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John L. Erickson (WSBA No. 4909, admitted 1973), of Bellingham, was suspended for three years, effective November 13, 2009, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following approval of a stipulation. This discipline was based on conduct in seven matters involving failure to act diligently, trust account irregularities, charging unreasonable fees, non-cooperation with Bar Association investigations, engaging in the unauthorized practice of law, deception, and non-compliance with duties while suspended.
Non-compliance with duties while suspended: Effective June 13, 2007, Mr. Erickson was suspended from the practice of law by order of the Supreme Court for failure to pay license fees. On July 31, 2007, he was reinstated. On May 8, 2008, the Supreme Court entered an order suspending Mr. Erickson from practice for 60 days, effective May 15, 2008. Based on a stipulation, the May 2008 suspension was imposed for, among other things, practicing law while suspended in 2007 and failing to cooperate with the Bar Association’s investigation. Under the terms of the stipulation, Mr. Erickson’s reinstatement to practice law was conditioned upon obtaining a statement from a mental health professional that he is psychologically fit to practice law and upon compliance with the reinstatement requirements, which include: (1) the duty to inform all clients, opposing counsel, and the court of his suspension; (2) the duty to file an affidavit of compliance with the provisions of Title 14 within 25 days; (3) the duty to not practice while suspended; and (4) the duty to cease holding himself out as a lawyer in any manner during the period of suspension. Mr. Erickson received three letters from the Association informing him about the conditions of reinstatement, two of which he did not open. In September or October 2008, Mr. Erickson obtained a fitness to practice statement from a mental health professional, but did not comply with the other requirements for reinstatement.
Conduct in seven family law matters: Between April 2006 and August 2008, Mr. Erickson was hired by clients in seven different family law matters. In one matter, a marital dissolution, the client repeatedly told Mr. Erickson that he was anxious to get the dissolution completed expeditiously. On November 20, 2006, the client provided Mr. Erickson with a proposed property distribution and asked him to arrange a meeting with opposing counsel to negotiate a settlement. Contrary to his client’s expressed desire to pursue a prompt settlement, Mr. Erickson did not send the proposed property distribution to opposing counsel until March 30, 2007. The proposed settlement was not promptly accepted. Mr. Erickson did not file a notice of appearance, an answer, or a note for trial docket in the dissolution. Following Mr. Erickson’s June 2007 suspension and July 2007 return to practice, the client directed him to do what was necessary to expedite resolution of the dissolution or schedule a trial date. Mr. Erickson did not promptly pursue resolution of the dissolution or schedule a trial date as requested.
Clients in six matters paid Mr. Erickson advance fee deposits of between $100 and $2,500 each. Mr. Erickson failed to deposit the unearned fees into his trust account and used the fees before providing clients with legal services. In six matters, following his suspension from practice or his termination by clients, Mr. Erickson failed to return unearned advance fees, which ranged from between $100 and $1,840. Although Mr. Erickson did not have written fee agreements with the clients, and his billing statements reflected that his legal fees were being applied against the deposits and that the unused portion was a “balance forward,” Mr. Erickson represented to two of the clients that he was not returning the unearned fees because the deposits they paid were “non-refundable retainers.”
Clients in two matters filed grievances against Mr. Erickson with the Bar Association, to which Mr. Erickson failed to respond. After being served with a subpoena and subpoena duces tecum by the Bar Association regarding one of the grievances, Mr. Erickson appeared at a February 15, 2008, deposition. However, he did not produce all of the billing statements subpoenaed by the Bar Association.
Mr. Erickson did not notify one client about his June 2007 suspension. He failed to inform several clients of his 2008 suspension, and was hired and paid to complete services by three clients during, or just prior to, his 2008 suspension. During that suspension, Mr. Erickson continued to provide legal services, which included giving legal advice and drafting pleadings. The pleadings omitted any indication that Mr. Erickson prepared them or was representing the clients, and Mr. Erickson instructed the clients on how to present the pleadings pro se to the court. In one matter, Mr. Erickson told the client that he would bill him later for the prepared pleadings.
Mr. Erickson’s conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.5(a), prohibiting a lawyer from making an agreement for, charging, or collecting an unreasonable fee; former RPC 1.14(a) and current RPC 1.15A, requiring that all funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm be deposited into one or more identifiable interest-bearing trust accounts and no funds of the lawyer be deposited therein; RPC 1.16(d), requiring that a lawyer, upon termination of representation, take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred; RPC 3.2, requiring a lawyer to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client; RPC 5.5(a), prohibiting a lawyer from practicing law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction; RPC 5.8(a), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in the practice of law while on inactive status, or while suspended from the practice of law for any cause; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; RPC 8.4(j), prohibiting a lawyer from willfully disobeying or violating a court order directing him or her to do or cease doing an act which he or she ought in good faith to do or forbear; and RPC 8.4(l), prohibiting a lawyer from violating a duty or sanction imposed by or under the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct in connection with a disciplinary matter.
Jonathan Burke represented the Bar Association. Dan Evich represented Mr. Erickson. |