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Leylan Greb (WSBA No. 36433, admitted 2005), of Vancouver, Washington, resigned in lieu of disbarment, effective August 2, 2010. Mr. Greb affirmatively admitted that the WSBA could prove by a clear preponderance of the evidence the alleged violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, and that proof of such violations would suffice to result in disbarment, but did not affirmatively admit the facts and misconduct herein. This discipline is based on conduct involving failure to provide competent representation, failure to pursue a client’s objectives, lack of communication, conflict of interest, and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. The Statement of Misconduct reads as follows:
On June 2, 2008, client hired Mr. Greb to represent her in a dissolution matter. Client’s highest priority was to obtain primary custody of the children, who were then residing with her husband, and to enter into an acceptable parenting plan. Client also sought child support, shares of the equity in the family home, the assets of a family business, and her husband’s pension, and spousal maintenance.
A pretrial hearing was scheduled for July 11, 2008, to address custody and child support and to narrow the issues to be resolved at trial. Mr. Greb agreed to cancel this hearing without consulting client. As trial approached, Mr. Greb had not completed discovery; however, he rejected client’s suggestion that they seek a continuance.
Prior to the trial, Mr. Greb had tried only two family law matters and had experienced significant difficulty in obtaining the admission of documentary evidence in each case. In this case, Mr. Greb did not subpoena any witnesses to appear at the trial to authenticate the documents he planned to offer in evidence, although opposing counsel had not agreed to their admissibility. Mr. Greb failed to organize, segregate and properly mark his exhibits in a manner that allowed the court clerk to properly track them in the record. Mr. Greb also appeared unaware of the protocol for offering an exhibit for admission. Of the approximately 30 exhibits he had listed prior to trial, Mr. Greb was able to admit only one into evidence. The court considered that exhibit irrelevant. When faced with opposing counsel’s hearsay objections to his exhibits or to the testimony of his witnesses, Mr. Greb frequently was confused and unable to respond, instead abandoning the line of questioning or the exhibit.
The family court evaluator assigned to the case had recommended that Mr. Greb’s client be given primary custody of the children. Nevertheless, Mr. Greb did not call the evaluator to testify and presented only scant evidence of client’s care for her children over the course of the marriage. Client’s husband had purchased the family home before marriage, and later deeded it to himself and Mr. Greb’s client as community property. Mr. Greb did not make this known to the judge, nor did he offer any evidence to establish his client’s contribution to this community asset. Rather, he stipulated that the family home was a separate asset belonging to the husband, and did not object to it being awarded to him. Mr. Greb did not request spousal maintenance for his client, and introduced no evidence concerning her income during the marriage. As a result, income was imputed to his client at an amount greater than her actual earnings.
After Mr. Greb rested his case, the judge granted opposing counsel’s motion for a directed verdict on the award of the family home to the husband with no offset. Mr. Greb then made an unsuccessful attempt to reopen his case. At the conclusion of the trial, the judge announced his findings as to property and stated that he would reserve judgment on primary custody, the parenting plan, and child support. At this point, Mr. Greb asked to be allowed to introduce evidence of his client’s income. His request was denied as untimely.
The judge set a hearing for September 5, 2008, to address the remaining issues concerning the children. After the trial concluded, Mr. Greb contacted his malpractice insurer and was advised to withdraw from representation immediately. He filed a Notice of Intent to Withdraw on August 8, 2008, and another attorney appeared for his client; however, the judge did not allow Mr. Greb to withdraw at that point because the judgment rendered orally at the conclusion of the trial had not yet been signed and formally entered.
Between the conclusion of trial and the September 5, 2008, hearing, opposing counsel made a settlement offer under which Mr. Greb’s client would receive approximately half of the community’s equity in the family home and would have the eldest child live with her, while the two younger children would reside with the husband. In his letter proposing the settlement, opposing counsel stated that “if a new trial is requested…we will be asking the court to award all trial costs including my attorneys fees and our expert witness fees against you [Mr. Greb] personally since your ineffective representation during the first trial is the only basis the court could use to order a second trial.” Mr. Greb strongly urged client to resolve the matter by accepting the settlement offer. Ultimately, however, the court found there was no effective written acceptance under CR 2A.
On September 5, 2008, the judge signed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by opposing counsel and entered a Decree of Dissolution under which Mr. Greb’s client received no interest in the family home, the husband’s pension or employment benefits, or in the family business, and no maintenance. The judge then recused himself from further involvement in the case, and took no action relating to the unresolved issues relating to the children. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Greb’s client filed a pro se motion to vacate the decree based on Mr. Greb’s ineffective representation. The trial judge referred client’s motion to another judge while indicating for the record that, were he to decide the motion himself, he would likely have allowed it and, if so, he would have imposed sanctions against Mr. Greb for the opposing counsel’s attorney fees. Another judge denied the Motion to Vacate and set a trial date to address the issues of the parenting plan and child support. In the meantime, however, client obtained new counsel who facilitated negotiations under which the parties reached agreement on those issues.
Mr. Greb’s conduct violated RPC 1.1, requiring a lawyer to provide competent representation to a client; RPC 1.2(a), requiring a lawyer to abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued; RPC 1.4(a), requiring a lawyer to promptly inform the client of any decision of circumstance with respect to which the client’s informed consent is required, reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished, keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter, promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer’s conduct; RPC 1.7(a)(2), prohibiting a lawyer from representing a client if there is a significant risk that the representation will be materially limited by a personal interest of the lawyer; and RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
Natalea Skvir represented the Bar Association. Josephine C. Townsend represented Mr. Greb. |