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James Byron Holcomb (WSBA No. 1695, admitted 1967), of Bainbridge Island, was suspended for three years, effective June 21, 2008, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following approval of a stipulation. This discipline resulted from conduct in three matters involving failure to communicate, representation of clients in violation of the Rules, filing frivolous proceedings, practicing law while suspended, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, disobeying a court order, and violations of duties in connection with a disciplinary matter.
Matter No. 1: On December 20, 2007, the Supreme Court suspended Mr. Holcomb from the practice of law for six months, effective immediately. Mr. Holcomb knew of the suspension and filed an Emergency Motion to Stay Suspension on January 3, 2008, which was denied. Prior to his suspension, Mr. Holcomb had filed a Notice of Appearance for Client A, who was charged with DUI in a district court matter. After being suspended, Mr. Holcomb did not advise Client A, the court, or opposing counsel of his suspension and did not withdraw from representing Client A. Mr. Holcomb appeared with Client A in court on January 7, 2008, to request a continuance in Client A’s matter, and on February 4, 2008, to enter a pre-trial diversion agreement. The presiding judge later discovered that Mr. Holcomb was suspended from the practice of law. The judge summoned Client A back to court to meet with another attorney and decide if he wished to continue with the diversion agreement, which the client later reaffirmed.
Matter No. 2: In 2006, prior to his suspension, Mr. Holcomb began representing Client B, who was charged with DUI in a district court matter. After being suspended, Mr. Holcomb did not notify Client B, the court, or opposing counsel of his suspension and did not withdraw from representing Client B. Mr. Holcomb appeared in court with Client B on February 5, 2008, when Client B entered a guilty plea to a reduced charge. Mr. Holcomb also requested continuances of the sentencing date on Client B’s behalf and represented Client B in court at his sentencing on June 19, 2008.
Matter No. 3: Client C hired Mr. Holcomb to represent him in appealing to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) his removal from a position with a federal employer. Mr. Holcomb filed a Notice of Appearance on behalf of Client C on April 25, 2006. The appeal went to hearing before an administrative judge (AJ). On October 10, 2006, prior to a decision being made, Mr. Holcomb filed a Motion to Supplement Argument on Appeal, asserting that Client C had a mentally handicapping condition that rendered him incompetent to withdraw the appeal, and asked the AJ to order a mental evaluation. On that same date, Client C notified the AJ and Mr. Holcomb by letter that he wished to withdraw his appeal so that he could pursue his claim through arbitration. Client C also notified the AJ and Mr. Holcomb that he had terminated Mr. Holcomb’s representation. The AJ denied Mr. Holcomb’s motion and dismissed the appeal, finding that Client C was acting knowingly and voluntarily when he requested dismissal of his appeal.
Client C settled his claim with the federal employer, but did not advise the MSPB or Mr. Holcomb of the settlement. Mr. Holcomb filed a petition for review of the AJ’s decision with the MSPB, claiming to act on behalf of Client C, and again asserting that Client C had a mentally handicapping condition that rendered him incompetent to withdraw the appeal and asking the MSPB to order a mental evaluation. Client C had not re-authorized Mr. Holcomb to act on his behalf. The Clerk of the MSPB entered an order to show cause directed to Client C stating that the Board would not accept the petition for review unless it received within 15 days a “Designation of Representation” signed by Client C indicating that he had once again designated Mr. Holcomb as his representative. Client C did not respond to the order and the MSPB dismissed Mr. Holcomb’s petition for review. Mr. Holcomb filed a petition for review of the MSPB’s dismissal in the U.S. Court of Appeals, stating in the petition that he was representing Client C even though Client C had not authorized him to file the petition for review. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal because Mr. Holcomb failed to demonstrate that he was Client C’s representative. The Court of Appeals ordered Mr. Holcomb to show cause why he should not be sanctioned for filing a frivolous appeal. Mr. Holcomb made various arguments in response which were all rejected, and the court found that his appeal was frivolous. Mr. Holcomb was ordered to pay $2,000 to the federal employer.
Mr. Holcomb’s conduct violated RPC1.4, requiring a lawyer to promptly inform the client of any decision of circumstance with respect to which the client’s informed consent is required, reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished, keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter, promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, consult with the client about any relevant limitations, and explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; RPC 1.16(a)(1), requiring a lawyer to terminate representation where representation results in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law; RPC 3.1, prohibiting a lawyer from bringing or defending a proceeding unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous; RPC 5.5(a), prohibiting a lawyer from practicing law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction; RPC 5.8(a), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in the practice of law while suspended from the practice of law for any cause; RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; RPC 8.4(j), prohibiting a lawyer from willfully disobeying or violating a court order directing him or her to do or cease doing an act which he or she ought in good faith to do or forbear; and RPC 8.4(l), prohibiting a lawyer from violating a duty or sanction imposed by or under the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct in connection with a disciplinary matter.
M. Craig Bray represented the Bar Association. Catherine M. McDonald represented Mr. Holcomb. |