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Stephen D. Cramer (WSBA No. 9085, admitted 1979), of Federal Way, was suspended for eight months and received a reprimand, effective December 11, 2008, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following an appeal. This discipline is based on conduct involving trust-account irregularities, misrepresentations, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, and violations of the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct. Stephen D. Cramer is to be distinguished from Steven A. Kraemer of Portland, Oregon.
In May 2001, client G hired Mr. Cramer to defend him against a lawsuit. Client G made a $1,000 payment to Mr. Cramer on June 1, 2001, which Mr. Cramer deposited into his business account. Mr. Cramer gave client G a form agreement containing a provision that the initial funds paid were nonrefundable. Client G never signed nor returned the fee agreement to Mr. Cramer. There was, therefore, no agreement that the initial $1,000 payment would be nonrefundable. Client G’s case was set for trial on April 15, 2002. Within a week before the trial was scheduled to commence, Mr. Cramer told client G that he would withdraw as counsel unless he was paid $2,500 by April 12, 2002. Client G made a payment of $1,500 on April 9, 2002, and a second payment of $1,000 three days later on April 12, 2002. Both payments were deposited into Mr. Cramer’s business account. Mr. Cramer knew on April 12, 2002, that client G’s case would not go to trial on April 15. Testimony at trial showed that Mr. Cramer did not earn the $2,500 advance fees until November 2002. Though Mr. Cramer had not earned the $2,500, and had knowledge that the trial would not commence on April 15, Mr. Cramer deposited the funds into his business account instead of trust account.
During this time, Mr. Cramer was experiencing financial difficulties, as evidenced by a number of overdrafts in his business account. He also owed back employment taxes and had a payment agreement with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The business account was overdrawn more than once during the month of April 2002. There would not have been sufficient funds in Mr. Cramer’s business account to clear the April IRS check if the client’s funds had been deposited correctly in the trust account. Additionally, Mr. Cramer “needed time” to pay the settlement of another grievance filed against him.
Client G and his wife filed a complaint with the Bar Association against Mr. Cramer in February 2004. The complaint alleged, among other things, that Mr. Cramer misused client G’s funds and never discussed a fee agreement. The Bar Association requested that Mr. Cramer provide “billing and trust records (including canceled checks, ledger cards, disbursal statement, and monthly billings) for [client G].” In January 2004, prior to client G’s complaint, Mr. Cramer’s office was burglarized. The burglary resulted in the loss of a majority of his financial records. Accordingly, Mr. Cramer had a difficult time locating relevant documents to give to the Bar Association. However, he was able to produce a bank statement for his trust account that showed a $2,500 deposit on April 16, 2002. Mr. Cramer asserted to the Bar Association that the deposit consisted of funds received from client G. Mr. Cramer should have known that the deposit in the trust account was not client G’s funds, which Mr. Cramer had paid into his business account. Mr. Cramer knew from his billing statement that client G’s funds “were paid” on April 12, 2002, and not on April 16, 2002.
Mr. Cramer’s conduct violated former RPC 1.14(a), requiring that all funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm, including advances for costs and expenses, be deposited in one or more identifiable interest-bearing trust accounts maintained as set forth in the rules, and no funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm be deposited therein; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; and RPC 8.4(l), prohibiting a lawyer from violating a duty or sanction imposed by or under the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct (here, ELC 5.3(e)) in connection with a disciplinary matter.
Leslie C. Allen and M. Craig Bray represented the Bar Association. Leland G. Ripley represented Mr. Cramer. Edward L. Dunkerly was the hearing officer. |