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Bradley R. Marshall (WSBA No. 15830, admitted 1986), of Seattle, was disbarred, effective October 1, 2009, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following an appeal. This discipline was based on conduct involving forcing settlement contrary to clients’ wishes, charging unreasonable fees, conflicts of interest, trust account irregularities, failing to properly account to a client funds paid by the client, violating the Rules of Professional Conduct, making misleading statements to clients and disciplinary counsel, and engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. For more information, see In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Marshall, 167 Wn.2d 51, 217 P.3d 291 (2009).
In October 2000, Mr. Marshall agreed to represent two former members of a Masonic organization in bringing a lawsuit against their chapter. He sent a written fee agreement to the clients, which was for joint representation for a flat “non-refundable fee” of $15,000. In January 2001, Mr. Marshall filed a lawsuit against the Masonic chapter (chapter) and against another defendant on behalf of his clients (Clients A and B). In February 2001, Mr. Marshall agreed to represent a third individual (Client C), also a former member of the chapter, who paid him a $7,500 flat fee. Despite Client B having previously objected to adding Client C to their lawsuit, Mr. Marshall joined Client C as a plaintiff via amended complaint. Mr. Marshall did not advise any client in writing or obtain a written waiver. The chapter filed an answer, filed counter claims against all three plaintiffs, and filed third-party complaints against Clients A’s and C’s husbands, who were also former members of the chapter. The chapter also brought a lawsuit against all three plaintiffs. Mr. Marshall agreed to represent Clients A’s and C’s husbands for a flat-fee payment from both men totaling $19,000 and without obtaining consent in writing from any of his clients concerning a potential conflict of interest. All relevant lawsuits were consolidated in December 2001.
In April 2002, Mr. Marshall negotiated a settlement on behalf of Clients A, B, and C as to two individual defendants named in the litigation (not the chapter). Each client was to receive $12,500. The money was paid and deposited in Mr. Marshall’s trust account. In June 2002, at a mediation proceeding, the chapter attempted to reach a settlement resolving all pending claims in the consolidated litigation. As a result, Mr. Marshall, the judge for the mediation, counsel for the chapter, and some of the clients thought settlement had been reached. However, no written settlement agreement was signed by any of the clients, no written stipulation was executed, and all clients confirmed to Mr. Marshall that they had not agreed to a settlement. Mr. Marshall informed each of the clients that they would have to pay him an additional $15,000 each for his continued representation. Clients B and C refused to pay, arguing that their agreement was for a flat fee that they had already paid. By letter dated June 17, 2002, Mr. Marshall attempted to get Clients B and C to settle with the chapter, enclosing the release documents for signature and writing: “The Court has directed [Clients B and C to] sign the release and settlement agreement and the Chapter to do the same in order to consummate this matter.” This statement was not true. Clients B and C refused to sign the release and each wrote to Mr. Marshall stating their objections. Mr. Marshall responded by letter, dated July 31, 2002, that it was his “understanding that you each have settled your case” and stating that their claims had been dismissed and would not be heard at trial. However, the claims had not been dismissed as of that date.
In August 2002, the chapter filed a motion to compel Clients B and C to execute a settlement agreement with them. Mr. Marshall did not oppose the motion, although he had opposed a similar motion filed against those clients who had agreed to pay additional fees. There is evidence Mr. Marshall had sent the chapter’s counsel a copy of his July 31, 2002, letter to his clients. The chapter’s counsel testified that Mr. Marshall recommended that the chapter should bring the Motion to Compel Settlement. Client B wrote to the court attempting to oppose the motion pro se. Mr. Marshall wrote Client C in January 2003, inquiring whether she was still interested in pursuing claims and writing that, in order to proceed to trial, Client C would need to forward a check to him in the amount of $15,000 by January 23, 2003.
In June 2002, Mr. Marshall also began representing another former member of the chapter (Client D) in the lawsuit. Client D was paying Mr. Marshall on an hourly basis. Client D initially paid Mr. Marshall $1,000 on June 13, 2002. Mr. Marshall did not deposit any portion of the $1,000 into his client trust account. Over the next few months, Mr. Marshall billed Client D at an hourly rate of $175 per hour. Client D paid all of the invoices in full. In January 2003, Mr. Marshall met with Client D and agreed to complete her representation for a flat fee of an additional $5,000. He also agreed to prepare an amended fee agreement, which he never prepared. On January 27, 2003, Client D sent a $5,000 cashier’s check to Mr. Marshall’s office along with a handwritten note indicating it was for completing her case per their agreement.
In March 2003, Mr. Marshall represented Clients A and D in the lawsuit against the chapter. He did not represent Clients B and C, who still refused to pay the additional fees. The jury awarded $3,500 each to Clients A and D. Although Mr. Marshall agreed to represent Client D for the $5,000 flat fee, he sent her an invoice dated April 1, 2003, charging her $21,787.50 for professional legal services between March 10, 2003, and March 29, 2003. Through a different attorney, Client D challenged the invoice. Mr. Marshall filed an attorney’s lien for $21,787.50 and then filed a lawsuit against her. Mr. Marshall dropped the lawsuit after Client D filed a grievance against Mr. Marshall. At the hearing against him, Mr. Marshall claimed his demand to clients for additional payments was for costs. However, his costs after January 21, 2003, through the completion of trial totaled $53.92.
Mr. Marshall’s conduct violated former 1.2(a), requiring a lawyer to abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and to consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued; former RPC 1.5(a), requiring a lawyer’s fee to be reasonable; former RPC 1.7(b), prohibiting a lawyer from representing a client if the representation will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a third person, or the lawyer’s own interests, unless (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client, and (2) each client consents in writing after consultation and a full disclosure of the material facts; former 1.14(a), requiring that all funds of a client paid to a lawyer be deposited into an identifiable interest-bearing trust account and that no funds belonging to the lawyer be deposited therein; former RPC 1.14(b)(3), requiring a lawyer to maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate accounts to his or her client regarding them; former RPC 8.4(a), prohibiting a lawyer from violating or attempting to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct; former RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; former RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; and former RPC 8.4(l), prohibiting a lawyer from violating a duty or sanction imposed by or under the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct in connection with a disciplinary matter.
Christine Gray and Scott G. Busby represented the Bar Association at hearing. Scott G. Busby represented the Bar Association on appeal. Kurt M. Bulmer represented Mr. Marshall at hearing. Mr. Marshall represented himself on appeal. James M. Danielson was the hearing officer.
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