Mr. Holland’s client as personal representative and to impose a judgment and sanctions against both Mr. Holland and his client, for failure to properly administer the estate. Ultimately, a judgment of $25,000 was entered against the client. The court imposed a $6,000 judgment on Mr. Holland for his failure (by inaction) to prevent his client’s misappropriation of the minor’s funds, plus attorney’s fees and successor GAL fees. Mr. Holland has not satisfied the judgment. During a hearing on this estate, Mr. Holland appeared in court intoxicated. In this matter, Mr. Holland’s conduct in failing to comply with various provisions of the probate statute violated RPC 1.1, requiring lawyers to provide competent representation to clients; and RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
Matter 4. Mr. Holland represented a sole proprietor electrical contractor in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. Another contractor filed a $1,328,430.80 creditor’s claim, based on a joint-venture agreement. Mr. Holland agreed to defend this claim and file a counterclaim on a contingent-fee basis. Mr. Holland obtained permission from the bankruptcy court and filed a federal court lawsuit in 1990. In late 1990, the court dismissed the federal claims, and then in 1991 dismissed the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.
Mr. Holland then filed suit in King County Superior Court, alleging many of the same claims as the federal suit. The defendants made the same defenses as in the federal suit, and the court dismissed the state court claims on summary judgment. Mr. Holland did not file responsive pleadings or appear at the summary judgment hearing. Mr. Holland did not tell his client that a summary judgment motion was pending, or that the court dismissed his claims. Mr. Holland filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s dismissal, but the court denied the motion.
One defendant then moved for summary judgment on its counterclaims against the client. Mr. Holland did not file any responsive pleadings or appear for the oral argument. In January 1993, the court granted the summary judgment, entering a $1.4 million judgment against Mr. Holland’s client. The court denied Mr. Holland’s motion for reconsideration. During this time, Mr. Holland did not communicate with the client or respond to the client’s letters requesting information about the case. The client learned of the status of his claims and of the judgment against his company when he reviewed the superior court file. The client pursued his own appeal.
In November 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court rulings in this case. The defendant has not taken steps to enforce the judgment against Mr. Holland’s client, and the client’s business has steadily grown since 1990. In this matter, Mr. Holland’s conduct in failing to respond to motions and appear at hearings violated RPC 1.1, requiring lawyers to provide competent representation and RPC 1.3, requiring lawyers to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client. Mr. Holland’s failure to communicate with the client and apprise him of important events violated RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of the matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
The discipline imposed in this case reflects two aggravating and five mitigating factors. The aggravating factors include substantial experience and prior discipline. The mitigating factors include terminal illness and death of a spouse, financial difficulties, closing a law office and some degree of impairment and dysfunction, likely due to alcohol abuse and/or psychological issues. Following a default hearing, the hearing officer recommended that Mr. Holland be suspended for 18 months, and that he be subject to a number of conditions related to restitution and fitness to practice, which must be satisfied prior to his reinstatement to active status. In May 1999, the Disciplinary Board adopted the hearing officer’s findings and recommendation. By order entered August 31, 1999, the Court approved the Disciplinary Board order and entered an order suspending Mr. Holland for 18 months and setting terms of restitution and conditions precedent to reinstatement to active status.
Mr. Holland represented himself. Maria Regimbal represented the Bar Association. The hearing officer was Paul Larson.
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