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Charles S. Ferguson (WSBA No. 18024, admitted 1988), of Seattle, was suspended for one year, effective November 12, 2008, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a default hearing. This discipline was based on conduct involving failure to act diligently, failure to communicate, failure to expedite litigation, trust-account irregularities, and failure to withdraw from representation when a condition impaired his ability to represent the client.
On May 13, 2005, Mr. Ferguson entered a notice of appearance on behalf of his clients, who were named as defendants in a Lincoln County Superior Court matter. The clients paid Mr. Ferguson an advance fee of $3,000 to represent them. Mr. Ferguson deposited the funds into his business account, and then sent billing statements to the clients as the funds were earned.
On June 5, 2005, the plaintiffs filed a motion for default. The plaintiffs had previously sent notice of the motion for default to Mr. Ferguson on June 3, 2005. Mr. Ferguson did not file an answer or respond to the motion for default. On June 21, 2005, an order of default was entered. On the same date, the court entered judgments in favor of the plaintiffs in the amounts of $309,867 and $261,808 plus costs. On June 24, 2005, Mr. Ferguson left a voicemail message for plaintiff’s counsel acknowledging that he owed him an answer and that there was a motion for default set, and indicating that he would provide the answer by Monday. Mr. Ferguson never provided an answer and did not tell his clients about the order of default.
In January 2006, the plaintiffs sent Mr. Ferguson post-judgment interrogatories. In February 2006, the plaintiffs filed a motion for an order requiring that Mr. Ferguson’s clients answer the interrogatories. The interrogatories pertained to execution of the default judgment. In March 2006, Mr. Ferguson answered the interrogatories. Every time the clients received any paperwork (approximately 11 times), they faxed the documents to Mr. Ferguson. Each time the clients contacted Mr. Ferguson, he would assure the clients that he was “on top” of everything and not to worry. This representation was false.
In January 2007, Mr. Ferguson filed a motion to stay execution of the sale of his clients’ property pending the filing of a motion to overturn the default. The court denied Mr. Ferguson’s motion. The clients’ property was sold by the sheriff as a foreclosure, in partial satisfaction of the judgments. Mr. Ferguson states that he had been ill, which caused his failure to file an answer or otherwise protect his clients’ property.
Mr. Ferguson’s conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; RPC 3.2, requiring a lawyer to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client; RPC 1.14(a), requiring all funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm be deposited in one or more identifiable interest-bearing trust accounts and no funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm be deposited therein; and RPC 1.15(a)(2), prohibiting a lawyer from representing a client or, where representation has already commenced, requiring a lawyer to withdraw from representation of a client if the lawyer’s physical or mental condition materially impairs his ability to represent the client.
Sachia Stonefeld Powell represented the Bar Association. Mr. Ferguson represented himself. Deirdre P. Glynn Levin was the hearing officer. |