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Antonio Salazar (WSBA No. 6273, admitted 1975), of Seattle, was disbarred, effective May 12, 2010, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a hearing. This discipline resulted from conduct involving lack of competence, diligence, and communication; failure to disclose conflicts of interest; failure to obtain consent waivers; failure to properly supervise another lawyer; charging unreasonable fees; failure to provide accounting of fees; failure to refund unearned fees; and fitness to practice law.
Matter No. 1: In 1998, Mr. Salazar represented clients G, D, and H, all employees or shareholders of a taxicab company, in a felony assault case. On December 28, 1999, Clients D and G were involved in a shooting that killed a fellow cab driver. Client D was charged with first-degree murder in January 2000 and a lawyer was hired to represent him. Client G put his house up as a bail bond for Client D.
In March 2000, the family of the victim filed a wrongful-death lawsuit against various taxicab company employees, including Clients D, H, G, and C. The lawsuit alleged a conspiracy to kill the victim, which gave the defendants a motive to blame Client D for the victim’s death. Prior to the start of the murder trial, Mr. Salazar took on representation of Clients H and C in the wrongful death suit. In July 2000, Mr. Salazar began to represent Client C’s faction in a shareholder lawsuit concerning governance of the taxicab company; the opposing parties in the lawsuit were the victim’s faction within the company. Around September 2000, Client D’s lawyer learned that Client G planned to change his story and testify for the prosecution. Since the lawyer had taken written statements from the witnesses, including Client G, he determined that he would be an important impeachment witness and withdrew from representation of Client D. Client G withdrew the pledge of his home on Client D’s bail bond and Client D was returned to jail. Client C then hired Mr. Salazar to represent Client D and paid Mr. Salazar a flat fee of $22,000 from a defense fund he raised from his faction. Mr. Salazar had no fee agreement with Client D.
When Mr. Salazar took over the case, he knew that Client G had changed sides and had withdrawn the pledge of his home. By the time of the trial, Client G was a former client of Mr. Salazar’s, a defendant in the wrongful-death suit in which Mr. Salazar represented other defendants, a partial source of fees paid to Mr. Salazar, and a key witness for the prosecution. Mr. Salazar also had conflicts of interest involving Client C, who served as a significant source of business for him. Mr. Salazar was defending Client C in the wrongful-death lawsuit and the shareholder lawsuit while he continued to represent Client D in the murder trial. Client C was a central figure in these lawsuits and the disputes that gave rise to the shooting. In addition, several of the state’s witnesses numbered among Mr. Salazar’s clients in the shareholder suit. The discussions Mr. Salazar had with Client D about his prior representation of Client G were cursory. He did not provide details that Client D needed to determine whether to waive conflict, such as Client G’s goal to blame Client D as the sole killer of the victim in the wrongful death suit. Mr. Salazar never obtained a written conflict of interest waiver from Client D.
When the prosecutor raised the issue of potential conflicts to the trial judge, Mr. Salazar acknowledged representation of Client C and others on the state’s witness list but stated the matters were “totally unrelated” and that his client knew all about it. Mr. Salazar did not disclose his previous representation of Client G to the court.
Despite Client D’s testimony at trial that Client C was with him when the gun used to shoot the victim was purchased, and that Client G gave him the bullets, Mr. Salazar drafted a motion for summary judgment in the wrongful death suit asserting Client D was convicted of killing the victim and his clients in the suit had nothing to do with it.
Matter No. 2: Client L, a resident of Canada, contacted Mr. Salazar by letter dated March 15, 2006, to seek help on behalf of her husband who had been deported from the United States in 2003. After his deportation, a warrant was issued for his arrest because of an underlying theft charge. Client L explained it was impossible for her husband to come to the United States to clear the charge and asked Mr. Salazar’s assistance to get the warrant and the charge removed. Client L wanted to clean up her husband’s FBI background check so that he could emigrate to Canada.
Mr. Salazar took no action on the matter until October 2006, when he prepared a motion to quash the warrant, which was not filed. Instead, Mr. Salazar and his associate attempted to remove the theft charge against the husband by getting the victim to agree to accept restitution and the prosecutor to agree not to prosecute. The strategy proved unsuccessful since the prosecutor would not agree to anything unless the husband presented himself for a plea to a lesser charge, which he could not do because of his immigration status. On June 25, 2007, Client L hired a new attorney who filed a successful motion to quash the warrant. At the outset of representation, Client L paid Mr. Salazar $3,000. She requested an accounting of the fees and a refund from Mr. Salazar, neither of which he provided.
Matter No. 3: On August 7, 2006, Mr. Salazar’s firm was retained by Client M, a permanent resident of the United States, to help keep his wife and children, who were non-U.S. residents, in the United States with him. On July 11, 2006, the family had received an order to voluntarily leave the United States. An associate of Mr. Salazar’s firm met with the family and they signed a legal service agreement stating the firm would represent them in a “BIA appeal and motion to adjust status.” The family paid Mr. Salazar’s firm $3,000. The associate set up the file as an appeals file. The legal service agreement was held by the bookkeeper and not kept with the client file. Shortly afterwards, the associate left the firm. Mr. Salazar never saw the agreement and, without talking to the family, he considered only an appeal of the Cancellation of Removal and not the Adjustment of Status. The associate later sent Mr. Salazar an e-mail about the client’s case, explicitly stating that a motion to remand the matter for Adjustment of Status should be brought. By the time the associate sent the e-mail, Mr. Salazar had sued him for misappropriation of funds, and either did not receive, or read and retain, the e-mail. Without the e-mail or legal service agreement, Mr. Salazar had insufficient information to determine the best course of action to pursue on behalf of the client.
On March 15, 2007, Mr. Salazar filed an appeal of the order denying Cancellation of Removal and on August 6, 2007, the appeal was dismissed. Mr. Salazar received the dismissal on August 9, 2007, and did not forward it to the family until August 24, approximately 15 days later. An appeal of the dismissal was due on September 6, 2007. The family was given 60 days to voluntarily depart the United States. In October 2007, the family hired new counsel, who obtained the Adjustment of Status on their behalf. Had Mr. Salazar communicated with the client, he would have known that an adjustment of status, which is a “straightforward” process, was all that the family needed.
Matter No. 4: In October 2006, Client A hired Mr. Salazar to represent him in a LIFE Act Application (for status as a lawful resident of the United States). Client A submitted the application before hiring Mr. Salazar, and the application falsely stated he had never been convicted of a crime. Client A wanted Mr. Salazar to represent him in the scheduled interview and paid Mr. Salazar $500.
Instead of accompanying Client A to the interview with the immigration official, Mr. Salazar sent an inexperienced associate with no immigration experience. The associate was instructed by Mr. Salazar to take notes on what occurred, specifically on what additional information Client A would be required to provide. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Salazar received a Notice of Intent to Deny (LIFE Act application) from the Immigration Service. The notice, dated September 24, 2007, gave the client 30 days to provide additional evidence in support of his application. Mr. Salazar sent the notice to his client on October 29, 2007, after the expiration of the 30-day deadline.
Matter No. 5: In October 2007, Client O hired Mr. Salazar to represent him in removal hearings before the U.S. Immigration Court. At a court hearing Mr. Salazar attended, the court set a deadline of December 1, 2007, to file an EOIR-42, Cancellation of Removal application. Mr. Salazar failed to calendar or meet the deadline. Client O repeatedly inquired about the status of his case and Mr. Salazar told him not to worry. By December 13, 2007, Mr. Salazar still had not filed the application, and the Immigration Court entered a Deportation Order with a 90-day deadline to file a motion to re-open. Mr. Salazar did not inform Client O about the order. In February 2008, Client O learned of the order from a friend and called Mr. Salazar. At the time Client O called, there was still time for Mr. Salazar to file a motion to re-open. Mr. Salazar assured the client that he would do so, but failed to follow through, and by the time Client O retained new counsel, the deadline had passed.
Matter No. 6: In April 2006, Client K hired Mr. Salazar to represent him before the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), where he was appealing the Immigration Court’s decision to deport him based on a felony conviction. In December 2007, the BIA dismissed the appeal and upheld the court’s decision. Mr. Salazar and Client K negotiated an additional fee of $1,500 plus $500 in filing fees for the filing of an appeal to the 9th Circuit; however, in January 2008, Mr. Salazar accepted and gave Client K a written receipt for $1,000 in fees and $500 in filing fees for “Payment in full for 9th Circuit Petition.” Mr. Salazar did not file the 9th Circuit appeal nor did he inform Client K that he would not file the appeal, a part of which had been a request for a stay of execution of the Deportation Order. On March 18, 2008, Client K was arrested at his home in front of his distraught wife and children and spent 35 days in detention before being deported to Canada. Had Mr. Salazar sought a stay of the Deportation Order, the client and his family would have had time to prepare for an orderly departure to Canada. Client K was unable to obtain a refund of the money he paid to Mr. Salazar until they hired a lawyer to demand it.
Matter No. 7: Prior to the foregoing matters, Mr. Salazar had been disciplined for misconduct on seven separate occasions. In July 1990, he was censured for failing to advise a client over a period of three years that he would not take further action on an application until the client provided certain documentation, and failure to file an application on behalf of another client, despite the client’s repeated inquiries. In September 1994, Mr. Salazar was admonished for failure to file a criminal defendant’s appeal brief and to notify a client that he was no longer working on the case. In February 1999, Mr. Salazar was admonished for failure to cooperate in eight separate disciplinary proceedings. In December 1999, he was admonished for failure to ensure calendaring of a deadline. In September 2001, Mr. Salazar was censured for failure to timely file an appeal brief. In February 2005, he was suspended for 30 days for misconduct occurring between 2000 and 2004. The misconduct involved failure to communicate with and account to clients for fees, to expedite a visa application, and to promptly respond to a WSBA request for information. Lastly, in March 2008, Mr. Salazar was reprimanded for misrepresenting to opposing counsel that his client had agreed to a settlement.
Mr. Salazar’s conduct violated former RPC 1.1 and current RPC 1.1, requiring a lawyer to provide competent representation to a client; former RPC 1.3 and current RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; former RPC 1.4 and current RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to communicate and explain matters to a client; RPC 1.4(a), requiring a lawyer to promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance in which the client’s informed consent is required, keep the client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; RPC 1.5(a), prohibiting a lawyer from making an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses; RPC 1.5(b), requiring a lawyer to communicate the scope and basis or rate of fees and expenses for which the client is responsible before or within a reasonable time after commencing representation, communicate any changes in the basis or rate of fee or expenses to the client, and upon request, communicate to the client in writing the basis or rate of the fee; former 1.7(a), prohibiting representation of a client if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to another client; former 1.7(b), prohibiting representation of a client if that representation may be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer’s own interests; former 1.8(f)(2), prohibiting a lawyer from accepting compensation for representing a client from one other than the client if there is interference with the lawyer’s independent professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; former 1.9(a), prohibiting a lawyer who formally represented a client to represent another person in the same or substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client, unless the former client consents in writing after consultation and full disclosure of the material facts; RPC 1.16(d), requiring a lawyer, upon termination of representation, to take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled, and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned or incurred; former 3.3(a)(1), prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal; RPC 5.1(b), requiring a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the RPC; RPC 5.1(c), requiring a lawyer to take responsibility for another lawyer’s violation of the RPC; and RPC 8.4(n), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct demonstrating an unfitness to practice law.
Christine Gray and Erica Temple represented the Bar Association at the hearing. Joanne S. Abelson represented the Bar Association on appeal. Mr. Salazar represented himself. Kimberly A. Boyce was the hearing officer. |