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Christopher P. Raymond (WSBA No. 25131, admitted 1995), of Everett, was disbarred, effective January 15, 2009, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following approval of a stipulation. Mr. Raymond affirmatively admitted that the WSBA could prove by a clear preponderance of the evidence sufficient violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct supporting disbarment, but did not affirmatively admit all the facts and misconduct herein. This discipline is based on his conduct in two matters involving failure to act diligently and to reasonably expedite litigation, failure to communicate, trust-fund irregularities, conduct involving dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, and violations of duties during a disciplinary investigation.
Matter No. 1: In 1999, Client A was involved in an automobile accident. Client A hired Lawyer D to represent him in a claim for uninsured motorist (UIM) coverage arising out of the accident. In June 2005, Client A hired Mr. Raymond to represent him in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. Lawyer D settled the UIM claim on behalf of Client A, who received his share of the settlement proceeds in August 2005. In September 2005, Mr. Raymond filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on Client A’s behalf and claimed an exemption for the UIM settlement proceeds. In October 2005, the bankruptcy trustee filed an objection to the claimed exemption. In November 2005, the trustee’s attorney filed a supplemental objection to the claimed exemption. On December 7, 2005, the trustee’s attorney sent an e-mail message to Mr. Raymond offering to settle the exemption dispute. Mr. Raymond replied on the same date that he was leaving for a vacation and would deal with the settlement proposal when he returned on December 19, 2005. Over the next six months, the trustee’s attorney sent at least two more e-mail messages to Mr. Raymond in an attempt to settle the exemption dispute. Mr. Raymond received those e-mail messages, but did not reply to them. On June 9, 2006, the trustee’s attorney sent an e-mail to Lawyer D explaining that he had tried to resolve the exemption dispute with Mr. Raymond, but that Mr. Raymond would not reply. Lawyer D passed on that information to Client A. For the next several weeks, Lawyer D and Client A left multiple telephone messages for Mr. Raymond, who did not reply. Finally, in late July 2006, Client A was able to speak with Mr. Raymond, who told him that he would contact Lawyer D and the trustee’s attorney and that he would take action to resolve the exemption dispute. Mr. Raymond did not contact Lawyer D or the trustee’s attorney, and he did not take action to resolve the exemption dispute. In October 2006, Lawyer D and the trustee’s attorney negotiated a settlement of the exemption dispute that was subsequently approved by the bankruptcy court. Lawyer D, who is not a bankruptcy lawyer, negotiated the settlement because neither he, nor the client, nor the trustee’s attorney could elicit any action from Mr. Raymond.
Client A filed a grievance against Mr. Raymond. On November 22, 2006, disciplinary counsel sent a copy of the grievance to Mr. Raymond and requested a written response by December 6, 2006, which Mr. Raymond failed to do. On December 28, 2006, disciplinary counsel sent Mr. Raymond a notice by certified mail informing him that he would be subject to discipline and liable for the costs of a deposition if he failed to provide a written response to the grievance by January 10, 2007. On January 10, 2007, Mr. Raymond sent two letters to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. One letter, dated January 10, 2007, stated: “Contained with this letter is the response originally prepared to this grievance in December, 2006.” The other letter, dated December 4, 2006, was Mr. Raymond’s response to the grievance. Forensic analysis revealed that both letters were created on January 9, 2007, and modified on January 10, 2007. In the response, Mr. Raymond stated that no action was taken in Client A’s bankruptcy case for several months because the bankruptcy trustee was too busy. Mr. Raymond also stated that, in the summer of 2006, he requested more information about the UIM settlement from Lawyer D, but Lawyer D did not reply and that Mr. Raymond sent Lawyer D a letter in September 2006 “outlining the options” and suggesting “alternative strategies for resolution.” At disciplinary counsel’s request, Mr. Raymond provided a copy of his client file, which included a letter dated September 6, 2006, addressed to Lawyer D. Mr. Raymond knew he had never sent that letter or any other letter to Lawyer D. In the letter dated September 6, 2006, Mr. Raymond stated, “To date, our efforts to reach each other by phone have not been successful ...” and that he and Client A had agreed on “a strategy of waiting out the trustee.” Mr. Raymond’s deposition was taken, during which he testified under penalty of perjury that he created the letter dated December 4, 2006, on or before December 4, 2006, which he thought he had sent to the Association at that time, and that he created the letter dated September 6, 2006, on or before September 6, 2006, which he sent the letter to Lawyer D at that time. Mr. Raymond did not admit to the conduct described in Matter No. 1, that the statements were false and misleading, or that he knew them to be false and misleading, but did admit that there was a substantial likelihood the Association would be able to prove the allegations by a clear preponderance of the evidence.
Matter No. 2: In December 2004, Mr. Raymond filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on behalf of Client B. At that time, a mortgage corporation (Mortgage, Inc.) held a security interest in real property that Client B owned. The filing of the bankruptcy petition automatically stayed any action by Mortgage, Inc. to foreclose on the property. Between January and July 2006, Client B fell behind in her monthly mortgage payments to Mortgage, Inc. On July 18, 2006, Lawyer C filed a Motion for Relief from Stay on behalf of Mortgage, Inc., requesting that Mortgage, Inc. be allowed to foreclose on Client B’s property. A hearing on the motion was scheduled for August 23, 2006. When Client B received a copy of the motion, she telephoned Mr. Raymond and asked for his advice. Mr. Raymond told her to gather up enough money to become current with her mortgage payments. In July and August 2006, Client B brought Mr. Raymond three cashier’s checks totaling $1,984, payable to Lawyer C’s firm. Mr. Raymond told Client B that he would deliver the checks to Lawyer C’s firm. Instead, Mr. Raymond endorsed the checks and deposited them into his trust account. Mr. Raymond failed to inform Client B that he did not deliver the funds to Lawyer C’s firm.
On August 9, 2006, Mr. Raymond told Lawyer C that he would agree to a stipulated order continuing the stay on the condition that Client B pay the full amount owed, including late charges, attorney fees, and costs. Lawyer C sent Mr. Raymond a Stipulated Order Conditioning Stay (stipulated order) that would require Client B to pay $2,237.76 by August 31, 2006. The August 23, 2006, hearing was stricken. Mr. Raymond signed the stipulated order and, on August 31, 2006, filed it. Mr. Raymond failed to inform Client B about the stipulated order or the requirement that she pay $2,237.76 by August 31, 2006.
On October 12, 2006, Lawyer C’s paralegal sent a letter of default to Mr. Raymond and Client B. The amount due included the $1,984 that Mr. Raymond was to have delivered Lawyer C’s firm. Based on Mr. Raymond’s representation, Client B believed that Mr. Raymond had delivered the three checks totaling $1,984 to Lawyer C’s law firm. She requested information concerning the checks from Mr. Raymond, but he did not return her calls. She then contacted her bank and learned that the three checks had been negotiated. On October 29, 2006, Client B wrote a letter to Lawyer C’s firm stating her belief that most of the amount due had already been delivered by Mr. Raymond. She further stated that she would deliver the letter and the remaining funds to Mr. Raymond on October 31, 2006. On October 31, 2006, Client B brought Mr. Raymond the letter along with three new cashier’s checks totaling $419.82 payable to Mortgage, Inc. and to Lawyer C’s firm. Mr. Raymond told Client B that he would deliver the letter and the three checks to Lawyer C’s firm. He did not inform her that he had never delivered the three checks totaling $1,984 that she had brought to him in August 2006. By October 31, 2006, Mortgage, Inc. had not received any of the $2,237.76 that was due on August 31, 2006, under the terms of the stipulated order, and Lawyer C filed a Certificate of Noncompliance and Notice of Termination of Stay.
On November 1, 2006, an Order Terminating Stay was entered. Mortgage, Inc. sent Client B a notice of default, informing her of its intent to accelerate her loan and foreclose on her property unless the entire unpaid balance, along with an additional $364.68 in late charges and $424 in delinquency-related expenses, was paid by December 3, 2006. After she received the notice of default, Client B requested information from Mr. Raymond, but he did not return her calls. Client B then contacted her bank and learned that the checks she had given to Mr. Raymond in August 2006 had been deposited at his bank, that the checks she had given to Mr. Raymond in October 2006 had never been negotiated, and that none of the funds had been delivered to Lawyer C’s firm.
On November 27, 2006, Client B was finally able to speak with Mr. Raymond, who told her for the first time that the $1,984 she had brought to him in August 2006 was in his trust account. Mr. Raymond also told her that the checks she had brought to him on October 31, 2006, had been picked up by his courier service for delivery to Lawyer C’s firm, and he would verify that his courier service had delivered them. Mr. Raymond knew those statements were false and misleading. He gave Client B a money order in the amount to $1,984 drawn on his trust account. On November 28, 2007, Client B asked Mr. Raymond whether he had verified that his courier service had delivered the checks to Lawyer C’s firm. Mr. Raymond told Client B that he would refund the $364.68 in late charges that had been assessed against her. Mr. Raymond also stated that he could get the $364.68 from his courier service due to its failure to deliver the checks on time. Mr. Raymond knew that statement was false and misleading. He wrote a check to Client B in the amount of $364.68. The check was drawn on his trust account. At that time, Client B had no funds in Mr. Raymond’s lawyer trust account, since he had just refunded the $1,984 he had deposited in August 2006. Mr. Raymond had retained at least $364.68 of his own funds in his lawyer trust account together with his clients’ funds.
Mr. Raymond’s conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; former RPC 1.4(a), requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; RPC 1.15A(c), requiring a lawyer to hold property of clients and third persons separate from the lawyer’s own property; RPC 1.15A(h)(1), prohibiting funds belonging to a lawyer to be deposited or retained in a trust account, except funds to pay bank charges, funds belonging in part to a client or third person and in part or potentially to the lawyer, and funds necessary to restore appropriate balances; RPC 1.15(h)(8), prohibiting the disbursements on behalf of a client or third person from exceeding the funds of that person on deposit; RPC 3.2, requiring a lawyer to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client; RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; and RPC 8.4(l), prohibiting a lawyer from violating a duty or sanction imposed by or under the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct in connection with a disciplinary matter (here ELC 5.3(e) and ELC 5.5(c)).
Scott G. Busby represented the Bar Association. Leland G. Ripley represented Mr. Raymond. Joseph Nappi Jr. was the hearing officer. |